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Japan's reevaluation of its security position and the role it wishes to play in 
regional and international matters has been influenced by the reemergence of China and 
continue to affect Japan as it moves to its newly described role. Japan's ongoing 
modernization of its forces, which are directed under its National Defense Program 
Outline and Midterm Defense Program, do not, however, seem to be in reaction to any 
overt perception of a Chinese threat or Chinese influence. These programs reflect Japan's 
decision to take a "balanced approach" to security, an approach based on the United 
States-Japan security arrangements, supported by a self-reliant defense force and in 
conjunction with regional and international approaches to security. 
The Japanese, with their balanced approach to security, are carefully preparing for 
the 21st Century. By addressing security from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and 
international perspectives, Japan is putting itself on a more even keel. It is no longer 
relying exclusively on the United States-Japan security arrangements nor is it waiting for 
the United States to lead the way in its foreign policy. Th~ "China factor," in its small 
way, has enabled Japan to better prepare itself to deal with the United States, its 
neighbors, as well as the rest of the world, as it prepares for the 21st Century. Areas of 
tension remain, however, that could stress, strain or break its security structure. Such an 
event could cause Japan to reassess the system it has chosen. What is clear, however, is 
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This thesis examines the "China factor" in Japan's modernization for the 21st 
Century of its security structure and military. More specifically, it looks at Japan's 
reaction to the reemergence of China as a powerful player in East Asia security affairs. 
This reaction has led to a reevaluation of its security position and the role it wishes to 
play in regional and international matters. It has required a reevaluation of the security 
environment in East Asia, the security arrangements based on the United States-Japan 
security relations and a thorough review of the missions, doctrine, training, manning and 
equipment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Despite the dramatic changes that have 
occurred in the last seven to ten years, Japan has taken an approach which has been 
incremental and has taken action only after extensive planning. 
I begin with a review of the relationship between Japan and China, in which a 
number of characteristic trends are identified and examined. The Sino-Japanese 
relationship has struggled through a history of aggression, animosity and misperceptions 
that continue to color their dealing with one another today. Some of the emblematic 
factors in this relationship, such as nationalism, racism, and the fear of a "new Japanese 
militarism," can be traced from these historical relations and continue to influence their 
modernization efforts. Despite the growing "friendship," economic aid and increasing 
trade between the two countries, the negative images and animosity lingers on and 
continue to have an important impact on the way in which these tWo countries interact. 
Japan clearly sees China as a growing competitor in the East Asian security arena 
and one that must be watched. In its annual (1996) white paper on defense, Japan for the 
XX1 
first time has identified China as a country which needs to be given more attention by its 
defense establishment. A brief examination of the important factors behind China's 
military modernization provides a background and the basis from which to measure the 
degree to which Japan is responding in its modernizations to China. 
Japan Self-Defense Force's modernization programs, as outlined in the 1995 
revision of the National Defense Program Outline, the Mid-Term Defense Program 
(1996-2000), and the 1996 white paper on defense are examined. I then turn to look at 
the structure of the Self-Defense Forces and the impact of its current "drawdown," 
restructuring and new missions on the capabilities of each branch. This examination 
makes clear that the modernization of Japan's Self-Defense Force reflect Japan's 
appreciation of its new security environment and are closely associated with the security 
arrangements with the United States. The 'China Factor' has not had a great deal of 
direct influence on Japan's military modernization, but indirectly it has been a strong 
factor in the security approaches which Japan now embraces. 
Given that Japan's defense policies and arrangements are intricately linked to the 
United States, no analysis of Japan's modernization programs would be complete without 
an examination ofthe United States-Japan security relations. Specifically, I examine the 
changes or redirection of effort agreed announced in the United States-Japan Security 
Declaration in April 1996, the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa, and the ongoing revisions to the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. It is 
obvious that this security relationship has a great impact on Japan's actions and 
influences its response to China's reemergence and its growing strength in the region. 
xxii 
Japan's approach to security outlined in the reinvigorated U.S.-Japan security 
arrangements and in its modernization and restructuring of the Self-Defense Force do not 
signify a major change of direction or immediate fear of some new threat. What they do 
represent is a subtle shift of emphasis from its previous exclusive reliance on the security 
arrangements and self-reliant capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces, to a "balanced 
approach," which better emphasizes the importance of regional and international security 
structures as well. It is this triad of security approaches that will be used to take Japan 
into the 21st Century. 
In the end, the future prospects and the ultimate success of this security posture is 
dependent on Japan's ability to deal with the tensions and disputes in its immediate 
geostrategic environment. Tensions that could lead to future problems include the 
Korean peninsula, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes, such 
as the Senkaku Islands/East China Sea and Japan's concerns in the South China Sea. 
Depending on how tensions here are dealt with, the results could weaken or destroy the 
security environment and Japan's new security system. China plays a critical role in each 
area of tension and will only grow more important over time. By addressing security 
from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and international perspectives, Japan is putting its 
security relationship on a more even keel. The 'China factor,' in its small way, has 
enabled Japan to better prepare itself to deal with the United States, its neighbors, as well 




The history of relations between Japan and China are steeped in animosity, 
aggression, and misperceptions. Despite the troubled past they are moving steadily 
toward economic interdependence. This dichotomy of enmity and economic reciprocity 
make the examination of this relationship complex and intriguing. It is necessary to 
begin with an understanding of the history behind the relations. of these two countries and 
how they view each other to understand their importance to one another and the 
importance of stability and peaceful relations in the region. The significance of this 
relationship in East Asian security matters can not be understated. The United States, 
Russia, and other smaller powers in the region have roles to play, but it is on the relations 
between Japan and China that stability, prosperity and peace rest. Japanese Foreign 
Minister Yukihiko Ikeda clearly identified its importance to Japan; "Basically, bilateral 
relations with China are as important as those with the United States."l China's Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen has acknowledged publicly the importance of their relationship, 
their geographic, historic and economic closeness and believes improvements in the 
relationship are important, not only for the two countries, but also for the region.2 
Despite the stated importance of the relationship, a number of historical problems still 
continue to influence and challenge the relationship and therefore stability in the region. 
1 Ikeda quoted by Kajita Takehiko in "Ikeda: Ties With PRC 'As Important' As Those With U.S." 
Translated in FBIS-EAS-96-218. 8 Nov 1996. 
2 Press Conference for the APEC 1996 Philippines Meetings, available HTTP. http://infomofa.nttls.eo.jp/ 
infomofa!apecinfo/1996/j-china.html. 
1 
This thesis will examine ways m which Japan is modernizing its security 
arrangements and particularly its military in preparations for the 21 51 Century. Japan's 
modernization reflects many influences, both domestic and foreign, and there are 
numerous explanations as to why Japan has decided to move on the course that it has 
chosen. These range from various internal and external factors such as Japan's "Peace 
Constitution," the ideals of pacifism that the people of Japan have embraced following 
the disasters of World War II, and domestic political considerations. External factors 
such as the U.S. security arrangements with Japan, the growing regional and international 
structures for security, and the reemergence of China in regional and international affairs 
also have had a great deal of influence. No one factor alone can explain Japan's 
direction, but it is a question of combination and degree. This thesis will focus on an 
examination that will try to determine the extent to which the last factor, the reemergence 
of China, has influenced Japan's approach to security for the future. 
In this thesis I will look at Japan's reaction to the reemergence of China as a 
powerful player in East Asia security affairs, particularly as manifest in the 
modernization of the People's Liberation Army. I will answer the question, "To what 
degree has Japan's reevaluation of its security position has been influenced by the 
reemergence of China and how will this 'China factor' continue to affect Japan as it 
inches toward its newly described role?" This thesis will focus on the Japanese 
perspective and attempts to identify, describe and analyze the "China factor" in Japanese 
military modernization and security. 
2 
--------------------------------------~~-------
Before one can begin to examine the particulars of the current modernization of 
Japan's defense forces, it is important to review the history of the relationship between 
Japan and China. Therefore in Chapter II, I will examine this relationship, some of the 
emblematic factors in this relationship, and a brief examination of the important factors 
behind China's military modernization. The Sino-Japanese relationship, which dates 
back longer than most countries have been in existence, has struggled through a history of 
aggression, animosity and misperceptions that continue to color their dealing with one 
another today. Couple China's military modernization and its reemergence as a powerful 
player in East Asian security matters with the emblematic factors of this relationship, 
such as nationalism, racism, and the fear of a "new Japanese militarism," and it is clear 
that the two countries continue to have direct and significant influence on one another. 
To what degree these factors drive Japan's security concerns for the future are important. 
Despite the growing "friendship," increasing economic aid and flourishing trade between 
the two countries, the negative images and animosity linger on and could undercut their 
relations in the future. 
Japan clearly sees China as its most important competitor in the East Asian 
security arena and one that must be carefully observed. In its annual white paper on 
defense, Japan for the first time identified China as a country which needs to be given 
more attention by its defense establishment. "The situation must be watched with caution 
in terms of promotion of nuclear weapons and modernization of the navy and air forces, 
expansion of naval activity and heightened tension in the Taiwan Strait as seen in the 
3 
-------·---------------------------------------------: 
military drills near Taiwan."3 In order to determine the extent to which Japan is 
responding to China's modernization, I will briefly examine China's modernization of the 
PLA, looking specifically for the sources for change and reasons for modernization. 
With this as background and a basis for comparison, I will in Chapter III examine the 
Japan Defense Agency's modernization program, looking at the recently revised National 
Defense Program Outline, the Mid-Term Defense Program (1996-2000), and the 1996 
white paper on defense. From these broad program outlines I will then tum to examine 
the force itself; the structure of the Self-Defense Forces and the impact of its current 
"drawdown," restructuring and new missions on the capabilities of each branch. The idea 
is to derive the sources for change in Japan's modernization program and to evaluate the 
degree to which it reflects Japan's concerns with China. 
Given that the Japanese defense arrangements are intricately linked to the United 
States, no analysis of the Japanese modernization program would be complete without an 
examination of the United States-Japan security relations. In Chapter IV I will look at 
this and specifically the changes or redirection of effort agreed upon in the updating and 
signing of the United States-Japan Security Declaration in April 1996 by President 
Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, the recommendations of the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa, and revisions to the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. It 
seems apparent that this security relationship has a great impact on Japan's current 
3 Quote from Defense of Japan 1996, Response to a New Era, cited by Kajimoto Tetsushi in "Defense 
Report Voices China Concerns." Japan Times Weekly International Edition, Vol. 36, No. 30, July 29-
August 4, 1996. pp. 1, 6. 
4 
modernization programs and the direction of its future security arrangements, but it also 
not so obviously reflects the influences of China's reemergence and its growing strength 
in the region. 
Finally in Chapter V, I conclude with an examination of the future prospects for 
Japan's security arrangements. Tensions and disputes surround Japan, including the 
Korean peninsula, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes, such 
as the Senkaku Islands and the East/South China Seas. Any one of these hot spots, 
depending on how it is dealt with, could hurt or even destroy the new security 
environment and the system Japan is developing to deal with it. China plays a critical 
role in each one of these areas and will only grow more important over time. 
5 
6 
II. MODERN RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA 
The relationship that exists between Japan and China has grown and developed 
over more than 1500 years. It has continued through good times and bad, and remains 
today as one of the most important to both countries. In this chapter, I will review a 
number of the critical aspects of this relationship over the more recent past 150 years. 
From this review I will then examine some of the characteristic trends or patterns of this 
relationship, looking specifically for characteristics that will continue to impact it in the 
future. Finally, I will look at China's recent military modernization (1985 to present) 
focusing on the basis and sources for this modernization. The combination of these 
historical characteristics and trends for the future, with China's military modernization 
will give us a basis for examining the changes in Japan's security arrangements and 
military modernization. 
Japan and China have had relations stretching back well before 593 AD, though 
this date was the first time in which Japan and the Japanese empress Suiko received 
"official recognition" from China. It was a pivotal period in which Buddhism was to take 
firm root and Japanese culture was to be Sinified.l The principal method that the 
Chinese used and have used historically in their foreign relations has been suzerainty. 
This was an attempt at the conquest of mind and pocketbook through the exportation and 
imposition of Confucian values and the Chinese tributary system, a method that has been 
called "Imperial Confucianism" by the noted historian and China scholar John K. 
1 Taken from Trager, James. The People's Chronology. CD-ROM. Henry Holt and Company, Inc. 1994. 
7 
Fairbank.2 During this period Japan accepted this tributary status, gammg from it 
trading advantages as well as the opportunity to identify and gather techniques and ideas 
that could be assimilated. 3 
The Japanese, as they accepted into their society the Confucian ideals, have 
adapted, refined and "Japanized" them into a different form of Confucianism, one that 
had a more aggressive, imperialistic characteristic to it. In the modem history of these 
t\vo countries,4 control of the relationship has been decidedly one-sided, with Japan as 
the aggressive, dominant partner. The negative images and perceptions resultant from 
Japan's imperialistic actions of modem times have left a lasting impression on the 
Chinese. When it is in China's best interest- such as when there is a perceived injustice 
or when there is a problem between China and Japan -the negative image is brought out 
as a weapon to be used against Japan. Despite the outward appearance of normality in the 
current political and economic interaction and "friendship," these negative images built 
on historical animosity continue to color the foreign relations between the two in a 
pessimistic and negative way. 
An attempt even at a brief recapitulation of the entire history of these two 
countries' relations is well beyond the scope of this paper and therefore I will begin from 
the period when Japan "entered the modem world," from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 
2 John King Fairbank. China: A New History. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992) pp. 62-63. 
3 Christopher Howe, ed. China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
1996) p.4. 
4 For this work, I consider modern history to begin with the opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration 
1854-68 to the present. 
8 
onward. I will review chronologically the major events and conflicts between the two 
countries, 1868 - 1945, focusing on those aspects that have most directly affected the 
underlying relationship and created this sense of distrust, negative images and destructive 
perceptions. I will then look at the Cold War and Post-Cold War period, examining the 
growing relations and "friendship" between the two to see how the negative images and 
animosity from the previous period continue to pervade and flow like a dark undercurrent 
through the modem relationship, disrupting and undercutting it. 
A. FROM THE MEIJI RESTORATION TO THE NANKING MASSACRE 
Japan, as it observed the world just prior to its forced opening by Commodore 
Perry's Black Fleet in 1853, could see the impact of European colonial expansion, 
especially the military disasters and national humiliation the British had inflicted on 
China in 1839 - 1842 and again, with the French and British, in 1856-1858.5 When 
forced to open itself, Japan decided, after great turmoil, to turn to modernization and 
westernization and to seek an international status that would ensure what happened in 
China did not happen to them. The necessary principles were outlined in the Emperor's 
Charter Oath of 1868, which established deliberative assemblies, did away with the 
feudal class system, and most importantly, stated the desire to seek knowledge 
throughout the world to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule. 6 
5 Edwin 0. Reischauer. Japan: The Story of a Nation. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing. 1990) p. 94. 
6 Milton W. Meyer. Japan: A Concise History. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1993) p. 128. 
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As Japan became more confident in the region and began to assert itself, it did so 
by looking to China as an area into which it could expand. In 1874, Japan sent an 
expedition to Taiwan, to punish the aborigines on the east coast of the island for killing 
fifty-four of sixty-six shipwrecked Ryukyuans. The Ryukyu Islands were claimed by 
Japan and had been part of Satsuma Daimyo since 1604. However, they also paid tribute 
to China through their own ruler, who, moreover, had entered on his own into 
independent treaty relations :with Western representatives, including Perry. As a result of 
this incident, China was forced to pay an indemnity to Japan, which established in 
Western law that the Ryukyu Islands were legally part of Japan and not a tributary state 
of China. With the legal standing of the islands clarified (in Japan's eyes) they were fully 
incorporated into Japan and were made the prefecture of Okinawa in 1879.7 
1. Japan Knocks China Out of Korea 
In the early 19th Century, Japan also looked to Korea, the object of a number of 
past attacks and invasions, as an outlet for the energies of its disestablished samurai. It 
did so v.ith the economic motive of acquiring a captive market for Japanese consumer 
goods, the strategic consideration of preempting Russian encroachment into the Korean 
Peninsula, and the impulse of the Meiji leaders to spread Japan's "imperial glory" 
abroad. 8 In that China had long considered Korea to be a tributary state, rivalry for 
control of the peninsula began to grow. Japan, using a sort of "gunboat diplomacy" 
7 Reischauer, p. 127 and Meyer, pp. 159-161. 
8 Carter J. Eckert et al. Korea Old and New: A History. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. I 990) p. 
198. 
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reminiscent of Perry's opening of Japan, frightened Korea into signing the Treaty of 
Kanghwa in 1876. This was the first modern treaty for Korea, which was very similar to 
the unequal treaties Japan had been forced to sign upon its opening. This treaty asserted 
Korea's independence (and therefore denied Chinese suzerainty), opened trade ports to 
Japan and provided the Japanese in Korea with extraterritorial privileges. 
Reformists within Korea and the Korean King favored Japan, though conservative 
factions wanted China to assist it in throwing off Japanese control. When mob 
demonstrations got out of hand and the Korean palace was attacked, both countries sent 
troops to assist. In 1885, after a number of heated disputes, a Sino-Japanese convention 
was signed in which both countries pledged to remove their troops, and, if either side 
found it necessary to return troops to quell further disturbances, each agreed to notify the 
other first. In the following years sporadic uprisings continued to occur. In 1894 a large 
Korean peasant uprising occurred, giving both Japan and China reason to send in their 
troops. Both did so, however, without prior notification of the other. Though the 
Koreans suppressed the uprising before the foreign troops arrived, Japanese ships fired on 
Chinese gunboats and a British ship transporting Chinese troops to Korea. Soon 
thereafter, Japan formally declared war on China. 
2. Sino-Japanese War 
China's view of the Japanese and their ambitions in Korea did not seem to take 
into account the military modernization that the Japanese had undertaken or the 
importance of their drive into Korea. In fact, China did not consider Japan to be an 
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important nation or of any great concern for two reasons. First of all, throughout the 19th 
century, and for many centuries prior, the Chinese had always regarded only domestic 
events as truly important. 9 Thus the actions occurring in Korea were important to only a 
very small percentage of Chinese. Secondly, those who did concern themselves with the 
foreign relations of China, invariably thought of England, Russia, and France, and then 
only remotely of the United States. The next grouping of states were tributary states such 
as Korea, Annam, and the Ryukyus. Japan did not fit into either of these groups and 
because it did not have even an irregular tributary relationship with China, it did not rate 
even that ceremonial importance.! 0 
This disregard for Japan left the Chinese poorly prepared for war with the 
modernizing Japanese Army and Navy. The Japanese were able to quickly defeat the 
Chinese Navy, thoroughly rout the Chinese Army and conclude the war within nine 
months. During the war, Japan expelled all Chinese forces from Korea, attacked into and 
captured the Liaodong peninsula and the naval base of Lushun (Port Arthur), and 
occupied the naval base at Weihaiwei on the Shandong peninsula, thereby commanding 
the sea approaches to northern China. 
In the Treaty of Shimonoseki (signed April 17, 1895), China was forced to give 
up Korea as a tributary state, as well as suffer its first loss of territory in modem times 
9 There are complex arguments made as to what is 'Chinese' and what are 'domestic events.' For this 
argument, Chinese is defined as the governing Han Chinese and domestic events to be events occurring 
with the borders of China itself. For the sake of this argument, Manchuria lies within these borders. 
10 Samuel C. Chu. "China's Attitudes Toward Japan at the Time of the Sino-Japanese War" in Akira Iriye, 
ed., The Chinese and the Japanese. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980) p.77. 
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with Japan's annexation of Taiwan and the Pescadores islands as well as the Liaodong 
peninsula. Additionally, China was forced to pay an indemnity, open four new treaty 
ports, extend the most-favored-nation clause, and promise a new treaty of commerce. 
However, within six days of signing the treaty, intervention by France, Germany and 
Russia (the Triple Intervention) forced Japan to return the Liaodong peninsula and 
withdraw from the Chinese mainland. This experience constituted the most humiliating 
diplomatic defeat for Japan prior to World War II and left a lingering sense of distrust for 
these powers and a desire to make sure this type of event could not happen again.11 
3. Chinese Revolution 
The Chinese Revolution that broke out on October 10, 1911, was initially seen in 
Japan as beneficial because it was believed that by providing timely assistance to the old 
regime in China, the latter would be obligated to Japan. Additionally, the emergence of 
Yuan Shikai as the primary leader in China, at least initially, was considered to be in 
Japan's favor because he would provide stability in the country and was a personal friend 
of the Japanese minister in Peking and so would look favorably on relations with 
Japan.12 At the same time, Japan also felt constrained by the enormous popularity of the 
Chinese revolutionaries in Japan. Sun Yatsen, in order to prevent civil war and prevent 
foreign intervention, had agreed to unite China under Yuan. Sun also believed that Japan 
would help China and worked on bringing the relationship closer through economic ties. 
11 Meyer, p. 162. 
12 Marius B. Jansen. Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972. (Chicago: Rand McNally 
College Publishing Company. 1975) p. 203. 
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Sun looked to Japan as a friend and benefactor. "The patriots of your country have led 
and taught me, and I deem Japan my second fatherland and your statesmen my mentors. 
China awaits your saving help."l3 However, when Yuan Shikai began to revise the 
constitution at will and became a dictator, the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang began to 
oppose him. When Yuan suspended parliament and the provincial assemblies and forced 
the promulgation of a new constitution that made him President for life, widespread 
rebellions ensued which threatened the survival of the new republic. Japan felt that 
actions must be taken to stabilize the Chinese Republic or other powers might intervene. 
World War I provided Japan the opportunity and the excuse to settle the score 
against the Triple Intervention and continue its expansion into China. The British request 
for Japan to help destroy German men-of-war in Chinese waters under the terms of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance (1905) led to the Japanese decision to seize the Shantung port 
base of Tsingtao. Japan declared war on Germany, and in conjunction with the British, 
attacked and seized Tsingtao by November 1914. With this completed and despite 
British objections, Japan continued to strike German shipping and attacked and seized all 
the German holdings in the South Pacific, including the Marshalls, Marianas, Palau, the 
Carolines and Yap.14 
13 Sun Yatsen quoted in Jansen, p. 207. 
14 Jansen, pp. 197-198. 
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4. Twenty-One Demands 
The deterioration of central, political and administrative control in China and the 
pressures for resolve in dealing with China from the military, businessmen and from 
within the Japanese government, led Japan to issue of its infamous "Twenty-One 
Demands" to Yuan in 1915. Initially kept secret by both Japan and China, these demands 
included the transfer of all Imperial Germany's rights in China to Japan, the extension of 
the leases and privileges in south Manchuria and east Inner Mongolia, the confirmation of 
the control of the joint Sino-Japanese administration of the Hanyehp'ing Company, the 
extraction of China's promise not to lease any port or island along the coast to any other 
country (to protect China's territorial integrity), and finally the insistence on a group of 
terms that would have literally made China a Japanese protectorate.15 Though some of 
the demands. were rejected, China yielded to the Japanese insistence on keeping 
Shandong, southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia and later signed a secret deal 
to confirm these arrangements. 
5. May Fourth Movement 
The end of World War I and the Paris peace conference affirmed the Japanese 
claims on Shandong and brought the underhanded dealings of the Chinese government 
into public view. On May 4, 1919, Beijing University students swept through urban 
centers, holding demonstrations, boycotts, and issuing demands for the return of the 
15 Robert L. Worden, et al., Eds. China: A Country Study. (Washington D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office. 1988) p. 30-32. 
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Shandong concessions. The May Fourth Movement and the "political fervor, student 
activism, and iconoclastic and reformist intellectual currents" have been associated with a 
rekindling of the then-fading republican revolution and the growth of Chinese 
nationalism.16 Though directly tied to and a result of unscrupulous Japanese actions and 
secret treaties, the movement, according to noted Japan scholar Marius Jansen, was 
nationalistic and anti-imperialistic but was not anti-Western nor anti-Japanese. I? In my 
opinion, however, it seems that though there may be other important reasons and aspect 
of these demonstrations, it cannot be denied that this action began as a pattern of anti-
Japanese demonstrations that raised the issues far above the level at which it would have 
normally been treated. Jansen's own example was a statement by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "the 
most important figure among the intellectual leaders of the day," which criticized "selfish 
nationalism and patriotism" as shoddy Japanese products that should be boycotted 
together with other Japanese imports." As seen in his words, which seem to give as much 
credence to the argument that, Ch' en, as much as the students, at least was partially 
consumed by animosity towards the Japanese. 
China's progress under the Republic and the various warlord governments that 
controlled parts of China during this period reinforced the conviction of many Japanese 
that unless Japan stepped in, China would never develop a stable government and into a 
profitable trading partner. However Japan's power and influence in China had been 
16 Worden, p. 32. 
17 Jansen, p. 248. 
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severely undermined by the rising nationalism, resultant of the May Fourth Movement. 
For the most part, the Japanese were satisfied, for the time being, with their control of 
Shandong and their relationship with Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria. Sun Yatsen, in his 
attempts to unify China, had tried to get Japanese, European, especially British, and 
American support, but none were willing to provide what he wanted. The Japanese had 
little confidence in Sun's ability to organize the rest of China. Therefore the only 
remaining source of support and the one to which he turned was the Soviet Union.18 
China struggled to consolidate under the Guomindang with the support of the 
Soviets, who also supported the newly formed Chinese Communist Party, which 
eventually led to problems. By 1925, the Nationalists were strong enough to begin the 
long delayed Northern Expedition against the northern warlords. Within nine months, 
half of China was under the Nationalists' control. However, the Nationalists were 
becoming more divided between left-wing and right-wing factions, such that in early 
1927, the left-wing and the CCP moved to establish a separate Chinese government. The 
Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, continued the Northern Expedition while attempting 
to wipe out the Communists. By mid-1927 all of China was nominally under Nationalist 
control and the remaining Communists turned to the peasantry to survive. The 
Nationalists used this period to consolidate control and modernize China's government 
and infrastructure.19 
18 Jansen, pp. 285-287. 
19 Worden, pp. 32-34. 
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Japan was not satisfied with the direction in which China was moving, or with its 
current position in China. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, a number of Japanese writers 
discussed the requirements needed to modernize and develop China. One such argument, 
put forth by Naito Kenan, is often referred to for championing Japanese "imperialism." 
He believed that indigenous reforms were impossible in China and to facilitate its 
development, China must go through a phase where foreigners would be employed to 
manage the affairs of state in place of the Chinese.20 This type of thinking was behind 
the rise in the belief that Japan must intercede in China and was also a contributing factor 
in the Manchurian Incident. 
6. Manchurian Incident 
On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops blew up a section of the South 
Manchurian railroad north of Mukden, blaming "Chinese Communists" for the act. 
Japanese troops, using the "attack" as an excuse, seized the rest of the city, and continued 
to thrust into Manchuria, taking all of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. They established 
the independent state of Manchukuo in March 1932. The Manchurian incident had a 
number of consequences, mostly in Japan, but also in China. The loss of Manchuria 
reduced revenues of customs and tariffs by 15% for the Kuomintang government and the 
loss of its vast potential for industrial development and war industries were a serious 
blow to the economy. It was another incident that brought out anti-Japanese 
20 Tarn Yue-Him. "An Intellectual's Response to Western Intrusion: Naito Kanan's View of Republican 
China" in Akira lriye, ed., The Chinese and the Japanese. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980) 
pp. 161-183. 
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demonstrations and boycotts. in major cities around China. If there were any Chinese 
with illusions about Japanese designs on China, this event clarified and focused them. 
The Manchurian incident had a major impact on the Japanese populace. As a 
result of the successes of its military in Manchuria and the Japanese civilian's reaction to 
the international opprobrium, there was a marked rise in support for this type of action; a 
"war mentality" seemed to have overtaken the Japanese people.21 Additionally the 
incident left the military in a far stronger and more independent position that allowed it 
more flexibility and greater support in its actions, both in Manchuria and in Tokyo.22 
The loss of Manchuria had another, more important effect on China, in that it led 
to the refocusing of the Guomindang government from one focused on the anti-
Communist extermination campaigns to one that would allow for the unification of the 
competing governments against a foreign threat. In December 1935, students in Beijing 
took to the streets, with the demand of "stopping the civil war and uniting as one against 
foreign invaders."23 In December 1936, Nationalist forces that had been pushed out of 
Manchuria by the Japanese, mutinied in Xi'an, forcibly detained Chiang Kai-shek until he 
stopped the anti-Communist fight, and allowed Communist forces to fight in designated 
21 Some have argued this "war mentality" was something unique to the Japanese, developed by the 
militaristic movements of its last 200 years of cultural evolution. Hendrix expands on this statement, 
looking at these cultural influences on Japan's peace constitution. He argues that a combination of 
Japan's culture, internal domestic organizations and pressure from foreign interests caused it. Henry J. 
Hendrix II. "The Roots of Japanese Militarism." (MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. December, 
1994) pp. 63-92. 
22 Jansen, pp. 383-384. 
23 Wu Jingsheng. "Reassessing the War in China." Beijing Review. August 12, 1985. p. 13. 
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anti-Japanese front areas.24 These events had far-reaching consequences, both for the 
Nationalists and the Communists, in that they allowed the consolidation and refocusing 
of the government against the Japanese that would eventually lead to the virtual 
destruction of the Nationalists by the Japanese during the coming war. This left the field 
clear for the Communists. 
7. The China Incident (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) 
Japan continued to push into northern China in an attempt to protect its forces in 
Manchuria and to prepare itself for the expected war against the Soviet Union. After the 
Manchurian Incident, China had decided to retreat in the face of Japanese advances. 
With the unification between the Nationalists and the Communists, China was then able 
to stiffen its defenses against the Japanese. The situation by 193 7 was fairly calm, with 
little movement along the border and neither country really expecting a full-scale war. 
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 193 7, really was nothing more than a 
few shots fired, and in fact, it is still unclear which side did the actual firing.25 Some 
have argued that a conspiracy by the Japanese China Garrison Army caused the incident, 
trying to draw Japan into a war against China; the Beijing Review in its reassessment of 
the \Var on its 40th anniversary seem to support this position.26 Hata and others argue, 
24 Worden, pp. 36-37. 
25 Hata Ikuhiko. "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937" in James William Morley. ed. The China 
Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent 1933-1941. (New York: Columbia University 
Press. 1983) pp. 243-261. 
26 Wu, p. 14. 
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however, that no such conspiracy existed ~d the Japanese, from the staff officers of the 
Garrison Army to the Army General Staff in Tokyo, moderated their stance and 
attempted to bring the incident to a quick local settlement.27 However, the incident did 
quickly escalate, again bringing Japan into full-scale war against China. 
Japan issued demands calling for an official apology, withdrawal of Chinese 
troops, dismissal of the commander of the Chinese forces, and acceptance of these 
demands by 11 July. In its response, China stated it would accept the minimum 
conditions of preservation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference 
in its . government and the right to appoint whom it chose to, and the removal of any 
restrictions on where it positions its forces. In short, the government rejected the 
demands.28 Therefore Japan began to mobilize its forces and developed a "Strategy 
towards China" that would continue Japan's push into China. 
8. The Rape of Nanking 
Japan's war against China spread from northern China to Shanghai as the Chinese 
Supreme War Council in Nanking decided to engage in a full-scale war of resistance 
against the Japanese. Japan launched attacks into northern China, Inner Mongolia and 
most of China's major coastal cities. The brutal way in which the Japanese conducted the 
war led to charges of atrocities and other war crimes. One of the largest and most 
disturbing of these incidents was the sacking and rape of Nanking in December 1937. 
27 David Lu. "Introduction: Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937" in Morley. ed. The China Quagmire. p. 
233. 
28 Rata, pp. 238-260. 
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Nanking, which had become the capital in 1928, had seen its population soar to nearly I 
million in 193 7. From its capture on December 17, 193 7, over the next six weeks, an 
estimated 300,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed, and 20,000 women were 
raped.29 
The war had a devastating impact on Chinese-Japanese relations with Chinese 
estimates of the results ofthe eight-year struggle against Japanese militarism leaving 21.8 
million Chinese soldiers and civilians dead and wounded and much of the country's 
industry destroyed or damaged. Japan also suffered losses, with more than 1.33 million 
troops killed, wounded or captured in China.30 The Tokyo War Crimes trials in 1946-47 
did little to placate the Chinese sense of loss and abuse. Only 28 individuals actually 
were brought to face the International Tribunal and all that were alive by the end of the 
trial were found guilty. However, some of the areas of greatest contention, such as the 
Nanking Massacre, narcotic trafficking, the use of bacterial warfare and human scientific 
experimentation, were not even used as counts against them or thoroughly investigated. 31 
B. POSTWAR RELATIONS AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS 
With its defeat at the end of World War II and its subsequent reinvention under 
the direction of the United States, Japan was firmly on the capitalist-side of the growing 
29 New Jersey Hong Kong Network. Online. Available HITP. http://cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html. 12 
November 1996. 
30 Wu, p. 22. 
31 Robert Gray. "Japanese Imperialism and the Massacre at Nanjing". New Jersey Hong Kong Network. 
Online. Available HITP. http://cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj-trans.html. 13 November 1996. 
22 
bipolar power struggle. China, after its successful unification under the ideology of 
Communism, was clearly on the other side of the proverbial fence. This ensured the 
separation of Japan and China in almost every aspect for over twenty-five years. It did 
not mean, however, that China could not react to changes, actions and statements made 
by the Japanese. The Cold War may have separated and kept the two from direct official 
relations but the Chinese and the Japanese both continued to react to each other's actions 
and were affected by the years of hostility and the animosity that had developed since 
1868. 
One of the first moves that drew Chinese (PRC) criticism was the 1950 "re-
militarization" of Japan under the reinterpretation of Article IX of the new Japanese 
constitution. In response to the need for troops in Korea, the United States sent most of 
its forces stationed in Japan and urged Japan to reexamine its self-defense requirements to 
fill the hole. The Japanese government authorized the National Police Reserve of 75,000 
persons in 1950 to replace the U.S. occupation forces sent to Korea. These were then 
reorganized and expanded into National Safety Force in 1952, and finally into a Self-
Defense Force consisting of a land, sea and air branch under the control of the Japanese 
Defense Agency in 1954. 32 
During this same period, China also protested and refused to attend the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, which reestablished Japanese sovereignty. Japan, by its 
acquiescence to U.S. foreign policy, chose to forgo relations with the PRC and concluded 
32 Reischauer, p. 219-220. 
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a separate peace treaty with Taiwan. Japan was thoroughly tied to the U.S. policy of 
containment of communism and its non-recognition of the People's Republic of China. 
Economic embargoes against China imposed by the United States during the Korean War 
further prevented direct relations between the PRC and Japan. However, by 1953 an 
informal pact on trade between PRC and private groups in Japan was created and by 
1956, the PRC was Japan's number one East Asian trading partner accounting for nearly 
30% of Japan's total trade in the region.33 
1. The Normalization of Relations with the PRC 
Even with the non-governmental, private economic ties, the opening of relations 
between the United States and China produced what was called the "Nixon Shock" in 
Japan. Shocking, because it was done without prior notification or consultation with the 
Japanese, it was a move in the direction many Japanese wanted to go. It was difficult 
because the PRC would not stand for both Chinas to be recognized and Japan, with its 
strong economic trade with Taiwan and growing trade with the PRC, needed to react 
quickly. In September 1972 Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's official visit with Mao 
Zedong in Beijing reestablished diplomatic ties and transferred formal recognition from 
Taiwan to PRC.34 But the lingering economic policy with the Republic of China was 
criticized by the PRC. Additionally, the Japanese "model" of economic policies between 
the two Chinas set a precedent for the United States. 
33 Allen S. Whiting. China Eyes Japan. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1989) p. 39. 
34 Meyer, p. 260. 
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2. Amnesia of History 
The predicament that has continued to stir considerable controversy in Japan and 
reaction from China, much of Asia and the world, and has yet to be fully resolved by the 
Japanese is their inability to acknowledge in an manner acceptable to China their war 
responsibility and guilt and their refusal to accept blame for their actions taken during the 
war. Additionally, there are a number of examples of an "amnesia of history," most 
notably in the Japanese denial of the Nanking Massacre and other brutalities that occurred 
in Asia. This position has taken three broad forms; either complete denial that the event 
occurred, arguing or downplaying the numbers involved, or the distortion or rewriting the 
history of the event.35 Prior to 1970, there was no open denial by the Japanese 
regarding the Nanking Massacre. In fact, there were a number of Japanese articles and 
books such as Katsuichi Honda's series of articles, "The Journey to China," published in 
Asahi Shinbun (Nov. 1971), which were based on interviews with the survivors of the 
Massacre. However, the Nanking Massacre was never emphasized in the Japanese 
history textbooks. By the end of 1971, the historical accounts and confessions of the 
Nanking Massacre began to meet with .strong resistance from the right-wing 
conservatives in Japan. Two articles, one by Shichihei Yamamoto, "Reply to Katsuichi 
Honda," and another by Akira Suzuki, "The Phantom of The Nanking Massacre," were 
published in April 1972. A book by Massaki Tanaka, Fabrication of Nanking Massacre, 
35 This section on war guilt is mainly taken from the New Jersey Hong Kong Network. Online. Available 
HTIP. http://cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html. 12 November 1996. 
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claimed that not only had the Nanking Massacre not occurred, but that the Chinese 
Government was responsible for the occurrence of the Sino-Japanese War. 
The denial of the Nanking Massacre again was put forward in an interview in 
1990 by Shintaro Ishihara, a popular contemporary writer in Japan (co-author of "The 
Japan that Can Say No") and former member of the Diet, who declared that the Nanking 
Massacre never occurred, and that "it is a story made up by the Chinese, ... it is a lie." 
Later on November I 0, 1990, during a protest by Chinese Americans against the Japanese 
action in the Diaoyu Islands (called the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese), the Deputy 
Japanese Consul in Houston maintained that according to Japanese sources, "the Nanking 
Massacre never occurred."36 
Besides total denial, a slightly less outrageous line of Japanese thought insisted 
that the total number of casualties of the Nanking Massacre was exaggerated by the 
Chinese. This view is best elaborated in a book written by Hata Ikuhiko, Nanking 
Incident, in which it was argued that the number of victims in the Massacre was between 
38,000-42,000. It was also argued that the killing of surrendered or captured soldiers 
should not be considered as "massacre." Despite these revisions of history, this book is 
now the official history text on the issue by the Japan Ministry of Education. 
36 New Jersey Hong Kong Network. Online. Available HTTP. http:l/cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html. 12 
November 1996. 
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3. Japanese Textbook Issue 
The third form the Japanese have attempted to use to rewrite the history of the war 
is through the revision of school textbooks. In 1982 the Japanese Ministry of Education 
proposed the revision of history textbooks, changing Japanese "aggression" in China to 
"advancing in and out" of China during the Sino-Japanese War. The Nanking Massacre 
was described as a minor incident that occurred because the Japanese soldiers were too 
frustrated by the strong resistance from the Chinese Army. Although the substitution of 
the words finally was stopped because of the strong protest by the surrounding Asian 
countries and various Japanese educational groups, the rewriting of the Nanking 
Massacre remained. Moreover, the Ministry of Education has never admitted that the 
distortion of history is a mistake. The textbook issue caused a media uproar in China 
with an enormous number of articles and pictures on the massacre again published, that 
continued until the Japanese government promised to review the terminology being 
used.37 
The controversy over textbooks died down but was reignited in the 1986 with a 
new round of textbook reviews by Japan's Ministry of Education. Without the same 
"media circus" atmosphere associated with the 1982 incident, the 1986 revisions were 
protested by the Chinese government and the Ministry of Education, as prodded by the 
37 Whiting, pp. 46-51. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made some corrections to the drafts but stood by the final 
version without apology.38 
4. The Question of an Apology 
The example of the Nanking Massacre shows the difficulty the Japanese have had 
in adequately acknowledging their role in and remorse for World War II or the Pacific 
War. The sense of reservations or qualifications in any apology, from both the private 
and government realm, continues to dampen international acceptance and the ability to 
move beyond the issue of war guilt and responsibility. The "apology" adopted on the 50th 
anniversary of the war by the Japanese House of Representatives,39 continued this 
debate. Though this statement originally was meant as a formal apology, by the time it 
was passed in the lower House, it had been watered down, made practically neutral in 
content and ambiguous as to what it was saying.40 Additionally, almost half of the 
members of the House abstained from voting, either in opposition to it because they felt it 
went too far or not far enough.41 Norma Field, professor of Japanese literature at the 
38 Whiting, pp. 55-60. 
39 "Resolution to Renew the Detennination for Peace on the basis of Lessons Learned from History." June 
9, 1995. Available HTfP.- http://www.nmjc.org/jpri!projects/documentl.html. 
40 Fukatsu Masumi. "The Eclipse of Showa Taboos and the Apology Resolution" in Japan Quarterly. 
Asahi Shimbun. October-December 1995. pp. 419-425. 
41 Of 502 representatives, 251 voted, 230 in support of it. 14 who voted against it were from the Japanese 
Communist party, wanted a stronger statement of apology. Of the 241 abstaining members, 70 were 
from the ruling coalition parties; of which over 50 were from the LDP, who felt the resolution went too 
far, and 14 were from the JSP, who felt it didn't go far enough. 141 of the abstaining members were 
from the Shinshinto (New Frontier Party) of who at least some felt it didn't go far enough. These 
statistics were put together by John W. Dower, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Japan Addresses 
Its War Responsibility." Available at HTTP. http://www.nmjic.org/jpri!projects/dower.html. 
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University of Chicago, examines some of the problems associated with war guilt, 
responsibility and apologies in her book In the Realm of a Dying Emperor42 and outlines 
very clearly the requirements for such an apology in the article, "The Stakes of 
Apology."43 She addresses the enormous societal pressures felt by any Japanese who 
believe they must dissent or act contrary to social norms. The article lays out three 
requirements of an apology: the acknowledgment of wrongdoing, the expression of 
regret or pain, and the "reparation" or request for forgiveness - of which "taking 
responsibility" is a part. She highlights, however, that though Japan has attempted to 
apologize, it has done so with reservations and has not allowed the Showa Emperor to 
accept responsibility for the war.44 
5. Anti-Japanese Student Demonstrations 
Another example of negative Chinese reactions in excess of what could logically 
be expected from the action can be seen in the anti-Japanese student demonstrations that 
occurred in September 1985. Chinese students in Beijing and elsewhere, ostensibly to 
commemorate the 1931 Mukden Incident, were provoked by Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro's tribute to Japan's fallen soldiers. The students demonstrated against Japan's 
present role in China's economic modernization, using wall posters and shouting "Down 
with Japanese militarism!," "Down with Nakasone!" and "Down with the second 
42 Norma Field. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor. (New York: Vintage Books. 1993) pp. 3-4. 
43 Norma Field. "The Stakes of Apology" in Japan Quarterly. Asahi Shimbun. October-December 1995. 
pp. 405-418. 
44 Ibid. p. 418. 
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occupation." Whiting argues that on one hand, this was a legitimate way to protest 
against the current broader policies of the Communist regime under the guise of anti-
Japanese rhetoric. 45 In the context of demonstration, however, it was a reaction to the 
anniversary of not only the Mukden Incident, but of the whole Japanese aggression 
against China. It triggered calls for boycotts against Japanese goods, stoning of Japanese 
cars, and other demonstrations against Japan. 
One final example of how the subliminal fear and animosity China holds about 
Japan was seen in China's acceptance of the U.S.-Japanese Security Agreement as proper 
and necessary to provide stability and security in the region, and though not specifically 
stated in the declarations, to hold down Japanese aggression and not allow them to 
remilitarize. Another aspect of this can be seen in Beijing's critical comments when 
Tok--yo lifted the ceiling of one percent on its defense expenditures in 1987 (fixed at one 
percent since 1976), even though the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were clearly 
inadequate to defend themselves, much less project force in the region. This will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter III and IV. 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSIDP 
From this review of Japan-China relations, there seems to be three trends or 
characteristics that group these events together and which continue to play a role in 
modern Japan-China relationships: 
45 Whiting. p. 66-79. 
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1. A historically-based animosity which includes the· questions of war guilt and 
apology. 
2. Racism and the "unique" character of the Japanese. 
3. The rise of and fear that a "new" Japanese nationalism, most often viewed as 
inseparable from remilitarization, is emerging. 
These characteristics are closely related, intertwined and difficult to differentiate which 
force is the primary actor or which is the most important. Despite this, it is clear they are 
active in Japanese thought and influence Japanese-Chinese relations. 
Historical animosity is the most obvious and easily identified problem that 
continues to influence modem Japan-China relations. It is this deep seated distrust for the 
Japanese, based on their past actions reviewed above. It is also, however, the one trend 
that the Japanese could mitigate by their own actions. This again brings us back to the 
question of war guilt and apology. With their inability to apologize, to accept the blame 
and move on, the Japanese, allow this issue to continue to flare up and disrupt their 
relations. There are any number of reasons for this to continue. Takeo Doi, in her work 
The Anatomy of Dependence, argues that this inability to apologize is tied to "amae," a 
term that has special importance and emotion in Japanese, and is nurtured and flourishes 
there, but is excluded and suppressed in the West.46 Amae is a sense of dependence that 
allows the Japanese to readily identify with the group, encourages the lack of 
individualism and places the basis of guilt and shame as a response to betrayal of the 
group. This identifies cultural factors as one of the things ·that makes it difficult for the 
Japanese to apologize. 
46 Takeo Doi. Translated by John Bester, The Anatomy of Dependence, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 
Ltd. 1981) pp. 166-170. 
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This historical guilt and problems with apologizing has given China a weapon that 
is often used in its dealings with Japan. As noted by one Japanese scholar, "China has 
frequently raised the issue of Japan's historical guilt as a card to be played in bilateral 
negotiations, and will doubtless continue to do so."47 Journalists Richard Bernstein and 
Ross H. Munro argue China's use of historical guilt about these wartime atrocities are a 
major part of China's effort "to keep Japan in a state of... 'permanent strategic 
subordination,"' or more specifically: 
to prevent Japan from ever being a 'normal' nation, such as the United 
States or China itself, a nation that has the sovereign right to determine its 
security needs and to build the armed forces required to meet those 
needs.48 
This is evident in China's tendency to raise these issues at times one would normally 
expect only pleasantries, such as the historic first visitation of a Japanese emperor to 
China in October 1992. Despite the apology made by the emperor, China was quick to 
remind Japan of its actions during the war and its responsibility to fully acknowledge 
these actions. 
The second trend that entangles and influences Japanese actions in subtle ways is 
a sense of racism. In Japan it is not uncommon to hear of the many benefits of "racial 
homogeneity" as well as prejudicial comments about minorities from other Asian 
countries, the Ainu people of Hokkaido, or the presumed inherent weaknesses of those 
47 Shinkichi Eto. "China and Sino-Japanese Relations in the Coming Decades." Japan Review of 
International Affairs. Winter 1996. p. 33. · 
48 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro. The Coming Conflict With China. ((New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc. 1997) pp. 171-173. 
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nations in the world with mixed or "mongrelized" racial compositions.49 Ian Buruma 
further describes some examples, such as former Prime Minister Nakasone's speeches 
extolling the virtues of the "monoracial state," the notion of Japanese "uniqueness" 
shown in a neurologist who wrote a bestseller about the uniqueness of the Japanese brain, 
or the uniqueness of Japanese snow which makes European-made skis unsuitable for 
Japan. 50 Though not a politically correct way of talking, these types of examples show 
up frequently in Japan, particularly in connection with ultranationalism and the right-
wmg. 
The final trend, and one that often encompasses the other two, is the rise of the so-
called new Japanese nationalism. Unlike nationalism in their own countries, much of the 
world views Japanese nationalism as something bad, tied closely to a remilitarization of 
Japan. Bruce Stronach, Dean of the Graduate School of International Relations, 
International University of Japan in Niigata, describes this new nationalism as the 
combination of a way of describing the increasing nationalism of Japanese youth; 
unfettered by war guilt and ignorant of prewar militarism and the hardship at the end of 
the war, as well as a way of describing the rebirth of nationalism in the postwar world. 51 
Stronach goes further and defines four types of Japanese nationalism; sociocultural, self-
determined, state-oriented and state-centric. He believes all four currently are in place in 
49 Paul Gordon Lauren. Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination. 
Second Edition. (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1996) p. 312. 
50 Ian Buruma. "A New Japanese Nationalism." The New York Times Magazine. April12, 1987. p. 23. 
51 Bruce Stronach. Beyond The Rising Sun: Nationalism In Contemporary Japan. (Westport: Praeger. 
1995) p. xvi. 
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Japan, with the populace generally favoring the sociocultural, and the governmental 
elites, the state-centric. The other two are relegated to the sidelines as the fanatic fringe. 
He clearly believes popular sociocultural nationalism in Japan is the controlling force, 
limiting the state-centric government, and almost ignoring the remaining fringe 
elements. 52 The implication is that if this type of nationalism is truly in control of the 
people, as Stronach argues, the possibility of a return to the militaristic policies of the 
past seem much less likely. It also leaves China's criticisms about Japanese 
remilitarization without a popular basis. 
D. THE "CHINA THREAT" AND CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
The belief in Japan that the reemergence of China constitutes a threat is based on 
three changes within China: China's rapidly developing economy, the military 
modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the reorientation of its 
military strategy. Beyond a cursory look at China's overall economic development, I 
have studiously remained focused on the security issues related to China's reemergence 
and have avoided deviling too deeply into the economic aspects of Japan's relations. It is 
important to remember, however, that Japan (as does the United States among many 
others) considers economic relations to be a critical aspect of its comprehensive security. 
China also considers economic development to be an important aspect of its overall 
security and so I will examine how its focus on economic development has played an 
important role in China's military modernization. 
52 Stronach, p.J64. 
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1. Economic Development 
Economic development has been given the highest priority by China. From as 
early as the 197 5 announcement by Zhou Enlai of the "Four Modernizations," the PRC 
has "pursued a national strategy with economic construction at the core."53 The Four 
Modernizations in order of priority were agriculture, industry, science and technology, 
and defense. The development of modem aspects of these four areas would secure 
China's long-range security and prevent a repeat of China's recent history of suffering 
and humiliation at the hands of imperialists. 54 This focus on economic development 
progressed only slowly at first, but began to take off under the added emphasis it was 
given by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980's. Deng's "Open Door" policies, which recognized 
market forces and the profit motive while retaining certain aspects of a centrally planned 
economy, brought about the consolidation of China's foreign and economic policies. 
According to analyst Robert Taylor, Deng and his followers staked their political 
legitimacy not on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism but on their policies of national 
economic development and their ability to improve the living standards of the Chinese. 55 
Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow on the National Defense University's 
Institute for National Strategic Studies has argued before the House Committee on 
53 Kayahara Ilcuo. "1995: Thorough Analysis of the Chinese Military Power. Expert Analyzes Reality of 
the Chinese 'Menace."' Chuo Koron. Translated in FBIS-CHI-95-021. 1 February 1995. 
54 Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr. China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region through 2010. Center from 
Naval Analysis, CRM 95-226. 
55 Robert Taylor. The Sino-Japanese Axis: A New Force in Asia? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) 
pp. 50-61, and Greater China and Japan: Prospects For An Economic Partnership in East Asia. (New 
York: Routledge, 1996) pp. 5-6. 
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National Security that economic development has become one of the driving forces in 
China. "The Chinese have decided that the key to great power status lies in building a 
world class economy and a world class military force, or, as it is often expressed, in 
building a 'rich country and a strong army. "'56 This means that for China to be able to 
afford a strong army, it must first and foremost develop its economy. Effie Petrie, in her 
thesis on the modernization of the Chinese military, takes this point one step further: 
China's modernization program is intended primarily to promote 
economic development. China can only attain a position of status and 
respect in the international community by developing comprehensive 
national strength. In addition to military modernizations, it must evolve 
economically and politically. Today, a nation's power is largely 
determined by its economic strength and political connections. China 
must strive to continue its economic growth and cultivate relations with 
both its neighbors and the west. 57 
China's economy has undergone tremendous change and is growing at an 
impressive rate for a country of its size and relative backwardness. The key result of this 
economic growth (in terms of its impact on military modernization) is that China now has 
the financial strength to fund a moderate military modernization programs. Exactly how 
much this actually entails, however, is under serious debate. Table 1 outlines some of the 
published estimates of China's military expenditures, including its "official figures." 
Additionally, the table includes a RAND study extrapolation of a moderate nine percent 
grov,th rate to give an implied dollar estimate for 2007. According to China analyst 
56 Ronald N. Montaperto. "The People's Republic of China as an Ascending Power." Prepared Testimony 
Before the House Committee on National Security. Federal News Service. 20 March 1996. p. 2. 
57 Effie R. Petrie. "Capabilities and Intention: An Analysis of the Military Modernization of the PLA." 
(MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. December, 1996). p. 27. 
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Michael Swaine, ·China's official military budget has increased well over ten percent per 
annum since at least 1990 and will continue as such for the foreseeable future, so this 
nine percent growth rate seems reasonable. 58 
A critical piece missing from the official military budget figures is the amount 
that should be included from enterprises owed and run by the PLA. The estimated figures 
by the research organizations have tried to take these into account. Numerous problems 
exist in determining what should be included, hence the wide range in estimates. While it 
seems obvious that monies earned in PLA enterprises that are then use expressly to 
purchase equipment and supplies for the PLA, or to pay, feed or house its soldier should 
be included, many of these enterprises are now in the production of goods for civilian 
use. 59 Petrie argues that of the estimated 20,000 PLA run enterprises, 75% have been 
converted from military to civilian production, and that the commercial scope for exceeds 
the military purpose for these enterprises. 60 
58 The official Chinese defense budget increased over 15 percent in 1989 and 1990, nearly 15 percent in 
1991, over 14 percent in 1992 and 1993, and 23 percent in 1994. These increases are a sharp reverse of 
the prior decade's average negative growth rates. Michael D Swaine. "China" Reprinted from Strategic 
Appraisa/1996, Zalmay Khalilzad, ed. (Santa Monica: RAND. 1996) p. 204. 
59 The official budget of the PLA consists primarily of salaries and personnel expenses, some operating 
and maintenance expense such as fuel for training. Defense procurements and research and development 
funds, however are located in other budgets. Additional sources of revenue for the PLA include: PLA 
commercial activities and profits, PLA unit grown crops and livestock which decreases required funding, 
and profits from arms exports. United States General Accounting Office. "Report to Congressional 
Committees: National Security, Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region." 
GAO/NSIAD-95-84. June 1995. pp. 16-18. 
60 Petrie, p. 32. 
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RMB Dollar Defense Implied Dollar 
Source of Estimate Year of Estimate Estimate Share Estimate for 2007 
Estimate (billions) (billions) (percent) (billions) 
Official exchange rate 1994 52.0 6.0 1.5 20.0 
··o-m"Ciaffi:gti.re.s-;-IMF·:················· ····························· ·············5i:6·· ··········-:3"3·:7···· ··········T:s·········· ··················ITio····················· 
PPP-based 1994 
.. 6fficiaffi:gti·r:es·:·ui1.iver5iiY······ ····························· ............. 5·2~·6·· ···········-:;5~·9···· ···········i·x········· ··················B4·:o····················· 
ofPennsylvania, World PPP 1994 
··iiiieiTiatioil.ai""ii15i.itlii·e·c;r·········· ····························· ···········ro·o"."ii .. ·········4s-:c>·~···· ·········"3":3"·········· ·················fso:o:···················· 
Strategic Studies 1994 55.0 184.0 
·);.rrr;;;··c:<>·iiti:c;can-Ci·················· ................................................................................................................................. l.s4:o ................... . 
Disannament Agency 1990 55.0 
··s·to.cidioim .. iTii.eiTiatioil.iii ................................................... 25'8'."7 ............. 4'5'.'6 .............. 8:6' ........................... Eo-:6 ................... . 
Peach Research Institute '94 1993 
Lowest combination 1993- 52.0 6.0 1.5 20.0 
.. ~?.~.~.i.~~~.~~.~~D ...................................... ~.?..?.~ .................................. ························ ........................... ·················································· 
RAND estimate 38.0 125.0 
·'fi'iihest·c·c;Tiii)inaiioil··················· ......... 199'3:········ ··········25.8'.'7 .. ··········3·7·7:6 .. ··········s:6·········· ··············1)62':o .................... . 
(SIPRI!Penn World) 1994 
Source: Michael D. Swaine, "China" Strategic Appraisa/.61 
Table 1: Range of Estimates for Current Chinese Defense Spending 
Whatever the actual amount, the fact remains that China's relative economic 
prosperity has allowed it to take a vigorous approach to its military modernization 
programs. This does not mean, however, that China is trying to modernize overnight. 
According to reporter Jack Weible, a recent Pentagon study mandated by the 1997 U.S. 
Defense Authorization Act, states that China is looking long-term in its modernizations 
plans, "with the goal of becoming 'the leading economic and political power in East 
Asia' within the next 50 years." It goes on to say that: 
Chinese military modernization will continue to focus on three 
components: small, high-tech forces for use in regional contingencies; 
61 Michael D. Swaine. "China." in Khalilzad, Zalmay. ed. Strategic Appraisal 1996. (Santa Monica: 
RAJ\TD, 1996) pp. 205-206. 
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large low- and medium-tech forces for defending its homeland; and 
"modest" nuclear forces to act as a credible deterrent to other nuclear 
powers.62 
2. Military Modernization 
The military modernization of the PLA has been ongoing since the announcement 
of the "Four Modernizations" in 1975. Fourth in order of importance behind agriculture, 
industry, and science & technology, the modernization of China's defense forces 
progressed only moderately in the 1970's and did not receive much attention until the 
mid 1980's. The initial modernization of the_ PLA during this early period was simply 
aimed at upgrading the various weapon systems and did nothing to address doctrinal or 
structural problems. 
Two wars in the recent past have had a great effect on China's military 
modernizations effort- the Sino-Vietnam border war in 1979 and the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War between the United States' led coalition forces and Iraq. Both wars caused the PLA 
leadership to turn a critical eye to the organization, structure and the equipment of its 
forces as well as to the doctrine, strategy and tactics under which it planned to fight. 
The 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, although only sixteen days long, revealed a 
number of serious shortcomings in the PLA's· capabilities. As the largest military 
operation China had mounted since the Korean War over twenty-five years before, this 
war was expected to be a relatively simple exercise for the numerically superior Chinese 
62 Jack Weible. "Pentagon: China Takes Slow, Steady Approach to Modernization." Army Times. 5 May 
1997. p. 29. 
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forces. Combine China's overwhelming size advantage with the fact the Vietnam was 
forced to fight on two fronts (the Vietnamese were also fighting with Cambodian forces 
on its southwestern border) and it is understandable that China expected to be able to 
conduct its punitive attack and depart with an easy victory. The Vietnamese army, 
however, after decades of fighting the French and then the United States, was the most 
combat-experienced army in Asia. It also fielded a highly mobile force which was more 
technologically advanced than the Chinese forces. Although Chinese forces penetrated 
about fifty kilometers into Vietnam and eventually claimed victory, the Vietnamese 
forces were able to inflict heavy casualties on the PLA. The PLA's performance was 
marred by poor mobility, weak logistics, outdated weaponry. Additionally poor 
communications, an unclear chain-of-command, and the lack of a military rank structure 
confused the situation and affected the PLA's combat effectiveness.63 
As a result of the problems identified during the Sino-Vietnam war, numerous 
organizational and structural changes were made to the PLA, including the creation of the 
state Central Military Commission (CMC), civilianization of many PLA units, 
consolidation of China's military regions from eleven into seven, streamlining and 
reduction of superfluous PLA forces, formation of group armies and the enactment of a 
new Military Service Law in 1985. The end result of this streamlining and reduction in 
63 Worden, p. 552. 
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forces was that the overall size of the PLA was brought from nearly 4.5 million soldiers 
in the early 1980's down to a force of approximately 3.2 million in 1992.64 
The other action that has been of primary importance in giving impetus to and 
reenthusing purpose into China's military modernization efforts was the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War between the coalition forces lead by the United States against Iraq. Two 
aspects in particular were noted by outside observers and Chinese military official. First, 
there are many similarities between the Iraqis and the Chinese - from the same type and 
age of its equipment to the doctrine and tactics these forces fought under. The striking 
speed with which the war was executed and the immense destruction caused by the 
advanced weapons also shocked China. "The Gulf War demonstrated that Chinese 
equipment and military doctrine were obsolete for the conditions of modem warfare."65 
The second aspect that many Chinese military experts identified after this war was 
its limited nature. This was highlighted in the Gulf War, but was also seen in the Soviet 
fighting in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraqi conflict. Chinese military officials now believe 
that limited warfare of a high-tech nature will be the norm for future wars. 
According to China analyst David Shambaugh who had discussed this war with 
Chinese personnel at the Academy of Military Sciences and National Defense University 
in 1991, the Gulf War greatly shocked China and its concepts of how wars should be 
fought. He noted the Gulf War: 
64 Michael D. Swaine. The Military & Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs. 
(Santa Monica: Rand. 1992). p. 160. 
65 GAO report to Congressional Committees, p. 4. 
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had a jarring effect on the PLA. The military nature of Desert Storm and 
the swiftness of the allied victory stunned the Chinese high command. 
Before the war, they had been predicting that U.S. forces would become 
bogged dov·m in a ground war similar to the Soviets' experience in 
Afghanistan. Every element of the allied strategy and capabilities left the 
PLA aghast and hammered home as never before the backwardness of the 
PLA. The PLA was forced to confront the elements of modem warfare: 
precision-guided munitions; stealth technology; electronic counter-
measures; precision bombing of military targets with minimized collateral 
damage; airborne command and control systems; in-flight refueling; the 
minimum loss of attack aircraft and life; the use of satellites in anti-
ballistic missile defense; strategic targeting and intelligence gathering; 
early warning and surveillance; the use of command centers half a world 
away ... This was the PLA' s first exposure to a high-tech war and they 
were stunned. 66 
While the Sino-Vietnam border war had pushed the process of modernization .in 
the PLA, the Gulf War caused a thorough revision of doctrine, training and most 
importantly, changed the Chinese thinking on weapons and technology. As a result, 
China's modernization has been focused in four main areas: education and training, 
restructuring of the forces, research and development (R&D) and acquisition of new 
weapon systems. 
a. Education and Training 
Reforms in education and training emphasized improving the military 
skills and raising the education levels of officers and troops and conducting combined-
arms operations. A critical part of this was the professionalization of the officer corps 
and the development of a noncommissioned officer corps from those not selected for 
officer training. This process had begun with the establishment of the National Defense 
66 David Shambaugh. "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger? The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 19. No.2. 
Spring 1996. p. 19. 
42 
University in 1985. It also included a complete revision of the PLA's military training 
system, with increased combined arms training and emphasis on professional military 
education. 
b. Force Restructuring 
Restructuring of the PLA as discussed after the Sino-Vietnam border war 
has resulted in the reorganization of the PLA into seven military districts with group 
armies as the primary units. Unlike the field armies of the Sino-Vietnam war period, 
group armies are unified infantry, armor, artillery, air defense and support assets under 
one commander that fight as a combined-arms force. Combined-arms forces are better 
able to deal with changing situations, varied intensities of combat as well as support, 
rearm and maintain themselves due to their streamlined structure and unity of 
command. 67 In support of the new strategies discussed in the next section, the PLA also 
developed "fist" units suited for the limited duration and intensity, high-tech warfare of 
the type observed in the Persian Gulf War and expected in the future. These small, well-
trained combat forces are trained to fight with the advanced technology weapons that 
were proven effective in the Gulf War. As a trade off for the cost ofthese new high-tech 
weapons, further cuts in the PLA are planned that will remove another 500,000 soldiers, 
leaving an end-strength around 2.5 million. 68 
67 Worden, pp. 561-563. 
68 "China's New Look Army: The PLA Tested Higher Tech in the Straits War Games." Asiaweek. 12 
April1996, p. 30. 
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c. Research and Development Efforts 
The third area of focus is in research and development. Critical 
weaknesses have been noted in China's Command, Control, Communications and 
Intelligence (C3I) systems, electronic warfare, precision guided munitions and jet engine 
design. The GAO report on Chinese military modernization has noted that: 
China has been successful in using indigenously developed technologies in 
conjunction with foreign technologies in its space and nuclear program; 
however, despite technological assistance from both Russia and Israel, 
China has had trouble developing an indigenous fighter aircraft. 
Additionally, China's ability to absorb new technology has been 
questioned and may be a roadblock to the PLA' s modernization. 69 
Fiscally constrained, the PLA has chosen to focus on a selected number of key areas 
rather than concentrating on an all-round buildup. C3I, space-based systems, precision 
guided missile technology, high speed computers and electronic warfare systems are at 
the core of China's R&D efforts. Another aspect of the fiscal constraints, the units 
receiving the newest systems are the elite "fist" units, while the other units are slowly 
butt steadily receiving upgrades to their systems.70 
tL Advanced Systems Acquisitions 
The final area of modernization is that of the acquisition of advanced 
weapon systems. As noted above, the R&D for these systems has been limited to 
selected areas, which has meant that for a large part of its acquisitions, China has been 
forced to purchase these systems on the foreign market. While this is the quickest way to 
69 GAO report to Congressional Committees, p.26. 
70 Ji You. "High-Tech Shift for China's Military" Asian Defense Journal. September 1995. 
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upgrade the PLA, it requires funds that are not readily available and diverts funds from 
other projects. Therefore modernization has occurred not only through foreign purchases, 
but China has also attempted to reverse engineer selected high-tech systems as well as 
indigenously develop others.71 The end result however, is a modernization process that 
is progressing at a moderate pace. 
The acquisition of advanced systems has mainly been focused on the naval 
and air forces, while the ground forces have remained last in line in terms of both priority 
and modernization. According to China military analyst Michael Swaine, the purpose of 
these purchases has been to develop a rapid reaction and limited power projection 
capability. As Table 2: Recent and Planned Major Naval and Air Acquisitions 
demonstrates, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been the major point of 
effort. This has allowed the PLAN to add over 20 new principal surface combatants since 
the mid-80's. These ships are equipped with a significant missile capability, advanced 
radar and fire-control systems, antisubmarine · warfare (ASW) and electronic 
countermeasures. Additionally China has added over 100 mine warfare ships of various 
classes, six missile frigates, and nine Houxin-class missile craft since the 1980's and is 
developing new classes of resupply amphibious assault ships. Also persistent reports 
indicate a plan to construct or purchase one or two medium to large aircraft carriers. 
71 Petrie, p. 53. 
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Branch Type Class Recent Planned• 
Navy Destroyer Luhu I 3 
Destroyer Luda III 2 14 
Missile frigate Jiangwei 4 2 
Submarine Improved Ming 10 ? 
Submarine Modified Romeo I ? 
Submarine Song 0 ? 
Submarine Kilo 4 18b 
Mine warfare ships Various 100 -
Missile craft Houxin 9 ? 
SSBN Xi a I ? 
SSN Han - 1-5 
Aircraft carrier 40,000-50,000 tons - 1-2 
LST Yukan 5 ? 
Tank landing ship Yutin I ? 
Air force Fighter J-7 40/year -
Fighter J-8 12/year -




Bomber H-6 4/year 
Transpon IL-76 25 ? 
• These number indicate quantities of weapon systems under consideration or already detennined. Question marks indicate 
uncertainty about a planned quantity. · 
bAn unkno\lm quantity to be coproduced. 
c Includes about 300 to be coproduced. 
Source: Michael D. Swaine "China" Strategic Appraisa/1996, p. 211. 
Table 2: Recent and Planned Major Naval and Air Acquisitions 
In the field of submarines, China has decommissioned and removed from 
service over half the number of its conventional submarines, but is upgrading its Ming-
class submarines and developing a new diesel-electric one to replace the old Romeo and 
Ming-class. It has also recently purchased four sophisticated Kilo-class conventional 
submarines from Russia. In nuclear-powered submarines, China plans to supplement its 
current Han fleet and build an new Xia-class ballistic missile submarine with an 
improved missiles. 72 
72 Swaine, "China." Strategic Appraisal. pp. 205-211. 
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According to Swaine these acquisitions have greatly improved the 
operational range, firepower, and air defense capabilities of China's principal surface 
combatants, thereby improving its capability to conduct operations farther from shore and 
for longer periods. 73 While these improvements have been successful for the PLAN, the 
PLAAF' s attempts at developing and advanced indigenous fighter and combat aircraft 
industry have been largely unsuccessful. While the PLAAF maintains the world's largest 
collection of 1950's technology Soviet aircraft, its modernization efforts have been 
mainly advanced through purchases of both aircraft and technology from Russia. The 
purchase and delivery of 26 Su-27/Flanker long-range fighters and 25 IL-76 transports 
have had the greatest impact on improving the PLAAF' s ability to support operations 
further from mainland China and provide some sort of power projection.74 
As mentioned earlier, the PLA's ground arm has been last in priority of 
modernization. Modernization efforts have mainly been directed at upgrading its existing 
equipment, purchasing and reversing engineering T-72 main battle tanks from Russia, 
and developing, in conjunction with Pakistan, a state of the art main battle tank. 
Additionally the PLA has introduced two new armored personnel carriers and anti-tank 
guided missiles.75 R&D efforts have focused on further developing anti-tank and anti-
aircraft missiles, armor-piercing ammunitions, helicopters, and an assortment of new 
73 Ibid. p. 208. 
74 Gregory K. S. Man. "Modernizing the Chinese Military." in Debra E. Soled, ed. China: A Nation in 
Transition. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1995.) pp. 278-280. 
75 Petrie, pp. 54-55. 
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transportation vehicles. Purchases in the early 1990's of over 300 helicopters from the 
United States, Russia, France Australia, and Germany has also helped their modernization 
efforts.76 
3. Change in Strategic Orientation 
The final change in China that has increased the belief in Japan that a China threat 
exists and becoming a problem in the future, is the transformation of the PLA' s strategic 
orientation. China has followed Mao's concept of "People's War" from the early 1930's 
until the late 1970's. The objective of this type of warfare is to fight a long, protracted 
land war emphasizing maneuver and attrition of the enemy forces by not only the PLA, 
but the entire populace of China. Mao believed that China could defeat a technologically 
superior enemy by using its great continental territorial size to trade space for time, 
"luring the enemy in deep" and then defeating him through attrition in a series of decisive 
battles. 77 This doctrine has an avowed defensive orientation that was not overtly 
threatening to other countries, such as Japan. The Sino-Vietnam border war, however, 
caused China to begin to review this doctrine and revise it to better account for the 
increasingly technical nature of China's military. Wars were not going to necessarily 
fought on Chinese territory and the need to rationalize this type of conflict as 
"counterattacks in self-defense" seemed to mark the need for change. 78 
76 Man, pp. 276-277. 
77 Montaperto. Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security. p. 3. 
78 Man. p. 266. 
48 
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the doctrine of "People's War" was 
restated as "People's War under Modem Conditions" in 1985. This took into account the 
vagaries of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and more local, limited duration actions on 
the other. Chinese defense planners began to note that these limited wars had certain 
characteristics: generally short in duration, geographically localized and not tending to 
spread, employment of massive firepower, particularly air power and short-range 
missiles, all weapons (including chemical and tactical nuclear weapons) were viewed as 
fair game and ground forces, though still important, were no longer seen as the mainstay 
or key to victory. 79 
However, according to China analyst Gregory Man, "the PLA's evolving Local 
War doctrine will only supplement, not replace, China's current official military doctrine 
-People's War Under Modem Conditions- which is based on Mao Zedong Military 
Thought."80 He argues that China has not abandoned the basic premise that the 
participation of the whole populace and mobilization of all the country's resources for as 
long as it takes to defeat the enemy. However, success in this new "outwardly-looking 
military doctrine of local war, requires "the employment of sophisticated weapons and 
specially tailored, highly mobile forces to make rapid gains by achieving and early 
tactical advantage."81 Two tenets of this new doctrine are particularly important to 
79 This characterization of limited wars is from Shambaugh, "China's Military. " and further supported by 
Ronald N. Montaperto in his work, "China as a Military Power." Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
Strategic Forum. Number 56, December 1995. 
80 Man. pp. 262-267. 
81 Man. p. 265. 
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understanding the belief that it is a more threatening in nature. The first is the principle 
of "active defense," where the PLA will mount a series of aggressive preemptive 
operations for the very inception of the conflict which will destroy the enemy's ability to 
encroach upon Chinese territory. The second element is the idea of a "strategic 
boundary" which Montaperto believes is a source of potential tension between China and 
its neighbors. This concept pushes the physical boundary of China outward, requiring 
China to develop the capabilities to project military power beyond its borders. 82 
Despite this evolving military doctrine, analysts believe that it will be years before 
the PLA is able to fully match its doctrine with the modernization levels required. 
Ronald Montaperto argues that one of the reasons for this is that the PLA "lacks a 
strategic focus." Without determining the most likely sources of any future conflict, the 
doctrinal revisions are incomplete and sometimes nebulous.83 It is clear, however, that 
from the perspective of a neighboring country, China's doctrine has shifted from one that 
was purely defensive, inwardly-looking in direction to one that has a outwardly-looking, 
more aggressive nature. 
E. CONCLUSION 
After looking at many of the key events in the modern relations of Japan and 
China that have developed into negative images and perceptions of Japan, three trends or 
characteristics have been identified that continue to influence the relationship between 
82 Montaperto, "The People's Republic of China as an Ascending Power." p. 4. 
83 Montaperto, "China as a Military Power." 
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Japan and China. Despite these seemingly negative trends, there is an equal if not greater 
positive trend of economic interaction and social conduct. In fact, the level of interaction 
between Japan and China, in terms of trade and loans and interpersonal contacts, Japanese 
visiting China, is the highest among all other countries (excluding Greater China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan) with which China has relations. 84 The level of Japanese investment in 
China has increased from approximately $349 million in 1990 to over $2.5 billion in 
1994.85 The Japanese trade deficit with China in 1995 was almost $14 billion, with 
imports of almost $36 billion and exports of almost $22 billion.86 It seems to be the 
case, however, that the negative images of Japan that have developed in China as a result 
of the history of animosity and destructive actions of Japan, continue to arise and disrupt 
relations between the two countries. China continues to use these historical animosities 
and Japan's history of aggression as a whip to beat Japan with, whenever they feel 
threatened by Japanese actions. 
China's rapidly developing economy has been able to provide the fiscal resources 
to moderately support the military modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 
These modernizations are based on the Four Modernizations and reflect militarily the 
lessons learned from China's poor showing in the Sino-Vietnam border war and the 
performance of the allied forces in the Persian Gulf War. From these stimuli China has 
84 Whiting, p. 28. 
85 Japan External Trade Organization. "Changes in Japan's Direct Overseas Investments" Online. 
Available HTTP. http://www.jetro.go.jp!WHITEPAPER/INVEST96/t12.html. 15 September 1996. 
86 Japan External Trade Organization. "Japan Trade Balance with China." Online. Available HTTP. 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/FACTS/t_2.html. 15 September 1996. 
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evolved its guiding military doctrine and strategy from that of a "People's War" to a 
modem version oriented on "limited war." As Swaine has argued, "This shift is reflected 
in a broad-based defense doctrine comprising the central concepts of local war, active 
peripheral defense, and rapid power projection."87 It is for these reasons that the China 
threat is believed to be growing, and analysts in Japan can believe that perhaps a "new 
cold war" has begun.88 China's concentration on modernizing the PLAN seems 
particularly threatening to Japan. A move to develop a blue water navy, while arguable 
aimed at protecting China's territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea, is equally 
disturbing to the security of these sea lanes, through which the vast majority of its oil and 
natural resource imports must flow. The problems with these fears will be discussed in 
the final Chapter on prospects for the future. 
87 Swaine, "China." Strategic Appraisal. p. 202 
88 Comment by the President of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Nakajima Mineo as quoted in 
Kyono Mamiko, "Is China a Regional Threat, or a Challenge?" The Daily Yomiuri. 19 November 1995. 
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III. MODERNIZATION OF THE JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCES 
The defense of Japan and the strategic concepts behirid it have gone through great 
changes as a result of the end of the Cold War. These changes reflect the new 
environment associated with the decline of the former Soviet Union's influence in East 
Asian affairs, the new pressures resonating from the expectations resulting from the 
Persian Gulf War and coalition warfare, and the reemergence of China as a powerful 
player in the region. These events, and the problems Japan has experienced with them, 
h~I.Ve caused the Japanese to review and revise their strategic concepts for defense. The 
National Defense Program Outline, the basic document which provides guidance and 
structure to the Japan Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces, was revised in 1995. 
This was the first major change in twenty years. As a result of this revision, Japan 
reviewed and in some cases restructured the various components of its Defense Agency 
and the Self Defense Forces, as well as the strategy for its employment and use. I 
The strategic direction of Japan's defense activities is not as broadly or explicitly 
stated as, for example, the U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement. The process through which Japan's strategic focus and principles are 
enunciated is not cleai, so it is therefore useful to review briefly how defense policy in 
Japan is formulated. This section will be followed by an analysis of the two broad policy 
statements that direct Japanese defense policy; the National Defense Program Outline 
1 Japan Defense Agency, National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996. Adopted 28 November 
1995. Available HTTP. http://www .jda.go.jp/policy/f _ work/taikou/index _ e.html. 
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(1'-.TDPO) and the Mid-Term Defense Program.2 While the NDPO looks long-term and 
provides broad, strategic direction, the Mid-Term Defense Program focuses on a five year 
period (1996-2000). A review of the latter will be helpful in pinpointing the immediate 
changes being made and the focus of the modernization program. Finally, the structure, 
training and doctrine, equipment and modernization efforts of the Japan Self Defense 
Forces will be examined to identify the major changes and direction of its modernization 
efforts for the 21st century. 
A. JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT 
The process of change within any government is difficult for a number of 
reasons- from bureaucratic inefficiency and infighting, to problems with the personalities 
of key players involved. There is normally, however, a lead agency, organization, or 
person, who takes charge and leads the group in the new direction. Reflecting the 
knowledge that it was the power of the defense establishment, key officers and the 
military wielding this power that led it to a series of aggressive wars, Japan has organized 
its defense community with many checks and balances, and as a decidedly second-place 
organization. 
1. Policy Formulation and Key Players 
The Prime Minister, as the commander-in-chief of the SDF, and directly 
responsible to the Cabinet and the Diet for the defense of Japan, is the most important 
2 On The Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FYJ996- FY2000). A tentative unofficial translation is 
available HITP. http://www.jda.jp/policy/f_ work/chukibou/index _ e.htrnl. 
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official in the defense community. Having said that, however, it is also important to 
realize that due to the diffusion of responsibility in the defense establishment, in certain 
circumstances he is relegated to a minor role. The Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Prime 
Minister's Office coordinates defense policy and is considered the right-hand of the 
Prime Minister. 
The Security Council (SC) of Japan is the organization that approves 
recommended defense policies and resolves budgetary problems but has little to do with 
the day-to-day business of the Defense Agency. It does not maintain its own staff and so 
does not have much impact on (or the capacity to meddle with) policy formulation during 
its early stages of development. Its members (see Figure 1 for its current members and 
important observers) greatly reflect their parent organizations and it functions very much 
like other Japanese governmental decision-making organizations - with behind-the-
scenes consensus building occurring first, so that when the Council does meet, an agreed 
upon course of action is in place, and every major ministry has already made its 
recommendations and changes to the proposal. 3 Even the name of the Security Council 
is a compromise, chosen over the "National Security Council" when it was changed from 
the National Defense Councill986, for its weaker connotation of military security and in 
deference to the opposition parties in the Diet.4 The Prime Minister must report to 
3 Michael W. Chinworth. Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy. (Washington D.C.: 
Brassey's Inc. 1992). pp. 22-23. 
4 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara. Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy 
Responses in a Changing World. (New York: Cornell University Press. 1993) p. 41. 
55 
President: Prime Minister 
Members: Vice Prime Minister 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Finance 
Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Director General of the Defense Agency 
Director General of the Economic Planning Agency 
Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission 
Regularly Present: 
Minister of International Trade and Industry 
Director General of the Science and Technology Agency 
Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
Assistant Members: 
Parliamentary Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Administrative Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Administrative Vice Minister for Finance 
Administrative Vice Minister, Defense Agency 
Administrative Vice Minister for Economic Planning 
Administrative Vice Minister for International Trade and Industry 
Administrative Vice Minister for Science and Technology 
Source: Adapted from Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1996 and Holland, Managing Defense. 6 
Figure 1: Security Council of Japan 
and/or consult with the SC in a number of areas before taking certain actions. These 
include decisions on the Defense Outline, the coordination of industrial production and 
other matters relating to defense planning, mobilization of the Self-Defense Forces, and 
other matters related to national defense that the Prime Minister recognizes as necessary 
to be discussed. 5 
The Japan Defense Agency (IDA) is the organization responsible for the 
implementation of the defense policies formulated and approved by the Security Council. 
(See Figure 2 for an outline of the Organization of the IDA.) A number of the IDA 
5 Ibid. p. 187. 
6 Harrison M. Holland. Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma. (Lanham: University Press of America. 
1988). p. 80. 
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members actively participate in the Security Council and the Director General of the 
Defense Agency is a voting member. As stated earlier, the Director General of IDA is 
not a major cabinet position but a the head of a secondary state agency. The Director 
General is a political appointee, though not normally one that is politically powerful, and 
it is the Administrative Vice Minister (an Assistant member in the Security Council and a 
career civil service post) that is the most influential. Additionally, "seconded" officials, 
from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and International Trade and Industry, 
hold many of the key positions such as Chiefs of the Internal Bureaus. The Internal 
Bureaus are where the majority of policy planning and procurement decisions occur. In 
those Internal Bureaus, the use of seconded officials is one of the main instruments by 
which civilian control of the military is realized. 7 Other seconded officials are scattered 
throughout the Defense Agency, occupying key civilian positions whenever someone 
must deal with the three services, other ministries and the Diet. 
The relative weakness often associated with the position of the Defense Agency 
Director General is not as big a problem as it once was. The fact that strong Director 
Generals have gone on to other, more powerful positions, has taken some of the force out 
of this argument. For example, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-1987) had 
extensive experience in foreign policy and defense issues and was previously the JDA 
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Figure 2: Organization of Japan Defense Agency 
Director General. On the whole, however, those who have held the position are normally 
seen as weak politicians which leads to the IDA being dominated by other ministries. 8 
One of the key problems with the structure of the Japanese Defense establishment 
is the lack of focus at the upper echelon. The multiplicity of players that work on defense 
issues is amazing and creates a problem of focus and priority. When an official is 
8 Ian Grow. "Civilian Control of the Military in Postwar Japan." in Ron Matthews and Keisuke 
Matsuyama, eds. Japan's Military Renaissance? (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1993). p. 61. 
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seconded to the Defense Agency, the person's motivation and allegiance often remain 
with the parent organization. 9 The agenda that is brought with the official is that of the 
parent. For example, an official seconded from the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry may be most concerned with Japan's economic well-being as it relates to a 
particular industry. Based on the desire to build up a critical industrial sector (for 
instance, the aircraft industry) the official may advance a position that favors and 
supports this industry rather than one which is best for the Defense Agency and the Self-
Defense Forces. An additional factor is that the atmosphere that requires a seconded 
official to fill key decision-making positions, necessarily discourages the development of 
civilian career defense specialists, because their ability to move up and fill key positions 
are dominated and blocked by these seconded officials. 
A second problem with the defense establishment in Japan is the second-class 
status that it holds and therefore its inability to attract the best people. The top college 
graduates of the prestigious universities tend to migrate to the top ministries: Finance, 
Foreign Affairs and International Industry and Trade. The problem is compounded by the 
pervasive nature of the pacifism that has permeated the population and influences the 
most promising individuals to look to the other ministries for employment. A Yomiuri 
Shim bun survey in July 1988 showed that while half of the surveyed population believed 
there existed genuine security concerns, only a little over 28 percent declared they would 
9 Chinworth, pp. 17-20, Holland p. 6. 
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support the SDF in the defense of Japan. I 0 In a 1995 survey conducted by the office of 
the Prime Minister, though over half the surveyed population believed the purpose of the 
SDF was to ensure national security, two-thirds believed its most main role to be disaster 
relief.ll The desire for a pacific, non-military approach to security by the average 
Japanese, affect the type and quality of person the IDA can attract. 
There are two other elements that must be identified to complete the defense 
establishment. They are the political parties, on one hand, and the defense contractors in 
the private business sector, on the other hand. Political support for defense is limited for 
the most part by the politicians' desire to be reelected. The pacifism that encompasses 
Japanese society also has a detrimental effect on politicians too closely associated with 
the defense establishment. Chinworth sites an example of a respected politician who lost 
reelection because he was perceived as ignoring the local constituency as he established 
his reputation on international and defense issues.l2 Despite this fear, there is still 
sufficient interest in the Liberal Democratic Party's organized special committees under 
its Policy Affairs Research Council (P ARC) that parallels the committees within the Diet 
on defense issues.13 These zoku, or caucuses, allow LDP members of these committees 
to become more familiar with defense issues as well as with· the special interest groups. 
I 0 Cited by Chinworth, p. 8. 
II "Public Opinion Survey on the Future Role of the SDF." Cited in Defense of Japan 1996: Response to a 
New Era. (Tok-yo: The Japan Times, Ltd. July, 1996). pp. 197-206. 
12 Chinworth. p. 21. 
13 Organizational information on the LDP is available HTTP. http://www.sphere.ad.jp!ldp/english/e-
orgchart.html. 16 Dec 1996. 
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However, the same problems that affect IDA officials - that of being related to a 
"second-class" agency with its history and the pervasiveness of pacifism - also affects the 
type and quality of politician interested in defense. According to Holland, LDP Diet 
members who tend to gravitate toward defense issues have relatively little influence in 
policy councils or in the Party, and as they attempt to advance their position as pro-
defense, their perceived "hawkish" stance diminishes the effectiveness of their effort.14 
The final actor in the defense establishment is the defense contractors and other 
businesses related to defense issues. Japan's unique defense industry, hemmed in by its 
constitutionally mandated export ban on military materiel, 15 has been nurtured by MITI, 
IDA and private concerns to ensure its viability should a future need for it arise. 
Although defense-specific industries account for not more than 0.6 percent of domestic 
industrial production and so can not be called critical to the national economy they are 
nonetheless important to the govemment.16 In preparation for the review of the National 
Defense Program Outline, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa created a nine-member 
14 Holland. p. 10. 
15 Japan restricted the export of anns to 1) communist countries, 2) countries under UN-resolution anns 
embargo and 3) countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976 these 
restrictions were tightened by a resolution passed by the Diet that banned anns exports to these three 
categories of countries, restricting the exports of anns in general and the plants that could produce them. 
This, however, was revised to not include the exchange of military-related technology to the United 
States in 1983. See Okazaki Hisahiko. A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense. (Lanham: University 
Press of America, Inc. 1986.) p. 82. 
16 Chin worth. p. 190, and Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the 
Postwar Search for Autonomy. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1995). Table 1.4, p. 18. 
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advisory panel to review Japan's basic defense posture. A statement from this panel 
reflects the importance of the defense industry to Japan: 
From the viewpoint of security, however, we would like to emphasize that 
it is extremely important to have a domestic defense industry capable of 
developing and producing technologically advanced and high-quality 
equipment. ... Furthermore, as Japan maintains a policy of imposing strict 
voluntary restraints on arms exports under the three principles of arms 
exports, weapons-related divisions of component enterprises have no 
alternative but to formulate production plans based entirely on orders from 
the Defense Agency. As a result, a wide variety of products tend to be 
produced on a limited scale, which leads to prices higher than the average 
price abroad. As for mainline equipment, it is notable that a major part of 
such equipment is either imported from the United States or manufactured 
domestically under license from United States defense contractors.17 
Okazaki Hisahiko argues in his pragmatic book on Japanese grand strategy, that 
the reason for these self-imposed restrictions is almost entirely related to "the 
manifestation of a 'pacific posture"' 18 that afflicts Japanese society and affects not only 
the defense industry but the Defense Agency itself. This reliance on domestic production 
for defense materiel has progressed from a low in the early 1950's of about 30 percent to 
consistently maintaining a ratio of domestic procurement to total (the kokusanka ratio) of 
over 90 percent since the early 1980' s.19 The advantages for Japan lie not only in 
maintaining these defense industries, but also in spin-off technologies, acquired through 
licensed production of U.S. defense systems. Japanese Defense analyst Michael Green 
17 The Modality of Security and Defense Capabilities of Japan: The Outlook for the 21" Century. Advisory 
Group on Defense Issues. (Tokyo, August 12, 1994). 
18 Okazaki. p. 82 
19 Green, p. 15. 
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uses the example of the brakes for the bullet train that were based on the design of the 
brakes for the F-104 Starfighter, built under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in the 
1960's.20 
2. Japanese Strategic Thought 
Japanese defense policies and contemporary strategic thought in Japan are firmly 
rooted in the three pillars and fundamental philosophies of their Constitution, the U.S.-
Japan security arrangements and the Charter of the United Nations. (Figure 3 shows a 
repr~sentation of the key documents and policies that form the framework for defense 
policy in Japan.) With these three primary pillars as their foundation, Japan's Basic and 
Standard Defense Policies were developed in 1957, establishing the following four 
principles considered necessary to achieve the objective of national defense: 
1. Support of the activities of the United Nations and the promotion of 
international cooperation. 
2. Promotion of public welfare and the enhancement of the people's love for the 
country. 
3. Incremental development of effective defense capabilities necessary for self-
defense. 
4. Use of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements as the basis for dealing with 
external aggression.21 
While the first two principles are statements of philosophy, the last two became the key 
elements of the Japanese passive security strategy based exclusively on this defensive-
only posture. 
20 Ibid. p. 14. 
21 Japan Defense Agency. Basic Policy for National Defense. 14 December 1996. Available HTTP. 
http://www .jda.go.jp/policy/f _ worklkihon _ e.html. 
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U.S.-Japan Security Treaty The Charter of the United Nations 
Basic Policy for National Defense Basic policies 
A. Defense-<>nly orientation 
B. Do not become a military power 
C. Adhere to 3 non-nuclear principles 
New National Defense Program Outline D. Ensure civilian control 
Mid Term Defense Program (1996-2000) 
Source: Japan Defense Agency, Framework of Defense Policy13 
Figure 3: Framework of Japanese Defense Policy 
Within the confines of this defensive-only military strategy, Japan would only 
take the minimum actions necessary for self-defense and do this with the minimum 
defense force necessary. In fact, the policy states that it was not attempting to meet fully 
the requirements for self-defense (or more specifically, that it is not building a capability 
directly linked to a military threat to Japan), but to prevent instability in the region by 
ensuring a power vacuum would not be created.22 Under this policy Japan could build 
up its defense capability moderately, ensuring civilian control and adhering to its three 
non-nuclear principles of not possessing, manufacturing nor allowing the importation of 
nuclear weapons. 
Changes to the security environment, in both the international and domestic 
conditions, have resulted in higher (and quite different) expectations of the types of roles 
and missions that the Self-Defense Forces might conduct. These changes led to the 
22 Holland, p. 21 and Appendix E, National Defense Program Outline (1973), pp. 91-96. 
23 Japan Defense Agency. Framework of Defense Policy. December 1996. Available HITP. 
http://www .jda.go.jp/policy.f _ work/f_ work_ e.html. 
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review of the NDPO. Changes in the threat due to the end of the Cold War and the end of 
the bipolar, confrontational atmosphere, brought a lessening in the probability of global 
war. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf War with its coalition warfare, demonstrated to 
the Japanese that regional conflicts still were going to occur. With the emphasis on 
multilateral efforts to combat regional problems arid decrease tensions and given the 
constitutional restrictions and popular support of pacifism, Japan could see that it could 
not fully participate. Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" was viewed as an insufficient form 
of participation24 and it was time to make changes and become a more active member of 
the international community. One role that seemed at least partially palatable to the 
Japanese and the world was that of United Nations peace-keeping and humanitarian 
assistance. 25 
The Japanese constitutional restrictions on the deployment of the Self-Defense 
Forces had to be amended before these forces could be used in this manner. This was 
done in 1992, after much debate, with the passage of the Law on Cooperation for United 
Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Related Activities.26 The use of the Self-Defense 
24 This is reference to Japan's use of aid/grants and other fonns of payments in lieu of personnel or 
equipment. It was specifically reflective of Japanese support of Desert Shield/Stonn and their 
contribution of over $13 billion. See Cronin, p. 21, Brian Cloughley. "Japan Ponders Power Projection." 
International Defense Review, Jane's Infonnation Group Limited, 1 July 1996, p. 27. and JosephS. Nye, 
Jr. "Coping with Japan." Foreign Policy, Number 87, Winter 1992-93, p. 108. 
25 This is not to say that all agreed to this. See for instance, Sasaki Yoshitaka, "Japan's Undue 
International Contribution." Japan Quarterly, Asahi Shimbun. July-September 1993.p. 243-265. 
26 See "Paths to Peace: Japan's Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and International 
Humanitarian Operations." Ministry of Foreign Affairs. December 1996. Available HTTP. 
http://www.nttls.co.jp//infomofa/pko/index.html. 
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Forces in humanitarian relief situations, such as in Rwanda, and at home, as with the 
Hanshin/Awaji earthquake, helped mollify the population's pacifist fears and has brought 
about a new level of acceptance of these types of uses of the SDF. 
The result of these changes in the security environment has been a shift in 
direction of Japan's strategic thinking on security issues and new calls to revise the 
NDPO. Prime Minister Hosokawa, in early 1994, initiated the review ofthe NDPO with 
the creation of a special advisory panel chaired by Higuchi Hirotaro, CEO, Asahi 
Breweries, Ltd. Consisting of eight other business leaders, academics, and defense 
experts, the panel met over a period of five months to hear briefings and to discuss 
relevant issues, ranging from regional security and defense issues to personnel, 
equipment and SDF structural issues. The panel completed its work with the presentation 
of the report "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The 
Outlook for the 21 51 Century" to Prime Minister Murayama.27 Most of the changes that 
were identified in this report eventually found their way into the new NDPO. The 
Higuchi report recommended: 
Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if 
anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new 
order. Indeed, Japan has the responsibility of playing such a role.28 
27 An English translation this report (The Higuchi Report) appears as Appendix A to Patrick M. Cronin 
and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, McNair 
Paper 31. (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 
November 1994.) pp. 21-60. 
28 The Higuchi Report, p. 30. 
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It goes on to identify that Japan's first mission in this 'new order' is to "build a coherent 
and comprehensive security policy" consisting of: 
First, promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and 
regional scale; second, enhancement of the functions of the Japan-U.S. 
security relationship; and third, possession of a highly reliable and 
efficient defense capability based on a strengthened information capability 
and a prompt crisis-management capability.29 
While the approach of using these three objectives is not new, the emphasis that it 
recommends on multilateral security cooperation and on Japan's own military forces in a 
more balanced way with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements is a definite shift away 
from the previous NDPO's predominant focus on the U.S.-Japan security relationship. 
B. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE 
As the strategic, mid- to long-term document used to guide the Defense Agency 
and the Self-Defense Forces, the National Defense Program Outline has a great impact on 
the roles and missions, equipment, training and modernization of the SDF. The 1995 
NDPO calls for a more balanced approach to better provide for the defense of Japan. The 
NDPO outlines three objectives: 
1. A multilateral approach to regional security. 
2. Strong, continued support of the U.S.-Japan security relations. 
3. A compact, effective, and flexible SDF. 
The basic premise of national defense remains unchanged. Japan continues to 
prevent aggression using a combination of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and its 
own defense capability. It continues to rely on the United States nuclear umbrella for 
29 Ibid. p. 30. 
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strategic deterrence. The major change in the NDPO is the additional emphasis placed on 
the nvo objectives of multilateral, regional security and the SDF. The emphasis on 
defense capabilities of the SDF requires the restructuring of elements of the SDF, mainly 
in scale and function. While the NDPO focuses mostly on these two objectives, it also 
makes a number of recommendations for changes in, as well as continued emphasis on, 
the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. These changes will be looked at in more detail in 
Chapter IV but are encapsulated briefly here. 
1. United States- Japan Security Arrangements 
The security relationship between the United States and Japan continues to be the 
cornerstone for Japanese security. The NDPO outlines four specific efforts that will be 
made to enhance the credibility of these arrangements and to ensure their effective 
implementation. 
The first effort is in the promotion of exchanges of information and consultation 
benveen the two countries. This includes close consultations on defense policies and 
U.S. military posture, particularly in connection with the Department of Defense's 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the New Special Measures Agreement on Host 
Nation Support (HNS), and the bilateral study ofballistic missile defense (BMD).30 
The second effort is the establishment of an effective posture for cooperation in 
operational areas including joint studies, exercises and training, as well as enhancement 
30 Joint Announcement United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Tokyo. December 2, 1996. 
Available HTTP. http://www .nttls.co.jp/infomofa/ju/security/joint 1202 .htm I. 
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of mutual support in those areas. The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 
recently announced a number of ways this cooperation will occur. 31 It includes a call for 
more joint training exercises such as the first JGSDF combined-arms, live-fire exercise 
that occurred in Yakima, Washington,32 and other such joint training exercises, 
particularly those focused on peace-keeping, humanitarian and disaster relief operations. 
It also calls for continued exchanges of officers under the Personnel Exchange Program 
(PEP) and attendance by officers of both countries in the others' service schools. 
The third effort is to enhance the broad, mutual exchange of equipment and 
technology and is most represented by the efforts made under the F-2 Production 
Agreement and the development of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs. It also 
calls for continued improvements in the Technology-for-Technology Initiative.33 
The final effort involves the implementation of various measures to facilitate the 
smooth and effective stationing of United States forces in Japan. These include 
implementing the New Special Measures Agreement on Host Nation Support and the 
recommendations of the fmal report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
(SACO). This report calls for the return of approximately 21 percent of the total acreage 
31 Ibid. 
32 Asia-Pacific Defense Forum Staff, Yakima: A New Japanese Training Ground. Asia-Pacific Defense 
Forum, Spring 1995. p. 26-30. 
33 A useful discussion ofthis initiative is found in Green, p.l30-142. The Initiative calls for reciprocity in 
technology transfers between Japan and the United States, directed specifically at giving U.S. firms and 
its industrial base greater access to and transfer of Japanese nonderived, dual-use technology. "The 
declining defense spending in both countries legitimized the concept of drawing on a common defense 
technology base." Green, pp. 139-140. The initiative was initially intricately linked to TMD 
development, but in October 1993 these were de linked. 
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currently under U.S. control on Okinawa, various measures that will reduce the impact of 
U.S. military activities on the inhabitants, and improvements in the reporting and 
prevention of major accidents involving U.S. forces. 34 
2. Multilateral Approach to a Stable Security Environment 
The NDPO identifies a multilateral approach to security as one of the objectives 
through which Japan is to approach security for the 21 51 century. This increased emphasis 
takes three broad approaches: the use of multilateral regional forums for discussion, the 
increase in exchanges (such as visits, port calls and personal exchanges between the SDF 
and foreign militaries), and support for the United Nations initiatives on arms control and 
disarmament for the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
missiles, as well as chemical and biological weapons. 
In the area of multilateral regional forums, Japan has increased its participation in 
and support of A SEAN, APEC, ARF and other forums as an effort to build regional 
confidence. The move is to give these forums a larger role in multilateral security, though 
at this point this is truly only at a fledgling state. Figure 4: Regional Participation (As of 
the 2nd ARF Meeting, July-August, 1995) outlines the various regional forums and 
shows current membership. In the Statement of the Chairman from the 2"d ARF meeting, 
it was agreed that the evolution of this regional security forum would be in three stages -
34 Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of Defense Perry 
and Ambassador Mondale. The SACO Final Report. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 December 1996. 
Available HTTP. http://www.nttls.co.jp/infomofa!ju!security/96saco l.html. 
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promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy, and elaboration 
of approaches to conflict- and that ARF was in the first stage.35 
To increase the number and types of educational exchanges and to expand the 
security dialogue, Japan recently has conducted exchanges with Korea, China, Russia, 
including a port call by the Korean Training Squadron, its first visit to Japan. Reciprocal 
visits by the Japanese also have been scheduled.36 High-level exchanges with China 
have included Japan Defense Agency Director Naoki Murata's visit to China 20-23 
August 1996 and the reciprocal visit of China's Defense Minister Chi Haotian in 
December 1996. The NDPO outlines the belief that these kinds of exchanges, port calls, 
and open security dialogue, will help to increase the transparency of defense issues in the 
region.37 
The revised NDPO calls for Japan to cooperate with efforts of the United Nations 
and other international organizations in arms control and disarmament with the purpose 
of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and land-mines. 
Japan's desire to play a larger role in the United Nations has been expressed in a number 
35 The second meeting of ARF was held in July/August 1995, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. Figure 4 is 
taken from Japan's New Defense Policy, an online pamphlet by the Japan Defense Agency. Available 
HTTP. http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/f_ work/jndp/index _ e.htmL 
36 For an extensive list of current exchanges, see Section II, "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Trends and 
Japanese Confidence Building Efforts" in Japan's New Defense Policy. 
37 Ibid. Section II, p. 1. 
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APEC 




Vietnam Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Malaysia 
ASEAN's Dialogue Partner ASEAN's Dialogue Partners 
EU Japan, Republic of Korea, Canada, United States, 
Australia, New Zealand 
ASEAN's Consultative Partner ASEAN's Consultative Partner 
Russia China 
ASEAN's Observers ASEAN's Observer 
Laos. Cambodia Papua New Guinea 
ASEAN Chairman's Guest 
Myanmar40 
Source: Japan Defense Agency, Japan's New Defense Policy 
Figure 4: Regional Participation (As of the 2nd ARF Meeting, July-August, 1995) 
of ways. It expressed the desire to occupy a permanent seat in the Security Council38 
and subsequently adopted the Law Regulating Treatment of Dispatch Defense Agency 
Personnel to International Organizations, which authorized IDA personnel, with 
restrictions, to be used to support UN activities. This was seen by some as a direct 
response to the U.S. Senate resolution (January 1994) which called on the U.S. 
government to support permanent membership only when Japan (and Germany) made it 
possible for their armed forces to participate in UN military activities.39 
38 Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, told the UN General Assembly in September 1994 that "Japan is 
prepared, with the endorsements of many countries, to discharge its responsibilities as a permanent 
member of the Security Council." Asian Security 1995-1996. (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and 
Security, 1995) p. 126. 
39 Ibid. p. 126. 
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Japanese contributions to the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) 
have included chemical weapons experts and observation teams in support of the survey 
teams in Iraq in 1993 and 1994. This led to the development of a unit specialized in 
protection against chemical weapons, and the development within the JGSDF Chemical 
School of the only facility in Japan recognized by the United Nations to manufacture 
chemicals for defensive purposes.41 These specially-trained personnel have been sentto 
China to survey and collect information that may in the future lead to the disposal of 
chemical weapons left in China by the Japanese Imperial Army.42 
3. Response to Large-Scale Disasters and Various Other Situations 
The last area on which the new NDPO places increased emphasis is in the area of 
disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and protection of lives or assets. Japan has already 
made contributions in support of humanitarian relief in Zaire and Rwanda, and stands 
ready to provide similar support for future international disaster relief efforts. The 
experiences with the earthquakes in the Hanshin-Awaji area of Japan have proven the 
SDF capable of providing this type of support, but not without improvements to its 
40 Myanmar (Bunna) has since been given observer status and is one of three countries (Myanmar, 
Cambodia and Laos) which will probably be admitted into ASEAN in the near future. 
41 This facility manufactures "Schedule 1" chemicals, which include: sarin, soman, tabun, VX and mustard 
gas. Approximately 88 grams of these chemicals are created annually for research purposes and none are 
used in nor does Japan produce any chemical weapons. "Chemical Protection Research by the JSDF." 
Japan's New Defense Policy. Section III, 2. p. 1. 
42 "Chemical Weapons and the Self-Defense Forces." Japan's New Defense Policy. Section III. p. 1. 
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emergency action/crisis management procedures.43 The incident of sarin gas being 
released into the subways of Tokyo also has brought to light the problems associated with 
SDF response to terrorist-type event and have demonstrated the utility of the Self-
Defense Forces in chemical defense and clean up. 
One aspect of this area discussed in the new NDPO raised the possibility that 
Japan might have to deal with a massive migration of refugees to Japan or the emergency 
evacuation of Japanese citizens living abroad. This obviously comes out of concerns 
about the problems that could occur with the reunification of Korea, and though it is 
qualified with the statement that it bears no particular contingency in mind, there is a 
troubling possibility that Japan would or could take some sort of action in Korea.44 
C. MID-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (1996-2000) 
The Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (MTDP), which covers the period FY 
1996-2000, takes the general approach approved in the National Defense Program 
Outline and provides guidelines for planning, lays out the major programs and the budget, 
and gives directions on the reorganization of the forces.45 
43 Critics of the SDF's response cite problems with slow initial response time, lack of exemptions from 
travel restrictions for emergencies and the requirement to wait for local authorities to request assistance 
before acting. See Asian Security 1995-1996 (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1995) p. 
137. Also Michael Blaker, "Japan in 1995: A Year of Natural and Other Disasters." Asian Survey, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) Vol. XXXVI, No. I, January 1996, p. 43. 
44 "Japanese Defense Policy and the New National Defense Program Outline." Japan's New Defense 
Policy. Section I, p. 3. 
45 On the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY/996- FY2000) was adopted by the Security Council and 
the Cabinet on 15 December 1995. A tentative unofficial translation is available HTIP. 
http://www.jda.jp/policy/f_work/chukiboulindex_e.htrnl. 
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1. General Guidelines for Planning 
The Mid-Term Defense Program Build-up Plan general guidelines began with the 
defense capacities and the principles to maintain while restructuring and refocusing the 
forces. The three new buzz words for the SDF are "compact, effective, and flexible." By 
"compact," the NDPO and the MTDP are attempting to downsize Japan's forces. This 
impacted most specifically the GSDF which will have its authorized strength cut by over 
20,000 personnel, and with all three branches, in terms of decreases in overall total on-
hand equipment. The personnel cuts, however, are mostly reducing the authorized 
strength of the force to a level closer to the current on-hand strength.46 As for the cuts in 
equipment, the focus is on eliminating outdated equipment and continuing to modernize 
the fleets with new equipment. 
"Effective" refers to the Self-Defense Forces' ability to perform its three main 
missions in the most efficient and economic manner. The three missions are the defense 
of Japan, disaster relief, and peace-keeping. The primary mission remains unchanged, 
this, of course, being the defense of Japan. The two new missions, based on new 
"expectations" of the SDF, are responding to large-scale disasters and humanitarian relief 
operations, and making a contribution to a more stable security environment through 
peace-keeping operations.· The MTDP concentrates on making "qualitative 
improvements" over that of quantity and enhancing necessary functions that support these 
three primary missions. A central part of improving the effectiveness of the force in the 
46 The 1992 Defense of Japan, shows the authorized/actual strength of the GSDF to be 180,000/151,176. 
75 
MTDP is the emphasis on strengthening the early warning and intelligence gathering, 
command, control and communications systems. 
The third aspect, "flexibility," is to be enhanced through an emphasis on the 
retention of personnel and equipment necessary for education and training and by 
creating, maintaining and retaining a new type of Self-Defense Reserve force with high-
readiness. 
The final points discussed in the new MTDP guidelines for planning highlight the 
continued relevance of and enhancements to the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and its 
role in the creation of a more stable security environment, while at the same time 
recognizing the constraints necessary given the economic and fiscal conditions in the 
country. 
2. Major Programs and Budget 
The MTDP outlines a number of new and continued equipment acquisition 
programs that are captured in Table 3 below. The specific programs will be discussed 
below. The MTDP calls for an estimated budget of ¥25.15 trillion at FY 1995 prices, 
($139 billion47) with an additional ¥110 billion ($608 million) set aside for use, with the 
approval of the Security Council, in case of large-scale disasters or to respond "to an 
unpredictable situation in the future."48 This represents an increase of ¥2.98 trillion 
47 Yen to dollar conversions were done using Purchasing Power Parity rates published by OECD at 
$1==¥181 in 1995. 
48 Section 5, Expenses Required. On the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY1996-FY2000), 
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($16.5 billion) over the last MTDP (FY1991-FY1995) with an average growth rate of2.1 
percent. However, the equipment procurement amount of¥4.28 trillion ($23.6 billion), 
represents a 3.6 percent cut, whlch according to some analysts, could deal the defense 
industry a "fatal blow."49 
Kinds of Equipment Quantity 
Ground Tank 96 
Self-Defense Artillery (Except Motor) 45 
Force Multiple Launch Rocket System 45 
Armored Vehicle 168 
Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile 24 Launchers 
Anti-Tank Helicopter (AH-1 S) 4 
Transport Helicopter (CH-47JA) 12 
Equipment and Material for Improvement 2 Groups 
of Surface-to-Air Guided Missile (HAWK) 
Maritime Destroyers 8 
Self-Defense Submarines 5 
Force Others 18 
Total Self-Defense Ships to be constructed 31 
(approximate tonnage) (about 100,000 tons) 
Patrol Helicopter (SH-601) 37 
Air Fighter-Interceptor (F-ISDJ) 4 
Self-Defense Fighter-Support (F-2) 47 
Force Transport Helicopter (CH-471) 6 
Intermediate Level Jet Trainer (T-4) 59 
Source: Japan Defense Agency, Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY1996-FY2000) 
Table 3: Equipment Acquisition, Mid-Term Defense Program 
D. JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES 
The restructuring of the JSDF under the NDPO and MTDP is discussed below 
under each service. Table 4 outlines the directed restructuring and major equipment 
49 "Japanese Defense Industry Braces for Restructuring" Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun. 21 December 1995. 
Translated in FBIS-JST-96-051. 
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gains, as well as the end-strength changes in personnel. As a matter of emphasis, the 
items that pertain to the Joint Staff Council and joint operations have been extracted and 
are discussed first. 
In the discussion earlier, it was noted that the major change of direction that the 
NDPO and MTDP advance is the balanced emphasis on multilateral security efforts, 
Japan's own defensive capabilities and the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. When 
reviev.r:ing Japan's defensive capabilities, the central role and mission continues to be the 
defense of Japan. To support this new balanced effort and in response to the new 
missions of disaster relief and assistance and other contributions to a more stable security 
environment (i.e., the mission of United Nations peace-keeping), the Self-Defense Force 
will be restructured as discussed below. 
1. The Joint Staff Council and Joint/Integrated Operations 
The NDPO directed that additional attention be paid to achieve joint and 
integrated operations through the enhancement of the Joint Staff Council's functions. 
The MTDP directed each branch of the SDF to "study enhancements of the Joint Staff 
Council's functions and take necessary measures" to improve joint operations. 50 
Strengthening the Joint Staff should help alleviate some of the problems the SDF has 
encountered in the past, areas such as communications. It also will provide a more 
"unified effort" toward the accomplishment of its missions. Security analyst Patrick M. 
Cronin, in his critique of Japan's review of its defense policies, has argued that "faced 
50 The Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan, "Reorganization of the major units and other points," point 4. 
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with the prospect of lower defense budgets and downsizing ground forces, Japan is likely 
to put a heightened premium on jointness."51 However, the very structure of the SDF, 
with its placement of the Joint Staff Council- not as an intermediary between the ground, 
maritime and air services and the Defense Agency, but as a separate advisory entity -
reflects the "stove pipe" approach taken to constrain military effectiveness. The adoption 
of the same kind of sweeping reform that the Goldwater-Nichols Act brought to the 
Department of Defense and the military in the United States is needed. According to 
Cronin, however, overcoming the historical animosity and interservice rivalry as well as 
the fundamental organizational and communications problems within the IDA, make it 
unlikely that some sort of sweeping reform will occur in the near future. 52 
One step that could greatly improve 'jointness" and interoperability is in the setup 
of a warning, intelligence, and command, control and communications architecture. The 
improvements directed in the NDPO and reemphasized in the MTDP will greatly enhance 
the interservice communications and assist in the interoperability and compatibility with 
U.S. forces under the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Additionally it will improve the 
SDF' s overall effectiveness in its primary "defense of Japan" mission, as well as help the 
SDF prepare to take a larger role in UN peace-keeping operations. 
The MTDP specifically directed the continued upgrade of the fixed type three-
dimensional radar systems and transportable warning and surveillance radar systems, and 
51 Patrick M. Cronin. "Japan's Emergent Security Policy." Joint Forces Quarterly. Spring 1995. p.21. 
52 Ibid. pp. 21-22. 
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the achievement of operational capability of the AWACS aircraft (mainly a ASDF issue). 
This will give a better "situational awareness" of the vessels, aircraft and other systems in 
the surrounding waters and airspace of Japan. To improve intelligence, the MTDP 
directed the development of a new central intelligence organization, aimed at high-level 
collection and analysis of strategic and operational intelligence. Additionally, it directed 
the establishment of a more efficient structure for the intelligence units. Finally, in terms 
of command, control and communications (C\ the MTDP directed the building of a new 
Central Command System, the establishment of the Integrated Defense Digital Network 
(IDDN) and improvements in the use of satellite communications. 
The creation of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) was modeled after 
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency of the United 
States. 53 It is located at the Joint Staff Council and is headed by a GSDF General, while 
the Defense Councilor will concurrently serve as the DIH deputy head. It will have a 
staff of 1600, consisting of general affairs, planning, analysis, radio and picture 
departments. 54 The development and operation of the DIH has been called "the linchpin 
of security" for Japan, and will have the dual function of improving Japan's overall 
ability to collect, process and analyze information in crisis situations, but will also free 
53 "Defense Agency To Fonn New Central Intelligence Body." Kyodo, 28 December 1996. Translated in 
FBIS-EAS-96-251. 
54 "New Defense Intelligence HQ Opens in Tokyo." Kyodo, 20 January 1997. Translated in FBIS-EAS-
97-013. 
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Japan from its complete reliance on the United States for strategic information.55 
Associated with this was the announcement in May 1996 by Prime Minister Hashimoto 
of Japan's intention to launch a spy satellite. This will upgrade Japan's capability to 
collect strategic intelligence without depending on the United States. However, 
according to Shigeru Matsui, a Japanese military commentator, the possibility of 
becoming totally independent (of the United States) is near zero. 56 
In order to gain a consensus on ballistic missile defense, the MTDP also directed 
the gathering of information "from a comprehensive point of view" of such a system's 
overall usefulness and a cost-benefit comparison. The development of this system and its 
useful employment will require a great deal of joint interoperability and intense 
coordination and will be a real test to not only the joint operations of the SDF but also to 
the U.S.-Japan arrangements. 57 
55 "The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is a Linchpin of Security." Sankei Shimbun, 21 January 1997. 
Translated in FBIS-EAS-97-016. 
56 Tu Po. "Japan will become an Intelligence Power." Yazhou Zhoukan, 25 November- 1 December 1996. 
Translated in FBIS-EAS-97-014. 
57 Cronin, p. 22. 
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NEW NDPO OF 1995 NDPO OF 1976 
Self- Self-Defense Personnel 286,541 321,701 
Defense Regular Personnel 238,641 273,801 
Force 
Reserve Personnel 47,900 47,900 
Major Units 
Ground 
Regionally Deployed Units 8 Divisions 12 Divisions 
6 Brigades 2 Combined Brigades 
Self- Mobile Operation Units I Annored Division I Armored Division 
Defense I Airborne Brigade I Airborne Brigade 
Force I Helicopter Brigade I Helicopter Brigade Ground-to-Air Missile Units 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups 
Groups 
Main Equipment 
Battle Tanks Approximately 900 Approximately 1,200 
Artillery Approximately 900 Approximately I ,200 
Personnel Regular 145,000 180,000 
Ready Reserve Personnel (New) 15,000 
Reserve Personnel 31,000 
Major Units 
Destroyer Units 4 Flotillas 4 Flotillas 
(For Mobile Operations) 
Maritime Destroyer Units 7 Divisions 10 Divisions 
Self- (Regional District Units) 
Defense 
Submarine Units 6 Divisions 6 Divisions 
Minesweeping Units I Flotilla 2 Flotillas 
Force Land-based Patrol Aircraft Units 13 Squadrons 16 Squadrons 
Main Equipment 
Destroyer.; Approximately 50 Approximately 60 
Submarines 16 16 
Combat Aircraft Approximately 70 Approximately 220 
Personnel Regular 46.085 46,085 
Reserve Personne I 1,100 
Major Units 
Aircraft Control and 20 Squadrons and 8 Groups 28 Groups 
Warning Units I Squadron (Airborne Early I Squadron 
Air Warning Squadron) 
Self- Interceptor Units 9 Squadrons I 0 Squadrons 
Defense 
Support Fighter Units 3 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 
Air Reconnaissance Units I Squadron I Squadron 
Force Air Transport Units 3 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 
Ground-to-Air Missile Units 6 Groups 6 Groups 
Main Equipment 
Combat Aircraft Approximately 400 Approximately 430 
Fighters Approximately 300 Approximately 350 
Personnel Regular 47,556 47,556 
Reserve Personnel 800 
Source: Adapted from Japan Defense Agency, Japan's NI!W Defense Policy and Defense of Japan, 1996. 
Table 4: Restructuring/Equipment/Personnel Totals of the SDF 
2. Ground Self-Defense Force 
The Ground Self-Defense Force is the primary recipient of and major player in the 
new peace-keeping and disaster relief missions. The GSDF is therefore directed to 
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restructure in order to be configured in units of more appropriate size for deployment to 
these contingencies. With the Brigade as the basic size of these units, five of the current 
divisions will be restructured into brigades, one of which will be configured with 
improved airborne mobility. Some units in each of these restructured divisions and 
brigades will consist of the new SDF Reservists with high readiness, and capable of rapid 
mobilization and deployment. The overall structure and deployment of the GSDF 
divisions and brigades remain regionally deployed in a balanced manner that conforms to 
the geography and population characteristics of Japan. The authorized end-strength of the 
GSDF is to be reduced from 180,000 to 160,000, of which 15,000 will be Ready Reserve 
Personnel. 
The major programs and equipment acquisition for the GSDF are focused on the 
modernization of its primary equipment as noted in Table 3. This will entail the overall 
reduction in the total number of tanks and artillery from approximately 1200 each, down 
to about 900. In response to the new requirements for transportation in support of 
international disaster assistance and peace-keeping missions, the MTDP directs the 
continued acquisition of the transport helicopter (CH-47). The MTDP also directs the 
continued stockpiling of ammunition and other measures to support sustainment and to 
reduce overall vulnerability. Additionally it directs the.reconstruction of old ramshackle 
buildings and other measures to promote greater harmony with the local communities and 
the areas surrounding the bases. 
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3. Maritime Self-Defense Force 
Under the MTDP, the Maritime Self-Defense Force is directed to restructure by 
disbanding two Regional District Destroyer Units and one Squadron of fixed-wing patrol 
aircraft. The current structure within the mine-sweeping force of two flotillas will be 
consolidated into one. To enhance training, the submarine force will create an education 
unit, within its own community. Additionally a similar squadron will be created by 
converting one squadron each of the fixed-wing patrol aircraft and the land-based patrol 
helicopter units into an education squadron specially for training pilots. 
The increased transportation needs required by Japan's new international disaster 
assistance and peace-keeping support has the MTDP directing the acquisition of 
transportation ships. One of these new ships, an 8,900-ton Landing Ship-Tank (LST), has 
been called by Jane's Fighting Ships 1992-93 "clearly a candidate for operating Sea 
Harriers, perhaps as an interim step toward building an aircraft carrier."58 Whether these 
ships are capable of some sort of "power projection" or are simply transports remains a 
matter of disagreement. Brian Cloughley argues that although the four amphibious ships 
under construction for the JMSDF will be capable of carrying tanks and the situation in 
which they would be needed in support of peace-keeping operations is difficult to foresee, 
other countries must accept that Japan is a major power. 59 
58 As quoted by Sasaki, p. 264. 
59 Brian Cloughley. "Japan Ponders Power Projection." International Defense Review. 1 July 1996, p. 27. 
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4. Air Self-Defense Forces 
The Air Self-Defense Forces, in an effort to consolidate its surveillance effort, has 
been directed by the MTDP to take parts of two of the current four aircraft control and 
warning unit's warning groups and reorganize them into an Airborne Early Warning 
Squadron. The MTDP also has directed that one squadron of the fighter-interceptor units 
be disbanded. 
The air defense capability continues to be a major effort in the MTDP with three 
programs to improve or test programs for modernization. It directs the implementation of 
a test modification program for the F-15, an improvement program for the Patriot and 
Hawk programs, and the acquisition of equipment and material for improving the short-
range and close-range surface-to-air guided missiles, and anti-air guns. The MTDP also 
provides for the acquisition of 47 F-2 fighter-support aircraft (previously known as the 
FSX), which was jointly developed and produced with the United States. 
In support of the requirement for transportation for international disaster relief 
assistance and peace-keeping support, the MTDP directs the study of a follow-on aircraft 
for the C-1 Transport Aircraft and the study of requirements and operational need for an 
in-flight refueling function for fighter-support aircraft. This postpones the decision on 
large-scale long-distance transports with .mid-air refueling capabilities. This is something 
the Ministry of Defense originally wanted, but the Socialist Party was adamantly against, 
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stating that "increasing the striking distance of fighter planes is contrary to the purpose of 
purely defensive forces."60 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The National Defense Program Outline and the Midterm Defense Program are the 
foundation by which the Japanese structure and direct changes and improvements to the 
Japanese Defense system. After reviewing the new changes, analyst Brian Cloughley 
concluded, "The JSDF is well-equipped with modern weapons and as well-trained as can 
be expected given self-imposed limitations."61 Others, however, have said that the SDF 
is incapable of providing its own defense, and that by 1999, it will be even worse. 62 This 
review has shown that within the framework currently accepted in Japan, the Self-
Defense Forces are capable of conducting operations in the defense of Japan and are in 
the process of restructuring, making force and equipment level changes, and preparing to 
conduct training to meet these newly directed missions. This does not mean, however, 
that there are not problems. 
Key to meeting the new requirements of the NDPO and MTDP is strengthening 
and employing a joint structure. The problem of Japan's "stove pipe" approach to the 
SDF has not been addressed. The Joint Staff Council continues to be nothing more than 
60 "New Mid-Term Defense Plan, Including a Notable Postponement." Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 15 
December 1995. Translated in FBIS-JST-96-051. 
61 Cloughley, p. 30. 
62 Tsutomu Matsumura, "Politicians Should Question Self-Defense Forces' Operational Abilities Before 
Debating on the 'Right of Collective Self-Defense'." Tokyo Sapia. Translated in FBIS-EAS-96-117. 
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an advisory body, and one not responsible, nor greatly involved in the separate defense 
forces. The improvements directed in command, control and communications will go a 
long way to making the current joint system more interoperable and compatible, but does 
nothing to improve the diffusion of direction at the upper levels within the defense 
establishment. 
The "balanced approach" advanced by the NDPO and the MTDP also has an 
inherent conflict in missions. The new emphasis on multilateral security efforts and 
Japan's role in United Nations peace-keeping missions are greatly restricted by the "Five 
Principles" governing the use of Japanese forces. The five principles are: 
1. An agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the 
conflict. 
2. These parties shall have given their consent to deployment of the peace-
keeping force and Japan's participation in that force. 
3. The peace-keeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any 
party to the conflict. 
4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the 
Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent. 
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the 
lives of personnel. 63 
These limitations, coupled with the continued constitutional question on the use of and 
deployment of Japanese forces outside the border of Japan greatly impair the possibility 
that Japan will be able to successfully fulfill their newly stated role in anything more than 
a cursory manner. 
63 "Five Principles Restricting Japan's Participation in PKO." Defense Guide of Japan, p. 1. Available 
HTTP. http:/ /cssewO l.cs.nda.ac.jp/-yas/JDAIDOJ/ PKO.html 
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Suggestions to remedy this situation range from opposition party leader Ichiro 
Ozawa's proposal that Japan establish a "stand-by force," organized and trained 
separately from the SDF, 64 to the debate over the need for some kind of a "basic security 
law" to govern the use ofthe SDF and resolve the constitutionality question.65 Until this 
conflict between the SDF' s "new mission" of peace-keeping and the restrictive principles 
for its participation is resolved, Japan's participation can only be nominal. 
The final area of conflict, the budget, has and will continue to be the major arbiter 
between desire and capability. This can be seen specifically in the competition between 
the large host nation support requirements for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan as part of 
the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and the costs associated with the modernization of 
the Self-Defense Forces. When these two are placed within the context of the current 
economic conditions and the one percent ceiling that the IDA has worked under since 
1976, the question of priority becomes real. Resolving this issue is something that must 
be done incrementally and could continue to be a problem for years to come.66 The 
constraints of the budget and the competition it causes between the SDF's new raison 
d'etre peace-keeping, and the U.S.-Japan security relations must be resolved for Japan to 
finish its modernization for the 21st Century. 
64 Ozawa Ichiro. "The Third Opening." The Economist. March 9, 1996. p. 21. 
65 "Defense Strategy of Japan." Defense Guide of Japan, p. 1. Available HTTP. 
http://cssewO l.cs.nda.ac.jp/-yas/JDA/DOJ/Policy.htrnl 
66 See Holland, p. 49-52, and Katzenstein & Okawara, p.I55-159. 
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What has become clear through this examination of the procedural manner in 
which Japanese security and defense matters are addressed, and the systematic way the 
National Defense Program Outline and the Mid-Term Defense Program are reviewed, 
revised and updated, is that external threat concerns have at best a very weak influence on 
the process. While this may simply be a reflection of the relatively peaceful nature of the 
current security environment, it seems clear that at least currently, fears of some sort of 
"China threat" are not directly influencing the process by which Japan reviews and 
modernizes its Self-Defense Forces. The greatest influences on the modernization 
process have come from internal sources: the bureaucratic process and system Japan has 
developed to manage and control its security forces, domestic political concerns, the 
pacifism that has been embraced by a majority of the Japanese people. 
External factors such as the U.S. security arrangements with Japan also strongly 
influence the modernization of the Japanese defense forces both directly, through 
limitations on what it will and will not provide, and indirectly in its pressure on Japan to 
increase its portion of this defense commitment. Other external factors such as the 
growing regional and international structures for security of which Japan is both an active 
participant in and a strong endorser, have had a moderate influence on Japan's 
modernization process both as a forum in which Japan can discuss and address security 
issues, as well as a reason for structural and mission changes to its defense forces. As 
Japan develops these forums, possibly into ones with some sort of enforcement 
mechanism, they will in the future play an even stronger role. 
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Therefore it is clear that because Japan has developed its defense forces and 
security structure devoid of any specific orientation on any one threat, the reemergence 
of China in regional and international affairs has had almost no direct influence in the 
modernization process or the orientation of the Japanese defense forces. The reaction to 
China's reemergence, as it impacts on Japan's security concerns, seem to be at a higher, 
strategic and political level, rather than influencing the modernization process itself. This 
VYill be further examined in the Chapter on the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and in 
the examination of the prospects for the future. 
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IV. UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
Despite the earlier quote by Foreign Minister Ikeda on the importance of the 
Japan-China relations, 1 there can be no doubt that the principal relationship and the 
primary foundation for Japanese security is the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Prime 
Minister Hashimoto, in his first policy speech to the Diet in January 1996, said that the 
" ... Japan-U.S. relations are the most important bilateral relationship not only for Japan 
but for the world at large and that they are the cornerstone of peace and stability for the 
Asia-Pacific region and the world .... " He noted that he will "firmly maintain the security 
arrangements with the United States, which arrangements provide the foundation for our 
wide-ranging cooperative relationship and are indispensable to the peace and prosperity 
of the Asia-Pacific region."2 
The U.S.-Japan security arrangement was rooted firmly in the Cold War's bipolar, 
confrontational attitudes that greatly influenced the way in which Japan perceived threats 
and prepared to defend itself. Since its inception, Japan has been able to use the security 
arrangements to focus national efforts and resources on its economic redevelopment. 
This seconding of Japan's security to the United States has not come without costs. 
Domestically, it has fueled a form of pacifism that now affects any action it may take to 
modernize or restructure its forces, or to use these forces in anything but the defense of 
1 As cited on Page 1 ofthis thesis, FBIS-EAS-96-218, 8 Nov 1996. 
2 Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro to the 136th Session of the National Diet. 22 
January 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.mofa.go.jp/f_m!hashimoto/ry_l36.html. 
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Japan. Furthermore, it has left Japan weak regionally and internationally in terms of their 
ability to perform any kind of leadership role in the security arena. 
The passing of the Cold War has brought about a new security environment for 
Japan. The importance of China to the security and stability of the region is one area on 
which the United States and Japan can both agree. Reflecting the new security 
environment and the importance of this "China factor," Japan has taken the actions 
outlined in Chapter III to modernize its military's roles and missions, doctrine and 
equipment. This importance of China also has had a similar effect in renewing and 
reinvigorating the importance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. This can be seen 
in the policies enunciated in the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto "Joint Declaration on 
Security-Alliance for the 21 51 Century," the December 1996 report of the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the ongoing revisions to the Guidelines for U.S.-
lapan Defense Cooperation. 
The U.S.-Japan security arrangements provide Japan strategic deterrence under 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella and are the foundation for the framework of its security 
structure. Japan's new security policies, as outlined in the 1995 NDPO and the 1996 IDA 
white paper, suggest a noticeable shift away from relying exclusively on this security 
arrangement. They now reflect a more "balanced approach" to security, with more 
symmetry between the roles of the bilateral security arrangement, the emerging regional/ 
international security aspects, and the role of Japan's Defense Forces. This shift reflects 
Japan's and the U.S.' desire to find the a larger role internationally for Japan, befitting of 
its status in the international community. In order to get a fuller understanding of the 
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historical basis for this development, I will briefly trace the ways in which the U.S.-Japan 
security arrangements has played a role in shaping Japan's strategic thought and defense 
force orientation. From there I will then explore the changes as outlined in the three 
sources noted above and how these changes reflect a new appreciation for the growing 
importance of China. The question to be answered is "Is this renewal and reaffirmation 
of the security relationship between the United States and Japan simply a 'reinvigoration' 
of the old system, a fundamental change in direction, or a combination of both?" 
A. BASIS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT 
The basis for the relationship that exists between the United States and Japan 
reflects the results of World War II and the need to bolster the East to defend against the 
growing dangers of the so-called "Evil Empire," the Soviet Union. From its surrender in 
1945 until it regained its sovereignty in 1951, Japan was completely tom down and 
rebuilt in the image and spirit of the United States. Okazaki Hisahiko, a Japanese 
academician concerned with Japanese strategic thinking, noted that East Asia and 
specifically Japan had become "the hunting preserve for the exercise of American 
idealism and moralism."3 Dependent on the United States for its survival, Japan was 
forced to embrace a new constitution that would ensure it never again was able to pursue 
a militaristic, expansionist foreign policy. 
3 Okazaki Hisahiko. A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense. (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc. 
1986) p.76. 
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1. The New "Peace" Constitution 
In order to create a foundation upon which Japan could be rebuilt, General 
MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was responsible 
for instituting a new constitution that would begin this reformation. The new constitution 
made two fundamental changes to the political structure in Japan: transferring the 
sovereignty of Japan from the emperor to its people and establishing an unambiguously 
British-style parliamentary system. Most importantly for future actions under the 
security arrangements and in response to his fear a rebirth of Japanese militarism, General 
MacArthur also insisted on the inclusion of the so-called "peace clause" in the new 
constitution.4 This clause, Article IX of the Constitution, renounced the use of war and 
the pursuit of the instruments of war as legitimate tools of a sovereign nation: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aims of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 5 
2. Defining the "Threat" and the Policy of "Containment" 
Despite the pacific aims of the constitution it had forced on Japan, the United 
States soon realized that some sort of Japanese military force would be necessary to assist 
4 W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) pp. 219-221. 
5 Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, promulgated 3 November, 1946 and put into effect 3 May, 1947. 
A complete copy of the Japanese Constitution, in both English and Japanese, can be found as the first 
addendum to Japan: Profile of a Nation, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1995) pp. 437-460. 
94 
in the new policies of"containment." With the loss of China to communism in 1949, the 
Soviets' first detonation of an atomic bomb and the belief that all communism was under 
the direction and control of the Supreme Soviet, the United States began to follow the 
policies outlined in National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68). NSC-68 
expanded on the ideas and observations of George Kennan, as articulated in his "Long 
Telegram" and "The X Article," and put forth a strategy that would "contain" 
communism. Kennan urged his superiors to adopt "a long-term policy of firmness, 
patience and understanding," designed to confront communism and Soviet encroachment 
"at every point" they are encountered. Though substantially oriented toward Europe, 
Japan was the third area of strategic interest where the United States would begin to build 
the "perimeter" called for by NSC-68 to contain communism. 6 The policy of 
containment was seen as universal in nature and as geographically unlimited. 
Additionally containment was viewed as needing a "total war" approach, in that the 
United States must be prepared to use its resources totally and unconditionally. The 
fervency and bitterness that came to characterize the Cold War and the policies of. 
containment were reflected in President Truman's speech to Congress when he declared, 
"The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and 
grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of 
6 The other two areas being the Rhine Valley in Germany and Great Britain. Robert Jervis. "The Impact of 
the Korean War on the Cold War." Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 24, December 1980. p.573. For 
a more detailed account of Kennan's thoughts, see George F. Kennan. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" 
in Phil Williams, et al. eds. Classic Readings in International Relations (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company. 1994) pp. 390-395. 
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a people for a better life has died."7 This confrontational approach to communism and 
the countries that espoused it put Japan, as the Asian ally against communism in the East, 
firmly and irrevocably in the United States' camp. 
The policies of containment brought new focus to U.S. -Japan relations. Three 
aspects of containment in East Asia were particularly important to Japan. First was the 
perception that a unified Sino-Soviet (communist) bloc existed. Second was the 
expanding nature of communism and the fear that once one country in the area fell, a 
"domino effect" would occur, with other countries nearby following closely behind. 
Lastly the signs that though not the most important arena (Europe was still assumed to be 
the place the next major power war would take place), East Asia was the area most likely 
to first test of the resolve of the United States and the "free world." These three aspects 
combined to make the U.S.-Japan security relationship the critical aspect of the Cold War 
environment. 8 
It is important to note that despite the Korean War and the Korean/Chinese threat, 
the principal and overarching greatest threat, as perceived by both the United States and 
Japan, remained the Soviet Union. The monolithic "Communism" was perceived by the 
U.S.-centered, capitalist world as completely controlled by the Soviet Union. The North 
Koreans and the Chinese, though huge in mimbers, were seen as utterly dependent on the 
7 President Harry S. Truman to the 80th Congress, March 12, 1947, cited in Cecil V. Crabb Jr., The 
Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982), p. 132. 
8 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "The Origins of the Cold War" in Classic Readings in International Relations, pp. 
395-402. 
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Soviets for much of .their equipment, training, and purpose of direction. Authors like 
Robert R. Simmons9 have shown this united communist front to be nothing more than a 
"false perception" of the capitalist world but that did not change the fact that this 
perception continued to guide U.S.-Japan relations. Thus the Soviet Union was seen as 
the principle threat against which the United States would support Japan as "a fortress 
against Communism in Asia."lO 
The contradictions of the "Peace Constitution" and the requirements of the policy 
of containment quickly came into conflict with the outbreak of war on the Korean 
peninsula. The deployment of the U.S. Occupation Forces in Japan to Korea prompted 
General MacArthur to order the formation of the Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men, 
and later expanded the Maritime Safety Agency by 8,000. This force evolved within two 
years to the National Safety Agency and in 1954 was transformed into the Defense 
Agency and the Self-Defense Forces. II 
A by-product of the Korean War and an important lesson to the Japanese, the 
dismissal of General MacArthur taught a powerful lesson to the Japanese about civilian 
control of the military. As one scholar noted, 
The reactions to Truman's dramatic and sudden action were those of 
bewilderment and astonishment that an unprepossessing civilian in 
Washington, even though President, could by one stroke of the pen fire a 
9 Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean 
Civil War. (New York: The Free Press, 1975) pp. 102-136. 
10 Terashima Jitsuro. "How To Control the U.S.-Japan-China 'Triangle Crisis'". Chuo Koron. Translated 
in FBIS-EAS-96-150. 1 August 1996. pp. 28. 
11 Japan Defense Agency White Paper. Defense of Japan 1996: Response to a New Era. (Tokyo: The 
Japan Times, Ltd. July, 1996). pp. 57-61, 370-372. 
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man who had come to represent to the Japanese people benign Authority 
and Power. This, it began to dawn on many Japanese, was "civilian 
controi."12 
This one event clearly displayed the resolve and control of the military by its civilian 
leadership, something which was clearly lacking in Japan prior to the new constitution. 
This principle became a central part of the postwar defense policy of Japan and was 
integrated into every aspect of the newly developing defense forces. 
The Korean War also had the effect of speeding the return of sovereignty of Japan 
to its people. The United States was in the impossible position of maintaining occupation 
forces in Japan, running the Japanese government, and attempting to put in place 
democratic ideals and institutions, while at the same time fighting a war against 
communism in Korea. All of this combined to pressure the United States, its allies and 
Japan to sign a peace treaty quickly. 
3. The Treaties of Peace and Security 
The Korean War brought about the need to formally end World War II in the 
Pacific and to change the view of Japan as the enemy to that of an ally in the defense of 
the free world.13 The San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference in 1951 formally ended 
the occupied status of Japan and returned to the Japanese people full sovereignty over 
Japan and its territorial waters. President Truman, in his opening remarks to that 
12 Harrison M. Holland. Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma. (Lanham: University Press of America. 
1988). p. 17. 
13 George Friedman and Meredith Lebard. The Coming War With Japan. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1991) pp. 111-112 
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conference, stressed three points that would guide U.S.-Japan relations to the present. He 
said first, that peace with Japan will bring further reconciliation and peace. Secondly he 
stated that the most important aspect of this treaty was to ensure that Japan would never 
again resort to aggression but rather opt for protection, while at the same time refraining 
from disturbing the security of other countries. Lastly he said that in the event Japan does 
establish its own self-defense force, those forces should be integrally linked to the forces 
of other countries.14 
The Peace Treaty was signed by 49 countries, but not by the Soviet Union, Poland 
and Czechoslovakia and China. At the same time, the United States and Japan also 
signed the Security Treaty 15 and later the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.16 The 
Security Treaty established the right of the United States t~ station troops in Japan and 
was an implicit agreement to come to the defense of Japan against foreign attack or 
domestic disturbances. The Defense Assistance Agreement established a legal basis for 
furnishing military equipment and technology to Japan. When Prime Minister Yoshida 
Shigeru signed the above treaties in 1951, he did so with the intent of· directing the 
recovery of Japan through economic means, leaving the security of Japan mainly to the 
United States. 
14 As cited in Crabb, The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy, p. 132. 
15 Security Treaty Between The United States of America and Japan, September 8, 1951, 3 United States 
Treaty (U.S.T.), pp. 3329-3340, Treaties and other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2491. 
16 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan, March 8, 1954, 
5 U.S.T., pp. 661-680, TIAS No. 2957. 
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4. The Yoshida Doctrine 
The doctrine named after Prime Minister Yoshida contained three main tenets. 
First, the economic revitalization of Japan was the primary national goal. Second, the 
United States would provide for Japan's security in exchange for the right to base forces 
in Japan. Third, Japan would only maintain a minimal, limited, defensive capability and 
avoid international strategic issues.l7 Cooperation with the United States on matters 
economic and political were critical to its success. 
The U.S.-Japan security arrangements was the means by which Japan could 
recover from its wartime destruction by focusing on the economy without incurring 
massive expenditures for external defense. Yoshida felt that providing bases in Japan for 
United States forces in exchange for security guarantees was a "fair price" for U.S. 
protection. IS Using Article IX of the constitution as cover, Yoshida was perfectly 
\\'illing to postpone the time when Japan would have rearm until after economic recovery 
had been achieved. In Yoshida's words, 
The day [we rearm] will come naturally if the livelihood recovers. It may 
sound selfish, but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is 
indeed our God-given luck that the Constitution bans arms. If the 
Americans complain, the constitution gives us adequate cover.l9 
17 Kenneth B. Pyle. The Japan Question- Power and Purpose in a New Era. (Washington D. C.: The 
AEI Press. 1992) pp. 21-25. 
18 Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers. Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing The U.S-
Japan Security Alliance. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) p.13. 
19 As cited in Kataoka, p. 16. 
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Yoshida also favored the bilateral relationship between the United States and 
Japan over proposals for regional collective security like NATO in Europe. He was 
supported in this by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who knew that another 
NATO-like collective security alliance would never make it past the U.S. Congress. 
In order to avoid conflicts in international strategic issues and as a necessary side-
effect of the Yoshida doctrine, Japan deferred on major foreign policy approaches to the 
United States. Japan's recognition of Taiwan rather than Beijing as the legitimate 
government of China is the clearest example of this. Despite following the U.S. lead in 
foreign policy, Japan has maintain~d a policy of economic independence in its trading 
partners. It reached out for the Chinese market with unofficial economic missions to 
Beijing and Sino-Japanese commercial relations were reestablished as early as 1952. 
Between 1952 and 1958, a total of four trade agreements were signed between official 
Chinese Communist organs and unofficial, private Japanese trade associations.20 These 
informal agreements, known as "friendship trade," accounted for nearly 30% of Japan's 
total trade in the region and made the PRC, Japan's number one East Asian trading 
partner.21 
20 Milton M. Meyer. Japan: A Concise History. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993) p. 
259. 
21 Allen S. Whiting. China Eyes Japan. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) p. 39. 
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5. 1960 Revisions and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
Both the Security Treaty and the Defense Assistance Agreement were revised in 
1960, under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,22 which further defined the 
U.S. commitment to Japan's defense. The 1960 revisions called for an incremental step 
for Japan to take a larger role in its own defense as it had agreed to in the initial Security 
Treaty: 
... Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense 
against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any annament 
which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace 
and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter.23 
As Japan began to recover economically and to grow more independent and able 
to stand on its own, the need to revise the Security Treaty had grown with this rising 
Japanese confidence. As the debate on revising the Treaty occurred, Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke provided an unusually blunt series of notes which outlined the basic 
problems with the U.S.-Japan relationship and the four areas that were the most 
problematic: 
1. Japanese aversion to war as against global policy of U.S., particularly its 
military policy towards Japan. 
2. Resentment against Japan's subordinate position to U.S. under Japan-U.S. 
security treaty arrangements. 
3. Antipathy arising from territorial problems. 
22 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. January 19, 1960. United States - Japan, II U.S.T., pp. 
1632-1651, TIAS No. 4509 and the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. 19 January 1960. 
United States- Japan. II U.S.T., pp. 1652-1675, TIAS No. 4510. 
23 Security Treaty, Preamble, p. 3331. 
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4. Disappointment over restrictive measures against Japanese goods in U.S. and 
dissatisfaction over embargo against Communist China.24 
Domestic political problems between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
and the opposition parties of the Left, compounded the difficulty of coming up with a 
revision which solved all of the above listed areas of antagonism. In fact the very 
constitutionality (in accordance with the Japanese Constitution) of the U.S.-Japan 
security arrangements was under question.25 To force the issue further and to pressure 
the ruling party, the Left in Japan (with cautious support of a number of more moderate 
groups and portions of the general populous) conducted street demonstrations, strikes, 
and distributed hand bills decrying the revisions. 
The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was a step toward a more 
equal bilateral relationship. Items in the initial Security Treaty that were believed 
necessary for stability and control during the occupation period but no longer acceptable 
were removed. For example, the Security Treaty clause which allowed U.S. forces to be 
used in domestic disturbances within Japan was removed, as was the clause which denied 
Japan the right to grant military concessions to any third party. 26 The Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation also had added a clause which put in place a ten-year time limit, after which 
the treaty would only require a one-year notification to terminate. Most importantly and 
24 As cited in Roger Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1992). pp. 80-81. 
25 Tokyo District Court Judge Date Akio ruled the security arrangements unconstitutional in 1959, only to 
have his ruling overturned on appeal by the Japanese Supreme Court. Ibid. p. 91. 
26 Article I and II, Security Treaty, p.3331. 
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the heart of the revisions, Articles V and VI gave specific guarantees of security to Japan 
and redirected and reemphasized the basis for stationing of U.S. forces in and around 
Japan. Article V stated that an armed attack against either the Japan and the United 
States "in the territories under the administration of Japan" would cause them to "act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." 
Article VI, in order to contribute "to the security of Japan and the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Far East," granted the United States "the use by its 
land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."27 The end result was a 
document that continues today to be the legal basis for the U.S.-Japan security 
arrangements and represents, according to its supporters, the very principles Yoshida had 
advocated in 1951 and outlined in the Yoshida Doctrine.28 
B. GRADUAL CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
Despite various problems most often associated with economic and trade friction, 
the security relationship between the United States and Japan continued on a relatively 
even keel through most of the Cold War period. By this I mean that the aims and goals 
have remained generally the same. The security arrangements have remained on the path 
set out in the 1960 revisions of the Mutual Cooperation and Security Agreements and the 
Yoshida Doctrine continued as the basic operating principle behind Japanese security 
policy through the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that change did not occur. The 
27 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Articles V and VI, p. 1634. 
28 Buckley, p. 97. 
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security relationship has required continuous maintenance and has had to be constantly 
managed. Three areas in particular experienced the greatest change; these are the 
perception of the threat, the level of U.S. commitment and the capabilities of the JSDF. 
1. The Changing Threat Perceptions 
The identification of a threat against which the U.S.-Japan security arrangements 
were to defend, has gone through a number of changes, both in direction and degree. As 
was noted earlier, the enemy against whom the security arrangement was originally 
established was the Soviet Union, perceived as the leader and director of the international 
communist community. Junior members of this community in Asia, China, North Korea 
and Vietnam, were seen as mere pawns under the Soviets control. This simplistic, 
bilateral antagonism provided the justification and purpose for the Cold War and was the 
basis for the security arrangement. From a global perspective, this division was relatively 
clear. In Asia, and specifically in Japan, however, the impact of or at least concern for 
other regional players tended to play a larger role than in the global perspective. 
Additionally the fluidity of the threat and the amount of change in Asia (in all aspects, 
politically, militarily, culturally, economically, etc.) has been much greater than in 
Europe, where this static, "enemies staring at each other across a border," mentality was 
born. 
At the beginning of the Cold War, the threat from the Soviet Union was clear, 
from a strategic perspective, but mainly in a broad, ideological way. The threat from 
" ... mainland China, which the Japanese tend predominantly to view as an Asian power, 
105 
rather than necessarily a Communist power in the Cold War context," always put a strain 
on the U.S.-Japan security relations and raised questions about the focus of Japan's 
defenses. However, from a numerical and capabilities perspective, the unprecedented 
build-up of Soviet forces in the Far East beginning in the late 1960's, with the relative 
decline in fear of China due to its dual focus (inward-looking and toward the Soviet 
Union), the primary threat and reason for the Security Treaty became even clearer.29 The 
Soviet build-up, directly related to the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, also highlights 
the problem Japan had with a threat based on a perception of some sort of unified 
communism. It became clear to Japan that both China and the Soviet Union must be 
considered as a separate, individual threat. The degree to which each was a threat to 
Japan, however, was vastly different. It is also important to keep in mind that being a 
threat does not necessarily mean the possibility of a direct attack on Japan. Personnel, 
weapons and equipment, the positioning, stationing and training of these forces, and most 
importantly, though also most difficult to know, the intentions and plans must be taken 
into account. 
Despite Japanese concerns with China's involvement in the Korean war, China's 
military forces were seen as mainly internally directed and not a threat to Japan. 
Simmons argues that the primary reason for China's involvement in this war was fear that 
the United Nations sponsored attacks into North Korea and toward the Chinese borders 
29 Okazaki, pp. 101-103. 
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could be pushed on into China.30 Once this fear was alleviated, China's focus returned 
to internal security and the growing Soviet threat. As the depth and intensity of the Sino-
Soviet dispute became more known, this internal and Soviet focus decreased Japan's 
concerns that China was anything but a long-term, distant threat. The Sino-Vietnam War 
and the poor showing of the Chinese forces there reinforced the belief that China was of 
. 
little direct threat to Japan. This was reflected in IDA assessment that "the most 
important major front for the Chinese military is considered to be the Sino-Soviet border, 
to be followed by the Sino-Vietnamese border.31 The Soviets, on the other hand, 
continued to take actions that demonstrated to Japan that they continued to be the greatest 
threat in the region. 32 
The change from seeing the threat as a single, unified force under the Soviet 
Union to a more multifaceted threat, emerged with the Sino-Soviet disputes of the late 
1960's, changing more with the expansion and outcome of the Vietnam War, the "Nixon 
Shocks" and the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC, but 
became truly credible with the announcement of the "four modernizations" by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1985. Up until this time, any question of threat to Japan would work its way 
back to the Soviet Union as the only credible one. Even the events listed above, though 
they might have changed perceptions of commitment or identified areas of concern, they 
30 Simmons, pp. 102-106. 
31 Defense of Japan 1982, p. 40. 
32 See Okazaki, p. 103, and Defense of Japan, 1982, pp. 7-14 for an examination of the expansion of 
Soviet influence and forces. 
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did not fundamentally change the principal threat in the area. The military modernization 
of the Chinese forces, however, brought the possibility of another threat onto the horizon. 
2. Changing Perceptions of the U.S. Commitment to Japan 
At the same time that the perceived threat from the Soviet Union was grO\ving, 
Japan began to see a waning or weakening of the U.S. commitment to Asia in general, 
and to Japan in particular. Conditions and events such as the unresolved nature of the 
Korean War, the effects from the shocks caused by the way in which the United States 
normalized relations with the PRC, the defeat and withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Vietnam, and the continued call for Japan to enlarge more quickly its defense spending, 
as well as the roles and missions of its forces, Japan could not help but question the U.S. 
resolve to stay in Asia. 
The belief that the United States was left with a "sour taste" in its mouth from 
problems associated with Korea and the lack of progress toward any kind of peaceful 
resolution, coupled with President Carter's troop cutback plans for South Korea, left 
Japan with a sense that the U.S. commitment to Asia was weakening by the mid-1970's. 
Though stopped by the Reagan Administration before they could occur, the idea that the 
United States would pull out a portion of its force in Korea, in spite of the real threat to 
security in the region from the North Koreans and in response to perceptions of a South 
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Korea human rights problem, made Japan question the relative importance of its 
position.33 
The so-called Nixon shocks, the normalization of relations between the United 
States and the PRC without prior notification, the removal of the dollar from the gold 
standard, and the import restrictions on textiles, all gave Japan reasons to be concerned 
about the sincerity of the U.S. commitment. If Japan, a nation that would be greatly 
affected by the reopening of China (a prospect Japan had been trying to arrange on its 
own) and a bilateral treaty partner of the United States, could not be consulted or at least 
informed in advance, many Japanese felt it did not bode well for the relationship. Tie to 
that the effects resultant from the ending of the Bretton Woods agreements and the trade 
dispute on Japanese textile exports, and you have Japan questioning the viability of the 
U.S.-Japan relationship.34 
The U.S. debacle in Vietnam and its subsequent withdrawal signaled another U.S. 
retreat from Asia. This war, more than any other, caused the United States to question its 
security policies throughout the world. A result of this "soul-searching" was the 
retrenchment of U.S. security policy titled after its creator, the "Nixon Doctrine." The 
Nixon Doctrine, in a nutshell, has been described as "a new emphasis on getting U.S. 
partners everywhere to bolster the U.S. leadership position by doing more on their own 
33 Edward A. Olsen. U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View. (Stanford: Hoover 
Institute Press. 1985) p. 41. 
34 Buckley examines, in great detail, many of the aspects and interrelated problems of the Nixon Shocks. 
pp. 115-137. 
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behalf."35 To the Japanese, however, it was seen as a rationalization for a reduced role 
for the United States in Asia.36 The key concept within the Nixon Doctrine was a 
retrenchment of America's overseas obligations, which would allow the United States to 
fulfill the remaining obligations more effectively and at a lower cost.37 
An integral part of the Nixon Doctrine and the final aspect that accelerated 
Japan's questioning of the U.S. commitment to Asia and to the U.S.-Japan security 
arrangements, was the continued U.S. pressure and demands for Japan to increase its 
support of the arrangements. U.S. requests for Japan to pick up more of its own defense 
had began as early as 1947 and probably always will be a part of the tensions related to 
this uneven security arrangements. However, during this period events such as the 
reversion of the Ryukyu islands (including Okinawa), for example, were viewed by the 
Japanese as a crowbar with which the United States was prying out further increases in 
Japan's security effort and thereby relieve the United States of the requirement. 
3. The Changing Capabilities of the Japanese Defense Forces 
As the U.S.-Japan security relationship has gradually changed over time, based on 
changes in the perception of the threat and the commitment of the United States, so have 
the capabilities of the Japanese defense forces. The History of the JSDF and Self-Defense 
Annals, Deployment and Outline of the Organization of the JDA, as cited by defense 
~s 
.) Olsen, p. 7. 
36 Ibid., p. 41. 
37 Crabb, pp. 278-324. 
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researcher, Satoshi Morimoto, breaks up the development and changes of the Defense 
Forces capabilities into three phases.38 The first phase encompasses the creation of the 
National Police Force Reserve, its reorganization under the Defense Agency as Self-
Defense Forces through the First Defense Buildup Plan in 1957. The second, or 
formative phase, began with the adoption of the Basic Policies for National Defense in 
that same year and continues through the end of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan in 
1976. The final phase, which begins with a new perspective on force modernization and 
defense procedures under the National Defense Program Outline, continued until the end 
of the Cold War. I would now add a fourth phase, one which goes from the new NDPO 
announced in 1995 and continues into the future. This phase encompasses the changes 
made reflecting the new security environment and is more a change in emphasis than 
direction. 
During the initial phase, Japan's newly created defense forces were issued 
weapons by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement39 and 
trained by U.S. Forces in Japan. Primarily used for domestic control and to reinforce 
local police, these forces could not yet be considered true defense forces. During the 
formative phase, Japan began to make use of Three- and Five-Year Defense Buildup 
38 Satoshi Morimoto. "The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its Role and Missions in the Post-Cold War 
Period." in Asia in the 2 !'1 Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities. Institute For National Strategic Studies 
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1994). pp. 171-188. 
39 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with Annexes, between the United States of America and Japan. 
8 March 1954. 5 U.S.T., pp. 661-680. 
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Plans to direct the development of the defense forces toward a specific level, thereby 
improving fighting capabilities of the SDF while preparing for any military eventuality. 
In the late 1950's this force was of sufficient strength and training to take over from the 
United States the primary mission of defense of Japan. The third phase began with the 
1973 National Defense Plan, which fundamentally changed the buildup of the defense 
forces from one focused on attaining a force with level of preparedness equal to a specific 
threat to one that was focused on building within clear limits on defense capabilities and 
spending.40 The concept of "defense power in peacetime" was used to explain the tie 
betv.;een the limits on defense spending and capabilities, the reliance on the U.S.-Japan 
security arrangements, and the ongoing detente between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 
The 1973 NDPO gave credence to an SDF that was only able to deal with limited 
or small-scale aggression, relying on the U.S. security guarantees for anything greater. It 
emphasized the modernization of the SDF's equipment, weapons and logistical support 
without increases in size or changes in missions. Five-Year Mid-Term Planning 
Estimates (renamed Mid-Term Defense Program Plans after 1985) were then used to 
direct defense spending within the one percent of GNP constraint place on the JDA.41 
'While there is a real limitation to a defense budget based on one percent of a given GNP, 
40 Holland, p. 21. 
41 The 1% ceiling on defense expenditures was put in place under Prime Minister Miki Takeo in 1976. It 
was removed as a formal policy in 1987 under Prime Minister Nakasone. Holland, pp. 49-52. Also see 
Table 5. 
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Japan has experienced phenomenal growth in its GNP and therefore the amount actually 
spent on defense has also increased.42 Even with the one percent restriction, the total 
amount spent on defense expenditures has increased from ¥1.3 trillion ($7.2 billion) in 
1975 to ¥4.8 trillion ($26.5 billion) in 1996, which was fourth highest worldwide.43 
However, Thomas Wilborn, an Asian specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, argues 
persuasively that in the case of Japan, it is unrealistic to use defense spending as a 
standard for comparing military capability. This, he argues, is due to volatile exchange 
rates, high personnel costs and high equipment costs. 44 
Table 5 provides an overview of Japanese defense spending from 1955 until the 
present. The table shows is that despite the large total, the growth and changes from year 
to year have been small. It also shows that even during years of high or low tension and 
periods when China and others have criticized the Japanese for remilitarizing, or when 
the United States has criticized them for not doing enough, there has not been a 
corresponding increase, decrease or great change in their defense spending. The Japanese 
have stuck to the plan laid out in the NDPO and the MTDP. That other countries have 
42 Under Prime Minister Nakasone's lead, an attempt was made to change or remove this limit, and for 
three years (1987-89) the spending limit was exceeded. Since then, however, though not a formal policy 
required by law, it has been followed and maintained. Defense of Japan, 1996. Reference 24. Changes 
in Defense Expenditures, p. 298. 
43 Ibid. p. 298 and United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers: 1995. (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1994). p. 42. 
The total amounts of these two references are different due to defmition differences. However, the trend 
in defense spending and the overall rankings are the same. 
44 Thomas L. Wilborn. Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia. (Carlisle 
Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute. United States Army War College. 1994) p. 14. 
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concern to complain is telling proof of the changes Japan's defense forces have gone 
through. 
'When the amount Japan spends on defense is compared with other countries, 
(Table 6) a similar result is found. In constant dollars, the amount Japan expends on its 
defense (and support of the U.S. forces stationed in and around Japan) seems on par with 
other countries of its size. Keeping in mind Wilborn's earlier comments about volatile 
GNP General Growth Defense Grov.'th Ratio Ratio of Defense 
Item (Initial Account from Budget from Defense Budget to 
Forecast) Previous Previous Budget to General Account 
FY (A) (B) Year (C) Year GNP (C/B) 
(CIA) 
1955 75,590 9,915 .0.8 1,349 -3.3 1.78 13.61 
1965 281,600 36,581 12.4 3,014 9.6 1.07 8.24 
1975 1,585,000 212,888 24.5 13,273 21.4 0.84 6.23 
1985 3,146,000 524,996 3.7 31,371 6.9 0.997 5.98 
1986 3,367,000 540,886 3.0 33,435 6.58 0.993 6.18 
1987 3.504,000 541,010 0.0 35,174 5.2 1.004 6.50 
1988 3,652,000 566,997 4.8 37,003 5.2 1.013 6.53 
1989 3,897,000 604,142 6.6 39,198 5.9 1.006 6.49 
1990 4,172.000 662,368 9.6 41,593 6.1 0.997 6.28 
1991 4,596,000 703,474 6.2 43,860 5.45 0.954 6.23 
1992 4,837,000 722,180 2.7 45,518 3.8 0.941 6.30 
1993 4,953.000 723,548 0.0 46,406 1.95 0.937 641 
199~ 4,885,000 730,817 1.0 46,835 0.9 0.959 6.41 
1995 4,928,000 709,871 -2.9 47,236 0.86 0.959 6.65 
1996 4,960,000 751,049 5.8 48,455 2.58 0.977 6.45 
Sourer: Japan Dtftnst Agtncy, Defense of Japan, 1996. Reference 24, p. 298. 
Table 5: Changes in Japan's Defense Expenditures (Unit: ¥100 Million,%) 
exchange rates, high personnel costs and high equipment costs, the amount is actually 
even less. 
Through the use of the NDPO and the MTDP, Japan has modernized the SDF 
\\ithin the confines of its defense-only strategy. As noted earlier, this strategy is not 
directed against or in response to any specific threat. It is completely backwards from the 
way the United States, for example, does its defense planning in which the first step is to 
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Defense Expenditure 
U.S. $(million) U.S. $per capita %ofGDP 
Country 1985 1994 1995 1985 1994 1995 1985 1994 1995 
Canada 10688 9695 9004 421 345 320 2.2 1.7 1.6 
China 27107 28945 31731 26 24 26 7.9 5.6 5.7 
DPRK 5675 5660 5232 278 245 219 23.0 26.6 25.2 
France 44604 45184 48002 808 781 826 4.0 3.3 3.1 
Germany 48149 36965 41815 634 454 509 3.2 2.0 2.0 
Indonesia 3197 2486 2751 20 13 14 2.8 1.6 1.6 
Iran 19423 2340 2460 435 38 38 36.0 3.8 3.9 
Japan 29350 46639 50219 243 372 401 1.0 1.0 1.1 
ROK 5892 12764 14359 209 285 320 5.1 3.3 3.4 
Russia 329449* 96693 82000 1189* 649 551 16.1 * 8.5 7.4 
Taiwan 8793 11457 13136 453 543 620 7.0 4.7 5.0 
United States 352551 293214 277834 1473 1130 1056 6.5 4.2 3.8 
Vietnam 3277 992 910 53 14 12 19.4 5.1 4.3 
Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance: /9961/997. pp. 306-308. 
* - Indicate total as the Soviet Union 
Table 6: Comparison of Defense Expenditures (1995 Constant Prices) 
identify the threat (or a series of threats). Then scenarios in which this threat might occur 
are imagined. Only then is the military force examined, to ensure sufficient forces are on 
hand or available to compete in these scenarios. Japan has chosen to build a force that it 
considers able to defend Japan, within the constraints of its one percent spending ceiling, 
the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and the continued peace and stability in the region, 
but without focusing on any specific threat. 
Some have argued that SDF readiness has been the victim of the lack of public 
support, on the one hand, and ulterior motives of the IDA on the other. Defense analyst 
Michael Chinworth notes that "IDA strategy over the past twenty years has been directed 
at establishing the policy precedents that accompany the production, development, and 
deployment of state-of-the-art systems" in an attempt to better itself in the eyes of its own 
people, and the Japanese bureaucracy. This pursuit of high-tech items has been at the 
cost of the overall development of the SDF. Critical areas such as logistical support and 
ammunition supplies, which do not carry that sexy "high-tech" label, generally are not 
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supported.45 Others question the true purpose of the SDF. "Many observers agree with 
Michael Chinworth in wondering if the purpose of the SDF is really to assuage U.S. 
pressure rather than to provide for defense, or any other military purpose."46 
A simple but meaningful way to look at the capability of the SDF is to compare it 
to the forces of other nations. Table 7 shows 15 other nations' ground, sea and air forces. 
Table 8 then shows a comparison of weapons systems within the region. What is clear 
after examining these two tables is that Japan on the whole seems to possess a military 
that is slightly smaller than that of other nations its size. Further, within the region, it 
Ground Forces Naval Forces Air Forces 
Name of Country (10.000 Name of Country (10,000 (Number of Name of Country (Number of combat 
or region persons) or region tons) Vessels) or region aircraft) 
China 220.0 USA 506.9 1050 China *6010 
North Korea 100.0 Russia 424.0 1700 USA *4200 
India 98.0 China 104.5 940 Russia *3440 
Russia 67.0 UK 82.6 300 Ukraine *1100 
ROK 55.0 France 46.0 330 India *930 
Pakistan 52.0 India 26.4 160 France *790 
USA 50.1 Peru 23.4 40 UK *600 
Vietnam 50.0 Turkey 22.7 240 North Korea 590 
Turkey 40.0 Taiwan 22.3 390 Syria 580 
Iraq 35.0 Germany 19.9 210 Egypt 580 
Iran 34.5 Italy 19.7 170 Germany *560 
Syria 31.5 Spain 19.1 ISO ROK *490 
Egypt 31.0 Brazil 18.6 190 Israel 490 
Myanmar 26.5 Indonesia 16.7 140 Taiwan *470 
France 24.1 Canada 16.3 70 Turkey, Poland 450 
Japan 15.3 Japan 34.6 160 Japan 520 
Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1996. Reference 8, p. 251 
* - Includes air force, naval and marine combat aircraft. 
Table 7: Outline of Major Countries' and Regional Military Power 
45 Michael W. Chinworth. Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy. (Washington 
D.C.: Brassey's Inc. 1992). pp. 8-9. 
46 Wilborn, p. 18. 
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Weapons System China DPRK ROK Taiwan Russia Japan 
(Far East) 
Main Battle Tank 8000-8500 3400 2110. 630 5600 1130 
Annored Personnel Carrier 6100 2740 2520 875 7000 940 
Artillery Pieces 14500 8000 4500 1375 5800 780 
Multiple Rocket Launchers • 2200 156 • • 90 
Attack Helicopters 81 0 75 45 190 84 
Reconnaissance Aircraft 290 0 28 37 100 120 
Fighter, Ground Attack 440 •• 255 •• 334 so 
Fighters 4411 529 130 327 450 259 
Bombers 566 82 0 0 180 0 
Submarines 63 25 4 4 43 17 
Destroyers 18 0 7 18 13 9 
Frigates 36 3 33 18 34 51 
Mine Countermeasures 120 25 14 16 47 35 
ASW Helicopter 40 0 47 19 75 110 
Amphibious Ship 55 0 15 21 17 6 
Amphibious Craft 370 260 36 400 203 40 
Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance: 199611997. 
* - Included in artillery pieces total .. 
•• -Included in Fighters total. 
Table 8: Regional Comparison of Major Countries' Weapons Systems 
shows the comparative lack of weapons systems within the SDF, the exception being 
surface combatants and ASW assets. While both tables only show quantity and do not 
accurately reflect capabilities (such as range, lethality, age, training, etc.), the data do 
cause one to question the basis of charges of Japanese remilitarization and fears of 
Japanese military might from an equipment/size standpoint. 
When evaluating the capabilities of the SDF, it is important to keep in mind the 
defensive orientation of Japan. While any weapon can be used for offensive as well as 
defensive purpose, the type and quantity ofweapons acquired by Japan do seem to be 
defensively oriented. Its lack of long-range transports (both naval and air), bombers, and 
in-flight refueling capabilities, coupled with the relatively large quantity of ASW assets, 
fighters and tanks (without the capability to move them off the island they are on), seems 
to give credibility to its claim of a defense-only strategy. Wilborn goes so far as to say 
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that " ... the SDF must be as close to that [exclusively defensive] standard as the military 
of any major nation."47 
The equipment Japan has acquired to defend itself is only part of the equation. 
The ability of Japan to develop a credible force which can deter aggression and defend 
the country is tied directly to the level of training it has attained. There have been 
arguments in both directions, saying that the SDF is poorly trained or well-trained. Those 
who believe it poorly trained point to the lack of live-fire training, limited training areas, 
unrealistic training, and the lack of combat experience within its ranks.48 On the other 
side, analysts point to the growing number of training exercises, particularly combined 
exercises (including two or all of the branches of the SDF), and to the greatly increased 
number of joint training exercises with the United States.49 This trend began in the 
1980's and continues today. Japanese forces have conducted training exercises in 
conjunction with the United States in and around Japan, Hawaii, Washington, New 
Mexico and Alaska.SO The Maritime and Air SDF have the longest history and closest 
ties to their related elements in the U.S. forces, but the GSDF has been increased its 
47 Ibid. p. 19. 
48 Nonnan D. Levin, Mark Lorell and Arthur Alexander. The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in 
Japanese Security Policies. (Santa Monica: Rand. 1993) p. 49, 51-52, 68-69, Tsutomu Matsumura, 
"Analyst Questions SDF Defense Capability" in FBIS-EAS-96-117, 12 Jun 1996, and Brian Cloughley, 
"Japan Ponders Power Projection" International Defense Review. Vol. 29. No.7. 1 July 1996. pp. 27-35. 
49 For one of the best overviews of the capabilities of the SDF in tenns of equipment, personnel and 
training, see Levin, Lorell and Alexander, Chapter 3, pp. 37-69. See also Kataoka and Myers. Defending 
an Economic Superpower. pp. 76-79. 
50 Defense of Japan, various years. For 1996, Reference 31. pp. 310-312. 
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participation levels.51 For example, for the last nine years Japan has participated in 
RIMPAC, a bilateral (United States and Japan) and multilateral (United States, Australia, 
Canada, South Korea, and Chile) joint naval exercise. 52 
The enormous changes Japan's SDF has gone through have allowed it to advance 
from its beginnings as a domestic police force to the point such that it is now capable of 
defending Japan. It must do so, however, within the constraints of its constitution, 
spending limits, and with the assistance of the United States. 
4. The Demise of the Soviet Union and a New Environment 
The implosion of the Soviet Union and the separation of its various republics into 
autonomous nations has dramatically changed the strategic environment of the world. 
The bipolar structure of military confrontation between the United States and its allies, on 
the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the communist world, on the other, has ended. 
With its end three major changes have occurred to the security environment: the 
possibility of global war has decreased immensely, the importance and use of a 
multilateral approach to security has increased, and nuclear weapons and the nuclear 
threat has diminished. 
The changes in the security environment no longer permit the single-minded focus 
on the threat posed by the Soviet Union that was a characteristic of the Cold War. 
51 Levin, Lorell and Alexander, p. 43, note 8. Asia-Pacific Defense Forum Staff, Yakima: A New Japanese 
Training Ground. Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Spring 1995. p. 26-30. 
52 A great deal of information on this exercise is available HTTP. http://www.cpf.navy.mil/r96oview.htm. 
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Inherent to the prevention of global war, the United States had focused most heavily on 
the Soviet Union. For Japan, this Soviet threat was apparent in the Far East Military 
District's overwhelming numerical superiority. In light of this force to the north, Japan 
was able to focus its defenses in that direction as it was truly the only military threat to 
Japan in the area. As this force deteriorated under the poor economic support and 
political confusion of Russia, other possible threats have become more critical and could 
destabilize the security in the region. The role of China has become particularly 
important, affecting all the possible problem areas, including the Korean peninsula, 
Taiwan, the South China Sea, and various smaller territorial disputes. Additionally many 
of the nations in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities 
mainly in light of their economic development. Regional conflict, based on ethnic, 
religious or territorial disputes are becoming more likely. 
As the bilateral system of confrontation dissolved, the use of multinational 
responses to security problems has grown. The coalition warfare ofthe Persian Gulf War 
and the multilateral use of sanctions and military alliances to enforce peace in Somalia 
and Bosnia is seen as the wave of the future. The emergence of U.N. structures which 
allow a effective international response to dangers provide for a greater reliance on 
multilateral actions. For Japan, the growing importance of ASEAN and its Regional 
Forum, the G-7, APEC, and the United Nations serve as the basis for the development of 
a regional security architecture. 
The final change to the security environment is the decrease of the importance of 
nuclear weapons and the associated decrease in the nuclear threat. This is the most 
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relative of all the changes, in that one nuclear bomb can still cause sufficient havoc and 
devastation that a. thousand seem redundant. However, reduction in nuclear stockpiles 
has begun in the former Soviet Union and the United States under the START I and II 
talks. However, they do not apply to other nuclear powers such as the United Kingdom, 
China and France, and countries such as North Korea and Pakistan have continued to 
pursue these weapons. In addition, the development and spread of weapons of mass 
destruction based on chemical or biological agents continue to present a danger. The 
nuclear umbrella guaranteed under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
remains the primary deterrent to these developments. 
With these changes in the security environment, it became necessary to reexamine 
the purpose and intent of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. As discussed in Chapter 
III, Japan's review of its policies began with the report, "The Modality of the Security 
and Defense Capability of Japan." This then became the heart of the revision and release 
of the new National Defense Program Outline. The NDPO, as the long-term vision for 
Japanese security policy, provided the basis for the Mid-Term Defense Program. The 
MTDP laid out the specific budgetary constraints, equipment and personnel levels, 
structural and doctrinal changes to be made and programs and studies to be conducted 
over the next five years. For. the United States, the same kind of review process in 
institutionalized in the Department of Defense's annual Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) and the production of its National Military Strategy which is 
reflective of the President's National Security Strategy. In addition, the post-Cold War 
environment had some calling for a reallocation of priorities in order to receive the 
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"peace dividend" possible from the unneeded expenditures on defense. Therefore the 
United States conducted a "bottom-up review" of its defense organizations, strategies and 
policies. From this process and as part of the review of regional security policy, the East 
Asia Strategy Report (EASR) was produced in 1995. This report provided a regional 
focus and perspective on the U.S. post-Cold War policies in East Asia. It positioned the 
U.S.-Japan security relationship as the core of U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific 
region and described the security alliance as fundamental to the peace and security of not 
only the nvo countries but also to the whole Asia-Pacific region. 53 
C. REVISIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE 218T CENTURY 
China's actions have helped to spur Japan toward a revitalization of its security 
arrangements with the United States. China's conduct in a recent series of aggressive 
political and military moves gave credence to those who believed China was becoming a 
threat. The duplicitous way in which China's Premier Li Peng could say to Japanese 
politicians that "China has not posed, and will not pose a threat to any other country. 
China's development will only benefit peace and stability in Asia and the world at 
large."54 while at the same time their forces were occupying Mischief Reef, taking it 
from the Philippines. The Chinese have taken other aggressive actions in the East and 
South China Seas, such as the Taiwan Strait missile firing and training exercise, and 
53 Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs. United States Security Strategy for the 
East Asia-Pacific Region. February 1995. p. 10. 
54 "China No Threat to Japan: Li Peng" Agence France Presse, May 6, 1996. 
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nuclear weapons testing. Additionally the strategic accord with Russia which has 
facilitated the purchase of advanced weaponry fuel the concern for China's real 
intentions. 55 
In conjunction with the Japanese and U.S. reviews of their respective strategies 
for security and in accordance with the requirements set out in Article IV of the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security, 56 concentrated consultations and dialogues took place 
. on the significance of the post-Cold War environment on the U.S.-Japan security 
arrangements. The forum for these discussions ranged from numerous working groups, 
the bilateral Security Subcommittee, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC is also 
know as the 2 plus 2)57 up to the Summit Meetings of the President of the United States 
and the Prime Minister of Japan. 58 
During this period of consultation, two agreements that will have a great impact 
on the operation of the security relations were updated. They were the Agreement on 
55 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro. The Coming Conflict With China. ((New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc. 1997) pp. 166-185. 
56 "The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at 
the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far 
East is threatened." Additional notes established the Security Consultative Committee, consisting of the 
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Director General of the Defense Agency, the U.S. Ambassador 
to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Articles IV, 
p. 1634; notes pp. 1650-1651. 
57 This U.S. participation to this group was changed in December of 1990 from those noted in footnote 56 
to now include the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. This combination of the Japanese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Director General of the IDA and the U.S. Secretaries of State and 
Defense are known as the "2-plus-2." 
58 The major forums for United States-Japan consultations on security are listed in Reference 29, Defense 
of Japan, 1996, pp. 303-304. 
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Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services59 and the New Special 
Measures Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Forces in Japan.60 In 
addition, a Special Action Committee on Okinawa was created to find ways within the 
security arrangements to better address and reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. 
The two-year review of the security relationship culminated at the April 1996 
Summit Meeting where two documents were issued: "Meeting the Challenges of the 21st 
Century, a Message from Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton to the Peoples 
of Japan and the United States"61 and "United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security 
-Alliance for the 21 51 Century."62 These documents are a renewal and revitalization of 
the security alliance and represent a decision as to the future of the security relationship. 
Perhaps the most important work, however, is still ongoing. The review of the security 
guidelines under which the United States and Japan cooperate on defense issues and plan 
for contingencies is critical. These guidelines will clearly establish the various actions 
59 Excerpts of the "Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United 
States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between 
the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Anned Forces of the United States of America," June 28, I996, 
are in Defense of Japan, 1996, Reference 32, pp. 3I3-3I5. 
60 Excerpts of the "Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning New Special 
Measures Relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and 
Areas and the Status of United States Forces in Japan," December II I995, are in Defense of Japan, 
1996, Reference 39, pp. 324-325. 
61 The full text of the message "Meeting the Challenges of the 2I 51 Century," is available HITP. 
http:/ /\\'WW .state .gov/www/regions/eap/japan/21 stcent.html. 
62 The full text of the message "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21 51 Century," is 
available HITP. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/jointsec.html. 
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and roles of the United States and Japan and allow for the discussion of situations that 
could cause serious damage the security arrangements. 
1. Improved Support and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
One of the most important aspects of U.S.-Japan security arrangements is the 
development of interoperability between the two forces. The success the United States 
and its allies enjoyed during the War in the Persian Gulf was directly ~elated to the 
agreements put in place prior to the conflict. Logistical agreements that allow the use by 
an ally of fuels, ammunitions, foods and wa~er, increase the efficiency and ease of 
operations. The Agreement on Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and 
Services (also know as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, or ACSA) allows 
the United States and Japan to support each other in bilateral exercises, United Nations 
peace-keeping operations and international humanitarian relief missions with such 
provisions as food, water, billeting, transportation, petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, 
communications, medical services, storage, training, spare parts and components, repair 
and maintenance, and air and sea port services. The agreement is not subject to the 
provisions of Japan's Three Principles of Arms Exports,63 but the use of the supplies or 
63 Japan restricted the export of anns to 1) communist countries, 2) countries under UN-resolution anns 
embargo and 3) countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976 Prime 
Minister Miki further tightened these restrictions, and in 1981 a resolution passed by the Diet banned 
anns exports to these three categories of countries, restricting the exports of arms in general and the 
plants that could produce them. This, however, was revised to not include the exchange of military-
related technology to the United States in 1983. See Defense of Japan, 1996, Reference 35 and 36, pp. 
318-320. 
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services must be consistent with the U.N. Charter and may not be transferred to a third 
party without consent of the provider. 
The impact of this agreement is particularly important to Japan in terms of the las_t 
hvo instances, U.N. peace-keeping and international humanitarian assistance. As noted 
earlier, Japan's defense forces, organized and equipped under the guidelines of a 
"defense-only" strategy, do not have either the heavy-lift capability nor the experience in 
establishing the logistical support requirements associated with these missions. This 
agreement provides the legal basis for exchange of these goods and services between the 
United States and Japan. For the United States, access and use of assets under the control 
of the IDA, particularly air and seaport services, will help it effectively operate in Japan. 
United States forces are deployed throughout Japan, though the majority are on 
the island of Okinawa. (See Figure Sand Figure 6.) Japan's assistance for these forces, 
which total about $5 billion dollars a year, cover over 75% of the costs associated with 
stationing forces in Japan. These include the wages and allowances of Japanese 
personnel that support the United States forces, utilities costs, base repair and 
development, and facilities improvement costs. The update to the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) as outlined in the New Special Measures Regarding Facilities and 
Areas and the Status of U.S. Forces in Japan takes into account the costs associated with 
the realignment, reduction and consolidation of the facilities and bases of the U.S. forces. 
This agreement also changes the way in which the amount provided by Japan 
incrementally increases, allowing for annual adjustments of the amount. This reflects 
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NameofUnit Location 
U.S. Forces Japan, Headquarters Yokota 
Anny 9 Theater Anny Area, U.S. Anny Japan 
Command Headquarters Camp lama 
17th Area Support Group (Honshu) Camp lama 
Navy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan Yokosuka 
Fleet Activities, Yokosuka Yokohama 
Fleet Activities, Sasebo Sasebo 
Commander, 7th Submarine Group Yokosuka 
Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Kamiseya 
7th Fleet and Headquarters of Patrol Wing I 
Japan Air Patrol Group Misawa 
MilitarY Sealift Command, Far East Yokohama 
Marines Marine Corps, Air Station, lwakuni lwakuni 
12th Marine Aircraft Group lwakuni 
Air 5 Air Force, Headquarters Yokota 
Force 35th Fighter Wing Misawa 
374th Airlift Wing · Yokota 
~kinawa 0 200 Kilometers 
0 200Miles 
Source: Adapted from Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 Strategic Assessment and Defense of Japan, 1996. 
Figure 5: Deployment of U.S. Forces, Japan (Excluding Okinawa) 
more accurately the costs and not simply a fixed increase which will provide Japan with 
less of a financial burden. 
2. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) 
The concern over the heavy burden of basing U.S. forces m Okinawa was 
increased with the rape of a young girl by U.S. soldiers in September 1995 and the 
Governor of the prefecture refusing to sign lease renewal agreements. About 75 percent 
of the U.S. facilities and training areas for its forces in Japan are in Okinawa. This 
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I. Naha Harbor Facility 
2. Futenma Air Station . ~ :. \.~ 3. Engineering Unit Office 4. Camp Kuwae 
, 
5. Yomitan Airfield 
' 6. Chibana Site 
I . 20 7. Binbaru Training Field 8. Kin Blue Beach 
'1\.. · · · 9. Okuma Rest Center 
"' Q 18: ~ ·• . · 10. Makiminato Fuel Depot 
• ar II. Awase Communications Facility 0 k~· W a·~ 12.CampZukeran 
~- 13. Sobe (Hanza) Communications Station 
Z2 14. Torii Communications Station 
IS Kilome1en 
0 IS Miles 
15. Senaha Communications Station 
16. Camp Courtney 
1 :ll ,1 17. Camp McTureous 
13 t 25f1 18. Mt. Yua Communications Station ~1' • 19. Genshi Communications Station 
20. Aha Training Field 
21. Hokube Training Field 
22. Henako Powder Dump 
• 2 ';/ 30., 23. Kadena Airfield 10 3 j r/ 24. Kadena Powder Dump 
~ 25. Camp Shields 
~ 1 \.nr----,..--.------,..,..--....,..,..,....,..------r-.,..--,.---, 26. Tongan Wharf 
... f1.' Name of Un1t Location 27. Army Oil Storage Facility 
~ 10 Area Suppon Group 14 28. White Beach 
( Army I" Battalion! I" Special Forces Grp (Abn) 14 29. Ukisaru Island Training Field 
"' ~=.::.._-+-:::0-:-k,:::..n.=av.:.:;-a::.;F""Iee::..:,.t .,:.A:!:ct.=ivt::..tv::. • .;.,K.:.ad:.,:en::.a:...:N~av..::al.;.;Ai::..:'-.r-~f--::-23:---1 30. Tsuken Island Training Field 
Navy Facilities Group 31. Camp Schwab 
Okinawa Air Patrol Group 23 32. Camp Hansen 
l----+-::i3 ;,r.;,Mari;:.;.:,:.n:..:e..:,E~x:..:pe::.d;,:it:..;io::.nary=~F-or-ce-----+~16;--~ 33. Red Beach 
3"' Marine Division 16 34. Is Island Auxiliary Airfield Marines 
4"' Marine Regiment (Infantry) 31/32 35. Torishima Firing and Bombing Field• 
12"' Marine Regiment (Artillery) 12 36. Uesajima Firing and Bombing Field• 
3"' Division Force Service Suppon Group 10 37. Kumejima Firing and Bombing Field• 
Headquarters. 31• Marine Expeditionary Unit 16 38. Kohi Firing and Bombing Field" 
Headquarters, 1• Marine Air Wing 12 39. Akae Firing and Bombing Field" 
36"' Marine Air Group 2 40. Oki Daito Firing and Bombing Field" 
Camp Smedley D. Butler 12 • Firing and Bombing Fields are located 
Air Force 18~ Wing 23 beyond the coverage of this map. 
Source: Adapted from Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 Strategic Assessment and Defense of Japan, 1996. 
Figure 6: Okinawa- U.S. Forces, Facilities and Areas 
represents about I 0 percent of the total land in the Okinawa prefecture and 18 percent of 
the main island.64 (See Figure 6) 
The Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas m Okinawa was 
established in order to find ways within the security arrangement to better address and 
reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. It was to provide recommendations to the 
64 Defense of Japan, 1996, p. 211. 
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SCC on ways to consolidate, realign and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust 
operational procedures in Okinawa. In April 1996, it released an interim report that 
recommended a 20 percent reduction in the "footprint" of U.S. forces on Okinawa by 
closing and returning a number of training sites, consolidating housing and transferring 
aircraft to other sites. Additionally it recommended various noise reduction and 
abatement policies, adjustments to training and operational procedures for live-fire 
exercises, road marches and parachute drops, and improvements to SOFA reporting and 
information systems. 
The final report released in November 1996 reemphasized the reductions outlined 
in the interim report. It discussed the commitment of both governments to deal with the 
various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces and steps to enhance 
mutual understanding between these forces and the local Japanese communities. The 
final report, as it was presented by the Security Consultative Committee, contained a 
concrete implementation schedule of the SACO's recommendations and demonstrated the 
importance placed by both governments on improving the speed and effectiveness of their 
joint consultative system. 65 
3. Joint Declaration on Security- Alliance for the 21st Century 
The culmination of the security consultative process occurred with the release of 
the Joint Declaration on Security and the accompanying message to the peoples of both 
65 The full text of the Final SACO Report, released 2 December 1996 by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of Defense Perry and Ambassador Mondale is 
available HTTP. http://www .nttls.co.jp/infomofaljulsecurity/96saco l.html. 
129 
countries. The message expounded on the contributions and benefits the security treaty 
has brought to both countries, the region and the world. It emphasized the importance of 
the treaty in enhancing the "peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region" and 
the shared values and beliefs on democracy and freedom the two countries share. It 
highlighted the work of the United States-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation on a 
Global Perspective and the success of the various global cooperative efforts that have 
been put forward by this initiative. 66 
The declaration, while not a formal change or even an update to the Security 
Treaty, does represent a clear and pointed statement of direction for the United States and 
more particularly Japan. It emphasized the central nature of the security arrangements 
and the desire, not only to continue it but to expand its scope and nature. It reaffirmed the 
current level of U.S. forces in Asia and specifically in Japan, declaring "the prevailing 
security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 
100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current 
level in Japan." It also declared Japan's continued support of those forces through the 
provision of facilities, areas, and other host nation support. 
From a bilateral perspective, the declaration signaled the desire to enhance 
interoperability between the two countries' forces through the new Support agreements 
and cooperative research and development such as the support fighter (FSX). 
66 The Common Agenda addresses a series of environmental, population, health assistance and technology 
and human resource issues. A fact sheet is available HTTP. http://www.state.gov/www/ 
regions/eap/japan!common.html. 
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Importantly, it also expanded the relationship with its desire to combat the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery means through research into ballistic 
missile defense (TMD). The declaration also stressed the importance of regional 
stability and called for China to play a positive and constructive role. 
The declaration put special emphasis on the develop~ent of a multilateral 
regional security dialogue and cooperation mechanisms and that will eventually lead to 
the creation of a Northeast Asia security dialogue. It pointed out the importance of the 
role being played by the ASEAN Regional Forum and called for the strengthening of 
support for the United Nations and similar international organizations. This emphasis is 
related directly to Japan's increased involvement in peace-keeping operations and 
humanitarian assistance. 
To many, the security declaration represents a shift in emphasis from the narrow 
focus on the defense of Japan of the past to a broader, regional focus on security. It is 
very much in line with the new NDPO's balanced approach and also underscores the 
centrality of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. It does not, as has been pointed out 
by security analyst Ralph Cossa, require the remilitarization of Japan's defense forces, or 
a formal revision of its constitution, nor is it an attempt to set the stage for a U.S. 
withdrawal from Asia. It is also not an attempt to shift the emphasis to the containment 
ofChina.67 
67 Ralph A. Cossa. "A Revitalised U.S.-Japan Alliance Should Cause No Alarm in Asia." Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Trends. No 78. The Business Times. 22-23 February 1997. p. 1. 
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China's reaction to the declaration was immediate and negative. Authors Richard 
Bernstein and Ross H. Munro argue that China sees the Declaration as a change in 
Japan's position and an attempt to counter China's growing power. They also see this as 
a change in China's position relative to the Security Treaty, which in the past has been 
tolerant of it, believing it was a counterbalance against the Soviet Union.68 Bernstein 
and Munro also note that China was confident that the arrangements prevented Japan 
from building a military sufficient to defend itself and that "the United States was helping 
to keep Japan down." Now they believe China sees the security arrangements as an 
"offensive pact" against them, expanding the Security Treaty to cover all of the Asia-
Pacific, and encouraging Japan to play a larger role, politically, militarily as well as 
internationally. 69 
4. Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation 
As the Joint Declaration stated, both countries recognize the need for closer 
cooperation and coordination in "dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas 
surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security 
of Japan." Therefore they agreed to review the 1978 Guidelines for United States-Japan 
Defense Cooperation. The current guidelines, developed after the first NDPO, address 
the posture of cooperation necessary for the two countries to deter aggression, actions to 
68 "Qian tolerant of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Daily Says." Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic 
Newswire. November 18, 1995. 
69 Bernstein and Munro, p. 168-171. 
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be taken in response to an armed attack against Japan and cooperation in the case of 
situations in the Far East outside Japan. 70 While the first two sections are fairly 
comprehensive, they do not reflect the expanded role of the SDF in peace-keeping 
operations and international humanitarian relief. They also do not reflect the new 
Support agreements, host nation support and the Special Measures agreement. 
The third section, however, is not very comprehensive and has not supported the 
type of contingency planning the United States and most of its allies normally conduct. 
The need to thoroughly review and update this section is particularly important because 
the process will clearly identify problem areas that could affect our mutual security 
interests in advance so that efforts can be made to solve the problems. The review of the 
guidelines will identify what each party wants and is willing to support. As Cossa argues, 
"Defining 'adequately support' to the satisfaction of both nations, and in a manner not 
threatening to Japan's peace-loving neighbours, is the goal of the revitalisation effort."71 
D. CONCLUSION 
The U.S.-Japan security relationship has taken quite a trip from its beginnings in 
the wake of World War II. It has progressed from a one-sided relationship characterized 
by total dependence, to one that, though not reciprocal, at least has the two countries 
dealing with each other as equal partners in providing for the stability and security of 
70 The Report by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation and the 1978 Guidelines are included in 
Defense of Japan, 1996, Reference 30, pp. 305-309. 
71 Cossa, p.l. 
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Japan. It has dealt with changing priorities within each government, economic tensions 
and disputes, yet has remained the most important bilateral relationship in the world. 
The influence of China on this relationship has changed over time as well. The 
early stages of the Cold War saw China as a junior partner to the Soviet Union and any 
concern from a security perspective was minimal at best. The focus and fear was directed 
toward the Soviet Union and Japan's defense forces were developed to defend against this 
threat. As the Cold War progressed, China's influence grew in the economic and political 
realms but it remained a poor second to the Soviet Union in the security arena. It was not 
until the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union that China began to 
have influence into the U.S.-Japan security relations and then only weakly. Despite its 
decline and the economic and political troubles, Russia was still seen as the greatest 
threat. With the focus of the security arrangement turned toward stability in the region, 
China's growing military modernization and aggressive actions clearly have became a 
one of the primary concerns of the security arrangements and will affect the direction of 
the relationship. 
The results of the year-long review of the U.S.-Japan security relationship has 
brought about a renewed and revitalized desire for cooperation and stability to the region. 
The emphasis of the alliance has shifted from one focused on just the defense of Japan to 
one concerned with the broader regional security issues as well. The review process and 
the Joint Declaration which came from it has resulted in a stronger security relationship 
between the United States and Japan than at any time during the Cold War. The premier 
importance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements was perhaps summed up best by 
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Prime Minister Hashimoto, in a joint press conference following his latest meeting with 
President Clinton, "There is no other bilateral relationship in the world that has any 
semblance to the Japan-U.S. relationship in the present and fundamental importance. I 
would like to reiterate my determination to further enhance the Japan-U.S. relationship 
for the benefit of not only the two peoples, but also for the Asia Pacific region and the 
world as a whole."72 
While the U.S.-Japan security arrangements are not directed at China and do not 
attempt to "contain" it as the arrangement was initially created to do of the Soviet Union, 
the impact and importance of China to this relationship is immense. This is perhaps best 
seen in the year during which Japan was in the process of reviewing the importance of 
this relationship and asking -itself if the security arrangement was the appropriate vehicle 
in which to go on to the 21st Century. While there were many advocates for continuing 
the alliance, a growing number of domestic critics were calling for changes or the 
dismantling of it. Then to make matters worse, the rape of a young girl in Okinawa by 
U.S. servicemen seemed have provided the ammunition for the firing squad which would 
end or at least change the security relationship. However, China's conduct at this same 
time raised the importance of the relationship to a new high. Through its duplicitous 
actions ·in seizing Mischief reef off the coast of the Philippines and then its naval 
exercises and missile firings off the coast of and over Taiwan, China appeared to prove 
that while it may not be a direct threat to Japan, its aggressive actions proved it to be an 
72 Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro. Joint Press Conference at the White House. 25 April 1997. 
Available HTTP. http://library .whitehouse.gov/This Week.cgi?type _p&date=2&briefmg=9. 
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intimidating presence introducing instability in the region. As noted by Thomas L. 
Friedman in an opinion/editorial piece in The New York Times, "Japan alone cannot 
handle China, Japan alone cannot handle a unified Korea, and Japan alone cannot protect 
its own sea lanes - so for all these we need the U.S. alliance."73 Japan's vigorous 
endorsement of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements reflect China's negative influence. 
73 Thomas L. Friedman. "J-a-p-a-n and C-h-i-n-a." The New York Times. 12 February 1996. 
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V. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Japan is approaching the 21st Century in a security environment that is 
characterized by threat uncertainty. In the areas surrounding Japan, numerous potential 
"hot spots" exist. Figure 7 displays the numerous border and territorial disputes in the 
region. In this Chapter, I group these locations into three areas of potential problems; the 
Korean peninsula, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes. 
China plays a role in each of these areas and its importance will only grow with time. 
The role that China plays in each of these areas is different, and I argue the path it will 
choose in dealing with each has a significant impact on Japan, the security environment 
and prospects of future stability in the area. Any one of these potential areas of tensions 
could hurt or destroy the new security environment and the system Japan is developing. 
Japan, with its "balanced approach" to security in Asia, is carefully and 
incrementally reinvigorating its security structure in preparation for the 21st Century. By 
addressing security from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and international approaches, 
Japan is trying to develop a balanced security structure that can deal with these potential 
problem areas within the confines of its constitution, the United Nations Charter and the 
firm foundation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. In the end, however, it will be 
the combination of the relationships between Japan, China and the United States on 
which the stability and security in East Asia rest. 
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Japan and the United States have worked closely to develop an environment that 
strives to integrate China. It requires, however, China's continued desire to be an 
involved actor within this established structure. This point was made clear in the Joint 
Declaration on Security by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto on 17 April 
1996, " ... it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China 
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play a positive and constructive role, and in this context [the peaceful resolution of 
problems in the region], stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation 
with China." I 
The United States and Japan have the important task of ensuring China's 
integration into this structure, but it will be China's actions upon which any further 
changes in the direction of the U.S.-Japan security alliance will be based. This is argued 
by defense analyst Ralph Cossa: "China's behavior, and not ulterior U.S. or Japanese 
motives, will be the determinant of the future direction of the alliance."2 It is with this 
problem of "containment" of China versus "engagement" as advocated by the United 
States and Japan that I will close this chapter. 
A. TENSIONS AND TROUBLES FOR THE FUTURE 
Japan's geopolitical security environment include three areas in which China's 
role and actions will greatly affect the prospects for future peace and stability. I will 
examine these potential areas of tension in three groups; the Korean peninsula, Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes. China plays a role in each of 
these areas and its importance will only grow more over time. The way that China flexes 
its muscle in each of these areas is different, but each is interrelated in that the path China 
chooses will have a considerable impact on Japan, the security environment and prospects 
1 The full text of the message "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21 51 Century," is 
available HITP. http://www .state.gov /www /regions/eap/japan/jointsec.html. 
2 Ralph A. Cossa. "In Defense of Japan's New Regional Role." Asia Times: The Voice of Asia. Thursday, 
January 16, 1997. 
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of future stability in the area. Any one ofthese potential areas oftension could weaken or 
destroy the new security environment and the system Japan is developing. The way in 
which China acts in resolving these situations will have a great impact on Japan, Sino-
Japanese relations and stability in East Asia. 
1. The Korean Peninsula 
Perhaps the single most volatile area of tension for the future of peace and 
stability in East Asia and specifically for Japan's security concerns is the Korean 
peninsula. Over 1,500,000 soldiers confront each other across the DMZ, from the United 
States, North and South Korea.3 The deterioration of economic conditions in the North, 
including chronic food shortages and decreased trade with the former Soviet Union and 
China, as well as the slow transition of power following the demise of long-time leader 
Kim II Sung, all combine to make the situation ripe for trouble. 
The fear that famine is about to overwhelm North Korea has brought it to 
negotiate some of the things it has in the past been unwilling to discuss. These include 
the "four-country talks" proposed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Kim of South 
Korea in April 1996 that would establish a framework for a peace agreement on the 
peninsula,4 final agreements on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization's (KEDO) building of two new nuclear reactors, and the United States' 
3 About 1,128,000 are from North Korea, 663,000 from ROK and 36,000 from the U.S. according to 
Defense of Japan, 1996, Reference 7, p. 249. 
4 Defense of Japan, 1996, p. 33. 
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three bilateral desires: the recovery of U.S. remains from the Korean War, a promise to 
renounce terrorism and talks to curb North Korean missile exports.5 
A sign that the deterioration of conditions in the North continues was sharply 
brought to the world's attention with the highest-ever defection of a North Korean party 
official, in February 1997. Hwang Jang Yop, in charge of international relations and one 
of the top North Koreans, requested asylum at the South Korean embassy in Beijing. 
After a diplomatic fervor that involved North and South Korea and China, and had North 
Korean agents stationed around the South Korean Embassy in Beijing, North Korea 
eventually claimed Hwang was useless and "dismissed him." On his arrival in Seoul, he 
stated that not only are North Koreans starving, but that there is a great chance of war on 
the peninsula as the hard-liners in the North have taken charge. He also stated that the 
possibility of collapse of the North Korean government seemed to him as unlikely due to 
the reign of terror used to maintain control. 6 His defection and comments call into 
question the probability that North Korea's government will dissolve and that because of 
the famine and its inability to train, it is incapable of fighting a war. Further, Hwang 
stated that North Korea is seriously considering launching a desperation attack against 
South Korea "and is capable of scorching South Korea with nuclear weapons, chemical 
5 Nigel Holloway. "Appointment in Beijing: The two Koreas are reported to be holding secret talks in the 
Chinese capital. The meetings could improve the prospects for peace on the peninsula." Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 13 June 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/june_l3/relations_j13.html. 
6 Shim Jae Hoon. "Man in the Middle: The shock defection in Beijing of a top North Korean ideologue 
confirms there are cracks in the Pyongyang regime's armour but could undermine the prospects for peace 
on the peninsula." Far Eastern Economic Review. 27 February 1997. Available HTTP. 
http://www .feer.comlfeb _ 27 /foreign 1_ f27 .html. 
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weapons and rockets," according to the South Korean intelligence agency. "North Korea 
believes it can win a war against South Korea, and that if the United States intervenes, it 
plans to scorch Japan, too," Hwang reportedly said.7 
China has moved to distance itself both economically and politically from North 
Korea, stopping the "friendship prices" on goods and most of the other aid that it used to 
provide it. 8 South Korea and China established relations in 1992 and the growing trade 
and economic cooperation between the two has contributed to the weakening of China's 
connection to North Korea. Politically, however, a great opportunity is presented to 
China in its role as moderator in the reunification of the Korean peninsula. The idea that 
the tv:o Koreas could reunify with the assistance and under the direction of China would 
show internationally the reemergence of China as a major player. Journalist Nigel 
Holloway argues that this was one of the main motives behind the secret talks China 
hosted between North and South Korea in June 1996 which seemed however, to produce 
no great results. Holloway argues that China's actions were to show the United States 
that it must be more fully involved in working out a solution to the problems on the 
Korean peninsula. It also partially explains why China has only tepidly accepted the 
U.S.-South Korean proposal of "four-country talks," in that China feels it was both not 
consulted in advance and not sufficiently involved from the beginning of the process.9 
7 Quoted by George C. Wilson. "Defector: N. Korea Capable of 'Scorching' Attack. Army Times. No. 41. 
May 8, 1997. p. 28. Also G. E. Willis. "Analysts: N. Korean Attack Could Have "Pearl Harbor 
Character." Army Times. No. 41. May 8, 1997. p. 28. 
8 Economist. "Kim Jong II's Inheritance." 16 July 1994. pp. 19-21. 
9 Holloway. Far Eastern Economic Review. 13 June 1996. 
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Japan's role in the peninsula is complicated by the distrust and hate that many 
Koreans still feel from the decades of Imperial control under the Japanese. The ongoing 
argument over the ownership of Takeshima (Tokdo in Korean) and the surprisingly 
visceral character of this dispute, shows the depth of the grievances that still exist.l 0 
Despite this, Japan plays a critical role in Korea, economically as well as politically. No 
matter how reunification occurs, either through implosion or explosion, the fall-out will 
affect directly the security environment and Japan's security arrangements. 
Three aspects of the unification process will most directly challenge Japan. The 
first is the support the U.S. could request from Japan should the situation on the peninsula 
cause a United States military response. This would quickly test the resolve of the new 
security alliance. If the needed support, be it facilities, equipment or funds, fail to be 
provided, it would very likely strain and probably break the major underpinnings of the 
security relationship. Secondly, even without military actions, simply the widespread 
famine could generate a flow of refugees that would quickly overwhelm the provisions of 
the new Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). According to reporter 
Shim Jae Hoon, South Korean officials are predicting up to 5 million North Korean 
refugees would attempt to flee their country, a prospect China, as the primary recipient of 
this flow, is taking seriously, United Nations officials are reporting China is building a 
giant refugee camp near Yanji on their northeast border with North Korea. Additionally 
10 Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 1997 Strategic Assessment: 
Flashpoints and Force Structure. Chapter 5 "Japan." Available HTTP. http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss 
/sa97 /sa97 ch5.html. 
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South Korea's Ministry of Unification has sought 4.6 billion won ($5.6 million) in the 
fiscal 1997 budget to build a refugee camp south of Seout.l1 
Third, the costs associated with unification will probably quickly overwhelm 
South Korea and require international assistance, of which Japan could be expected to 
provide a large portion. In comparison to similar efforts in Germany, financiers have 
estimated the total cost of reunification of the two Germany's at 1 to 2 trillion 
deutschemarks (about $600 billion to 1.3 trillion), 12 while Korean analysts are predicting 
that Korean unification could be a much more expensive process due to the decay of 
North Korea's infrastructure and economy, the relatively lower (in comparison to the 
West Germans) per capita income of South Koreans and the higher ratio of North to 
South Koreans than there were of East to West Germans.I3 
Many of these concerns can be addressed in advance, which is one of the primary 
purposes of the ongoing review of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines.l4 Japan's 
principal role in pursuing stability in the region and on the peninsula, however, can best 
11 Shim Jae Hoon. "Darkness at Noon: Its economy in a shambles, Pyongyang is hard-pressed to feed its 
people. In time, hunger could trigger an exodus of refugees from North Korea and bring the country to 
its knees." Far Eastern Economic Review. 10 October 1996. Available HITP. 
http://www.feer.com/oct_l 01 cover_ o I Oa.html. 
12 As noted by Nicholas Eberstadt. Korea Approaches Reunification. (New York: M. E. Sharpe. 1995) p. 
154. 
13 Jongryn Mo "German Lessons for Managing the Economic Cost of Korean Reunification." in Thomas 
H. Henriksen and Kyongsoo Lho, eds. One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification 
(Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. 1994). pp. 48-67. Also Eberstadt. pp. 154-158. According to 
Eberstadt there were four West Germans for each East German over which to spread the economic costs 
of the reunification, where as there are only 2 South Koreans for each North Korean. 
14 See Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation, p. 132 of this thesis. 
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be served in presenting a unified front in conjunction with the ROK and the United States 
in dealing with North Korea.l5 This aspect is being helped through its improving 
relations with the South, as demonstrated by the newly expanded defense consultations 
and exchanges.16 Japan's support of the "four-country talks," famine and other 
assistance to North Korea, and its encouragement of all parties to actively participate in 
the peace process is probably all that currently can be done in support of the peaceful 
reunification goal. 
2. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
Despite the fact that the PRC considers the incorporation of Hong Kong, Macao 
and (some day) Taiwan to be an internal, domestic issue, Japan and the rest of the world 
are carefully monitoring China's actions. The generally accepted belief is that the 
repercussions of failed policies here could be an economic, political and military disaster 
for China, the region and the world. 1 July 1997 will be one of the most important dates 
for China's reemergence as an active, powerful player in East Asia in that the world will 
be watching the way in which China reincorporates Hong Kong. The ramifications of 
how well this is done will be felt in every other potential area of tension in which China 
is involved. As one author put it, the way China handles Hong Kong will "shape the 
evolution of China's political identity and its integration into the international 
15 This is argued by Ralph A. Cossa in The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security, p. 30. 
16 "ROK, Japan Agree to Expand Military Ties." Korea Times. 23 September 1995, p.l. 
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community." 17 Aspects of this action are most obviously transferable to the 1999 
absorption of Macao, but much more important will be whether it can be used as a 
blueprint for the eventual absorption of Taiwan. If the policies and procedures used to 
implement the "one country, two systems" concept work, they will very likely become 
the guidelines for the reintegration of Taiwan. 
China's intentions and the ultimate status of Hong Kong are laid out in two 
documents: the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the 1990 Basic Law promulgated 
by the PRC. The first provides for the transition of sovereignty from the United 
Kingdom to China and establishes the concept of"one country, two systems," with Hong 
Kong retaining a high degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign affairs and 
defense. Additionally this Declaration is registered as a formal treaty with the United 
Nations. The second document lays the fundamental governing framework for 
implementation of the "one country, two systems" principle and specifically says that the 
PRC socialist system and policies will not be extended into Hong Kong. IS 
As the date to transfer Hong Kong approaches, differences over political 
freedom, rule of law and freedom of the press have surfaced that bring into question the 
ability of China to peacefully handle the transfer. The use ofthe 10,000-strong People's 
17 Michael Yahuda. Hong Kong: China's Challenge. (London: Routledge. 1996). As quoted in Frank 
Ching. "Reading the Tea Leaves." Far Eastern Economic Review. 12 December 1997. Available 
HTTP. http://www.feer.com/dec_12/inreview_d12a.html. 
18 The outline of these two documents was laid out in Jeffrey A. Bader, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs' testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 13 February 1997. Available HTTP. 
http://www .state.gov/www/regions/eap /970213 _ bader _hong_kong.html. 
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Liberation Army garrison that will be stationed in Hong Kong to quell dissent after the 
reincorporation could seriously damage relations within Hong Kong and 
intemationally.19 This force is the strongest indicator that China intends to maintain a 
tight grip on Hong Kong in the future, despite assurances local autonomy. Additionally, 
China's announcement that it would not recognize the validity or results of the electoral 
reforms that lead to the 1995 Legislative Council (or LEGCO) elections in the belief they 
were in violation of the Joint Declaration assurance that the "laws currently in force" 
would remain unchanged portend negatively on the democratic process in Hong Kong. 
The appointment of a 60-seat, provisional legislature to replace LEGCO upon the transfer 
of Hong Kong, further threatens the believability of the principles behind the "one 
country, two systems" policy.20 
The economic importance of Hong Kong to China can not be overstated. Jeffrey 
Bader, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, made this 
clear in his comments before Congress: 
Hong Kong is China's largest trading partner, and much of China's two-
way trade uses Hong Kong as a transshipment point. Sixty-five percent of 
foreign direct investment in China now comes from or through Hong 
Kong. Over 50,000 enterprises in Guangdong Province alone use Hong 
Kong investment and employ over 4 million PRC workers.21 
19 Bruce Gilley. "Hard to Resist: How much will China meddle after 1997?" Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 12 December 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/dec_12/hk_d12.html. 
20 Bader. pp. 2-3. 
21 Ibid. p. 6. 
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Beyond the economic impact of Hong Kong's integration into China, the other single 
biggest impact of this will be on its role as a blueprint for China's eventual absorption of 
Taiwan. In his book, Michael Yahuda focuses on the problems China is likely to 
encounter in the transfer of Hong Kong and argues that should this transfer fail to 
continue in a peaceful and economically profitable way, then China would no longer be 
able to offer a viable basis for peaceful reunification with Taiwan.22 Despite the fact that 
Taiwan has become integrated economically with Hong Kong and other major parts of 
China's Pacific coast,23 peaceful reunification is very much contingent on what occurs in 
Hong Kong in the next few years. Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui does not consider 
that talks about improving China-Taiwan relations are even possible until China's 
leadership fully regroups from the death ofDeng Xiaoping in February 1997. According 
to Lee, "the Chinese leadership is facing internal struggles. We would not even know 
who to talk to."24 The American Assembly Delegation to Asia takes this further when it 
argues that Taiwan is not only concerned with China's attempt to intimidate and chastise 
it \Vith military exercises and missile firings. Taiwan is also concerned that though China 
22 Yahuda. Hong Kong: China's Challenge. (London: Routledge. 1996). 
23 Masashi Nishihara. "Northeast Asia and Japanese Security." in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, eds. 
Japan's Emerging Global Role. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1993). p. 85. Jin-Young Chung 
totals the cross-investment between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at almost $40 billion and the most 
important aspect of the relationship between the three. "The Eagle, The Goose, and The Dragon: 
Cagemates in the Asia-Pacific Trade Order?" in Jonathan D. Pollack and Hyun-Dong Kim, eds. East 
Asia's Potential for Instability and Crisis: Implications for the United States and Korea. (Santa Monica: 
RAND. 1995). p. 135. 
24 Quoted in an interview with Japanese reporters in Taipei. "Breakthrough on Taiwan-China ties unlikely 
this year: Lee." NEKKEI NET. Available HITP. http://www.nikkei.co.jp/enews/SPECIAL/page 
/hong6.html. 
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may initially soften its position toward it as a result of the takeover of Hong Kong. Once 
it has solidified its control and the conditions there are returning to normal, however, it 
will again harden its approach toward Taiwan.25 
Despite the increased economic integration of Taiwan, three events would almost 
certainly result in some sort of military action by China against Taiwan. In the same way 
that simply a perceived movement in that direction caused the Chinese naval 
demonstrations and missile firings in February 1996, a move to some sort of declaration 
of independence by Taiwan would have similar results in the future. Secondly, 
recognition of Taiwan by any international organization in which membership is based on 
statehood would almost certainly incite China's wrath. Finally, any Taiwanese pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, either in development or purchase, would cause China to take 
immediate action.26 
The reversion of Hong Kong and Macao are critical to China's desire to be a 
leading player in international affairs. As U.S. Ambassador to China, James R. Sasser, 
said in an address to the Asia Society: 
Revision of Hong Kong will be a defining moment for China this year. 
China's leaders are smart enough to know that the world will be watching 
and that China's self-interest is well served by preserving intact Hong 
Kong's economic system, civil service and legal and judicial 
institutions .... I personally believe that China's leaders recognize that' a 
25 Findings in Phase I of the American Assembly Delegation to Asia (9-21 June 1996) as published in 
"China-U.S. Relations in the 21 51 Century: Fostering Cooperation, Preventing Conflict." 17 November 
1996. Available HTTP. http://www .columbia.edu/cu/amassembly/new/pahse l.html. 
26 These three possible courses of actions for China were laid out by Effie R. Petrie in her thesis: 
"Capabilities and Intention: An Analysis of the Military Modernization ofthe PLA." (MA Thesis. Naval 
Postgraduate School. December, 1996). p. 95. While defmitely not exclusive, they are illustrative of the 
conditions under which China might feel required to act. 
149 
-------------------------------------------
successful transition - a stable and prosperous Hong Kong - will have a 
positive impact on their image internationally. [Italics are mine]27 
China's ability to deal with Taiwan in a peaceful manner is inexorably linked to Hong 
Kong's incorporation. A forced or difficult merger of Hong Kong could very well lead 
Taiwan to pursue its own course independently, causing a reoccurrence of the conditions 
which brought about China's naval exercise and missile firing off Taiwan's coast and the 
subsequent U.S. naval response. The Taiwanese main opposition party has stated, in fact, 
that should it achieve a majority position, it will hold a plebiscite and, if independence is 
approved by the people and the party is sure they are willing to pay the price of war, it 
v.ill then declare Taiwan independent of China. Further, it stated that they will do this 
even if it is destabilizing to the region.28 
Japan's concern about Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are primarily economically 
based. Japan's investment in these areas are extensive. According to the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, cumulative Japanese investments amounts to approximately $13 
billion in China, $6 billion in Taiwan and $14 billion in Hong Kong, so it is not in 
China's interest to damage ties with Japan.29 In the long term, however, Japan's 
27 James R. Sasser. U.S. Ambassador to China, Address to the Asia Society. 4 March 1997. Available 
HITP. http://.,..•ww .state.gov/www/regions/eap/970204 _sasser_ china.htm I. 
28 Statements made by the Secretary-General of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's major 
opposition party to the American Assembly Delegation to Asia, and reported in its report of the 9-21 June 
1996 titled "China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century: Phase I." See footnote 25. 
29 Bruce Gilley, Sebstian Moffett, Julian Baum and Matt Forney. "Rocks of Contention: The dispute 
between China and Japan over the Diaoyu islands stirs up nationalist on both sides and threatens relations 
benveen North Asia's biggest powers." Far Eastern Economic Review. 19 September 1996. Available 
HITP. http://www.feer.com/sept_l9/relation_s 19.html. 
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concerns m the political-military arena are directed at the worse-case scenarios of 
unification. Should the conditions under which the merger of Hong Kong and Macao 
with China take place go bad, the political and economic fall-out could cause irreparable 
harm to Japan's security environment. This could easily degenerate into a situation that 
the United States might feel it needs to act, using the forces stationed in Japan, possibly 
straining the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. No matter how the unification occurs, 
China's control of Hong Kong and Taiwan would give it an area from which to base its 
efforts in the South China Sea as well as greater control over the sea lanes through which 
almost all of Japan's oil must flow. This would increase greatly the perceived threat to 
Japan, as well as increase or at least reemphasize Japan's reliance on the United States 
and its forces to protect this critical element of its economic strength.30 
3. Territorial Disputes 
As depicted in Figure 7, there are a large number on ongoing territorial and bo:i:der 
disputes throughout East Asia that have the potential to disrupt Sino-Japanese relations 
and cause damage to Japan's immature security structure. These disputes, because they 
primarily occur in isolated areas and do not involve indigenous populations, have the dual 
possibility of being situations in which the use of force is more likely as well as disputes 
which could most easily be settled through regional and international dispute settlement 
30 This prospect was brought up by Kent E. Calder is his assessment of the future security environment of 
Japan for the Center of Naval Analyses. Japan 2010: Prospective Profiles. (Alexandria: Center for Naval 
Analyses. March 1996). p.23. Petrie outlines the idea of China using Hong Kong as a forward base for 
power projection and control of the South China Sea, "Capability and Intentions" pp. 96-97. 
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methods. Two of these disputes which most directly affect Japan and China are located 
in the Senkaku Islands/East China Sea and the South China Sea. 
a. Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands 
A potential flash point exists between China and Japan in the territorial 
dispute over the Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu islands to the Chinese), a group 
of eight islets and reefs approximately 102 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan and 240 
nautical miles south of Okinawa) I The islands are actually a series of reefs and rock 
shoals that, with the exception of the three largest, remain at least partially submerged 
most of the time. The largest island, (about 2 miles in length, and less than one mile in 
·width) has in the past supported a Japanese fishery, a unimproved helicopter landing site, 
and recently a lighthouse. It was the construction of this lighthouse, initially in 1978 and 
most recently rebuilt in 1996, by a Japanese fringe group know as the Seinensha or 
Japanese Youth Federation, that reignited the current dispute.32 
The historical basis for China's claims date back to the 16th century when 
it exercised sovereignty over the area, though it is difficult to find anything that clearly 
states China's sovereignty over these particular rocks. China and Taiwan began to claim 
the islands again in the early 1970s after the publishing of a report on sea bed mineral 
31 One of the most complete compilation of background information, grounds for claims for all three 
parties as well as the U.S. legal position and obligations is covered in an article prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service and reprinted by the Pacific Forum CSIS. Larry A. Niksch. "Senkaku 
(Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and Obligations." PacNet Newsletter Number 45, 
8 November 1996. Reprinted in Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available 
HTTP. http://w>vw.csis.org/html!pac45.html. 
32 Nicholas D. Kristoff. "Behind Japan's Furor Over Tiny Isles, Gangland Fingerprints." The New York 
Times, 10 October 1996, p. 5. 
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research by the United Nations Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East which 
identified promising oil deposits around the Senkaku islands. When China created its 
Territorial SeaLaw in 1992, it again claimed the islands.33 
Japan bases its claim on its integration of the Senkaku and the Ryukyu 
islands (which includes Okinawa) in 1879. It argues that the Senkaku islands are part of 
the Ryukyu chain and were not annexed with Taiwan and the Pescadores which were 
returned to China at the end of World War II. Additionally China expressed no 
objections to the status of the islands at the San Francisco Peace Treaty conference which 
clearly indicated the islands were not part of Taiwan. Japan also points out that it had 
leased the islands to the United States (which used them as a bombing range) which then 
returned them to Japan, with the rest of the Ryukyus and Okinawa by 1972.34 
There are three major reasons for the importance of this dispute: 
nationalism, fishing rights, and oil/mineral resources. From China's perspective, an 
important reason for this dispute is the growing importance it places on nationalism. 
According to Hungdah Chiu, director of East Asian Legal Studies at the University of 
Maryland, China "fanned all this nationalistic sentiment with its military exercises in 
Taiwan in March. Now it's out of controi."35 As nationalism becomes the glue that 
33 Defense of Japan, 1996, p. 44 .. 
34 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands." 
Available HTTP. http://www.mofa.go.jp/ja/senkaku.html. Additionally see the Japanese Communist 
Party position in: "Questions Related to the Senkaku Islands and Perspectives for their Resolution." 
Available HTTP. http://www .infoweb.or.jp/jcp/English/e-senkaku.html. 
35 As quoted in James Cox. "Japan touches off furor by claiming Diaoyu Islands." Gannett News Service. 
29 September 1996. 
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holds China together, it becomes increasingly important that sovereignty be protected. 
Sovereignty is something China can not allow to be questi<med, though it may be 
secondary to economic concerns associated with the islands, as argued strongly by 
Michael Studeman in his detailed research into China's actions in the South China Sea.36 
The second reason for this dispute is fishing resources. The most 
important factor from Taiwan's perspective, the fishing rights associated with the 
Senkaku islands account for 40,000 tons of fish worth $65 million a year pulled from the 
waters surrounding them, according to its national fishing association. Japan has worked 
bilaterally \Vith Taiwan to resolve this issue and has reached agreement on the joint use of 
the waters, though it has not had success in dealing with China on this issue. 3 7 
The final reason and probably the issue of primary concern is oil. It is 
believed that the islands might contain "one of the largest oil and gas reservoirs in the 
world" and control of the islands would confer title to about 22,000 square kilometers of 
continental shelf and parts of at least three major oil-bearing structures.38 As noted by 
John Frankenstein, a China expert at the University of Hong Kong, "this is all about oil 
and gas. The reason you claim the Diaoyus isn't so much the Diaoyus, it's that it gives 
you extensive claims on the continental shelf."39 Kent E. Calder, analyst for the Center 
36 Michael William Studeman. "Dragon in the Shadows: Calculating China's Advances in the South 
China Sea." (MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. March, 1998). pp. 12-16,63-83, and 125-130. 
37 Cox. 29 September 1996. 
38 As cited in Gilley, et al. 
39 As quoted in Cox. 
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for Strategic and International Studies, argues that China's search for energy and growing 
energy dependence on oil make the Senkaku islands/East China Sea a potentially more 
explosive issue than the South China Sea, because the two parties involved are the most 
powerful in the region. Calder equates the geological structure and potential for oil with 
the North Sea fields and speculates that the 10-100 billion barrels of oil that may be there 
are larger than the amount available in the South China Sea.40 
Despite the above reasons for the dispute, China has been willing to shelve 
its concerns for immediate economic and political reasons. In order to defuse the crisis, 
China has kept a lid on anti-Japanese activists in Beijing, ordered universities to clamp 
down on student activities in protest, and in Hong Kong, refused to certify protest ships to 
carry passengers.41 Deng Xiaoping suggested in 1978 that the sovereignty issue be put 
aside and that the islands be developed cooperatively and this same approach is being 
again offered in hopes that this dispute will not grow into something that might hinder 
growing Japanese investments in China. 
b. South China Sea 
Though Japan is not a claimant to any of the disputed areas within the 
South China Sea, it is greatly concerned with freedom of navigation, sea lane safety and 
access to resources that may potentially be· in this area. Six corintries (China, Taiwan, 
40 Kent E. Calder. "Energy Futures." The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 19. No.4. Autumn 1996. p. 91. He 
also expands his argument on the importance of energy and the voraciously growing energy demand in 




Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia) are contesting with each other for 
control of parts of the hundreds of islands, reefs and shoals that make up the various 
groupings within the South China Sea. As the major claimant, China has advanced its 
actions under the direction of its 1992 Territorial Sea Law which advocated its maritime 
rights at the cost of all other claimants. Under this law, China claimed exclusive 
sovereignty over the Senkakus, Paracels and Spratlys, and most of the remaining islands 
and reefs of the South China Sea, specified China's right to evict foreign vessels from its 
water, and authorized the pursuit of violators on the high seas. It also required all foreign 
warships give China prior notification and receive permission to pass through China's 
territorial seas.42 Most important to Japan, this law threatens freedom of navigation, and 
increases the possibility that armed conflict could disrupt the flow of goods through the 
region. 
These territorial disputes provide a great opportunity to test Japan's 
commitment to using regional and multilateral forums for security concerns. Because 
these territorial disputes occur in isolated areas and do not involve indigenous 
populations, they have the dual possibility of being situations in which the use of force is 
more likely as well as the disputes most easily settled through regional and international 
dispute settlement methods. Michael Studeman argued that the South China Sea disputes 
with Vietnam and the Philippines demonstrate China's willingness to resort to the use of 
force when there is a "window of opportunity" both politically and militarily, when the 
42 Bilson Kurus. "Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d' Etre." Asian Survey. Vol. XXXIII. No. 
8. August 1993. p. 836. 
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chance of international uproar at its actions is perceived as minimal and when the benefits 
outweigh the costs.43 The ability of regional forums such as ARF to deal with 
aggressive actions, particularly with a country as formidable as China, will be a major 
test. China has made a number of statements that it could be interpreted to mean it is 
willing to resolve these situations through regional forums. For example, the July 1995 
statement by China's Foreign Ministry spokesman insisting that China has no interest in 
disrupting freedom of navigation in the Spratlys, and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen's statement at the ASEAN-PMC that China would try and resolve the Spratlys 
dispute using the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Despite these pronouncements, many 
continue to be skeptical of China's intentions and true willingness to allow these types of 
forums to work. 44 
B. ENGAGEMENT VERSUS CONTAINMENT AND THE FUTURE 
The success or failure of Japan's security arrangements could very well be played 
out in the potential areas for tension examined above. As discussed in Chapter II, Japan's 
ability to deal with China, as it expands its horizons and reenters the East Asian security 
community and the world as a powerful player, is hampered by a historically-based 
animosity and the perceived rise of and fear that a "new" Japanese nationalism, most 
often viewed as inseparable from remilitarization, is emerging. The modernization of 
43 Studeman, pp. 58-62. 
44 David B. H. Denoon and Wendy Frieman. "China's Security Strategy: The View from Beijing, 
ASEAN, and Washington." Asian Survey. Vol. XXXVI, No.4. April1996. pp. 425-426. 
157 
China's military has only added to problems with dealing with China's reemergence. In 
spite of, and in order to overcome these problems, Japan has developed its security 
arrangements based on the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, a defensive-only military, 
and an intent to develop regional and international security structures that will further 
peace and stability in the environment around it. The reinvigoration of the U.S.-Japan 
security arrangements has adjusted this security relationship from one clearly focused on 
the containment and defense against the expansion and aggression of the former Soviet . 
Union and world communism, to one that provides for security in an environment that is 
characterized by threat uncertainty. This readjustment expands the basis of the U.S.-
lapan security arrangements through incremental increases in Japan's own Self-Defense 
Forces' roles and missions, as well as through the support and development of regional 
security structures and multilateral approaches to conflict prevention. 
The areas of tension highlighted above are the three areas that will test these 
arrangements. They emphasize the importance that China plays in the future of East Asia 
and demonstrate the reasons Japan might perceive China as a threat to it as well as to the 
stability and peace of East Asia. The unanswered question, however, is whether or not 
China ·will be a participant within this structure or if it (or others) believes this structure is 
an attempt to hold down or contain it. Given the difficulty in prognosticating future 
actions of countries, particularly a country that is in the midst of great change with 
perhaps even greater change forthcoming, I want to focus on the second part of this 
question, both from the perspective of China, as well as that of the United States and 
Japan. 
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1. The Problems of Engagement and Containment 
One of the criticisms associated with the approach to security Japan and the 
United States have taken is that they have simply replaced the Soviet Union with China 
and the old Cold War policies of containment continue in East Asia. Japan, as during the 
Cold War, has again allowed the United States to take the lead in defining the policies 
and methods for implementation of those policies, though as discussed earlier, the 
Japanese are incrementally increasing their role and participating in greater levels. 
Nonetheless, a great deal of the current debate over engagement versus containment of 
China has occurred mainly in the United States. This does not denigrate the debate in 
Japan, but the level of involvement is definitely greater in the United States. While the 
security interests of the United States and Japan are different, current policy statements 
have shown the closeness that these two countries' policies reflect in the engagement of 
China. 
The debate whether the current Japanese and U.S. approaches to China invokes 
engagement or containment depends on the perspective of the argument. From China's. 
perspective, it seems clear that the leading advocate of the belief that the U.S.-Japan 
policies are designed to contain China is advanced by the PLA. According to Ronald N. 
Montaperto, Senior Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National 
Defense University, "the idea that the United States viewed China as a future, hostile peer 
competitor resided mainly within the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Now, 
the PLA appears to have carried the day. Where the United States sees Comprehensive 
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Engagement, the Chinese see Containment."45 Professor Kenneth Lieberthal argues 
further that in fact the current leadership in China is unable to refuse the hard-line 
policies advocated by the PLA and is not able to insure a more cooperative course is 
taken. In response to the perception that U.S. policies were directed at containment and 
supporting of the current division of Taiwan from China, the PLA-advocated policies 
have been adopted by Jiang Zemin. The results of this have been harsh rhetoric, 
withdrawal of Chinese Ambassadors and the military exercises and missile firings of the 
coast of Taiwan following the visa fiasco with Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui.46 The 
end result so far is that despite the efforts of the United States and Japan to articulate their 
policies under the title of engagement, China has continued to view them as simply 
efforts to contain China. 
On the other hand, the desire of the United States and Japan to engage China can 
not be denied. It has been outlined in the Clinton administration's East Asia Strategy 
Report (EASR), titled "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific 
Region,"47 and further defended by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs and primary author of the report, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in an article in 
45 Ronald N. Montaperto. "Managing U.S. Relations with China: Toward a New Strategic Bargain." 
Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University, Strategic Forum, Number 42. 
August 1995. p. I. 
46 Kenneth Lieberthal. "A New China Strategy." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74. No. 6. November/December 
1995. pp. 39-40. 
47 Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs. United States Security Strategy for the 
East Asia-Pacific Region. February 1995. 
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Foreign Affairs. 48 He argues that the strategy of engagement and enlargement has three 
parts: the reinforcement of the bilateral alliances as the heart of the strategy, 
maintenance of forward-based troops in East Asia and the development of regional 
institutions that are "confidence-building measures for the region."49 Japan has made a 
similar effort with its National Defense Program Outline50 and in its annual white paper 
Defense of Japan 1996.51 Both highlight the changes in the international system that 
reduce the overall chance of global war, but make the prospects for stability and peace in 
the region more difficult. They emphasize, as did the EASR, the primacy of the U.S.-
Japan security arrangements in the defense of Japan and overall security and stability in 
the region. The prevention of destabilizing factors from escalating into serious 
international problems is given priority, with the development and. improvement of 
regional, multilateral security structure and confidence-building measures (CBM) to 
improve the transparency of defense and security issues. 
Consultant Paul S. Giarra focuses on the growth in importance of the bilateral 
relationship between the United States and Japan. He notes that this relationship has 
grown from a single factor in the global picture to become the most important aspect in 
48 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "The Case for Deep Engagement." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74. No. 4. July/August 
1995. pp. 90-102. 
49 Ibid. pp. 94-95. 
50 Japan Defense Agency, National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996. Adopted 28 
November 1995. Available HITP. http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.html. Also in 
Defense of Japan, 1996, Reference 18. pp. 276-283. 
51 Japan Defense Agency White Paper. Defense of Japan 1996: Response to a New Era. (Tokyo: The 
Japan Times, Ltd. July, 1996). 
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the security and doctrine of both countries and the driving force behind the policies 
toward China: 
The bilateral relationship, once a single component of a much larger global 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, is now so important to the security of 
each country that its health has become a determinant of fundamental 
security principles and doctrines for both Washington and Tokyo. 52 
For Japan, the alliance provides a successful way to avoid direct military confrontation 
·with China, and for the United States, it provides the means through which it can stay 
effectively engaged in East Asia. It is from the basis of this bilateral relationship that 
engagement of China can occur. 
The main idea behind the concept of engaging China is that we acknowledge 
China's increasing importance to the region and world, its growing strengths - both 
military and economic- and seek to nurture and draw it into the international community 
through communication and cooperation in all aspects of the relationship. The major 
condition, of course, is that China obeys the currently recognized norms of conduct. This 
is done through the conscious trade-off between the ideals of a modem democratic nation 
(in which direction engagement is to draw, push and cajole China toward) and the 
realities of maintaining communications and congenial relationships with a country 
undergoing the immense stress of the changes it is experiencing in its ideology, 
leadership and basic philosophy of operations in the international community. 
Of course there are others who feel the ideas expressed under the term 
"engagement" are morally bankrupt and that the argument about engagement versus 
52 PaulS. Giarra. "Point of Choice, Point ofDeparture." Japan Quarterly. January-March 1997. p. 17 
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containment is nothing but semantics. This was posed by political columnist George Will 
in an opinion-editorial article, where he argued that engagement is nothing but a "frankly 
de-moralized policy of commercial and culture dealings that supposedly will, in time, 
produce the sedation and then the liberalization of China" necessary for it to be fully 
incorporated into the interdependent, global structure. Containment, on the other hand, 
means "skepticism about any early reform of China's domestic tyranny, and diplomatic 
and military planning against China's expansionist aspirations as they can be ascertained 
from China's diplomacy and military procurement." The bottom line, he goes on to say, 
is that the whole argument is unnecessary - there can be not doubt that the policy of the 
United States is to subvert and ultimately destroy the last remaining communist power: 
What the schematic clarity of the dichotomy between engagement and 
containment obscures is this fact: Whatever the tactics, the strategic aim 
of U.S. policy is, and must be seen to be, the subversion of the Chinese 
regime. It is China's tum. 53 
Authors Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro argue along a similar line, that the 
dichotomy between engagement and containment leaves one to believe that these are the 
only two choices. Both are really "so vague as to be nearly meaningless" and are being 
defined either by "the Clinton administration's confused rhetoric," or by "China's own 
propaganda machine" in such a way that engagement has come to suggest something 
worse: 
53 George F. Will. "China's Turn." The Washington Post. Thursday, 17 Apri11997, p. A23. 
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the idea that making concessions to China and shrinking from imposing 
sanctions on it no matter how bad its behavior will encourage it to act with 
greater restraint and responsibility in the international community54 
Others, such as Chalmers Johnson, have argued that the policies of engagement 
are drifting towards containment of China, not as the result of a directed policy but 
actually from the lack of a serious long-term vision toward China, the lack of Asia 
specialists on the National Security Council and the loss of control of the current policies 
to the Pentagon. He argues that "the United States and Japan must recognize that their 
bilateral arrangements for the Cold war are no longer appropriate" and that the problem 
for both U.S. and Japanese foreign policy is not to inhibit the rise of Chinese power but to 
influence and adjust to it. The best thing the U.S. could do is to withdraw its ground 
forces from Japan and Korea as soon as practical, (forces he feels are inherently 
destabilizing) while strengthening the 7th Fleet and its naval assets in the area. Only these 
naval forces, he believes, are needed to influence China and moreover, they are welcomed 
by the other countries in the region for their defense ofthe sea lanes. 55 
Despite the general theme that we should fear China, reflected in the title and 
cover of their book, the policy goals advocated by Bernstein and Munro are very close to 
those advanced by the proponents of engagement: 
There are three goals: one, to ensure peace in Asia by maintaining a stable 
balance of power there; two, to encourage the largest and potentially most 
54 Bernstein, Richard. and Munro, Ross H. The Coming Conflict With China. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc. 1997). pp. 203-204. 
55 Chalmers Johnson. "Containing China: U.S. and Japan Drift Toward Disaster." Japan Quarterly. 
October-December 1996. pp. 10-18. Also see his "The Chinese Way: In The Next Century, The World's 
Most Populous Nation Will Set The Pace in East Asia." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. No. 1. Vol. 53. 
11 January 1997. p. 20. 
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powerful country in the region, namely China, to be a responsible state 
committed to nonproliferation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and 
honest free trade; and three, to induce China to become more democratic 
and to respect the human rights of its own people, partly on the grounds 
that democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes go hand in hand. 56 
It is toward these three goals that all sides in the debate of engagement versus 
containment want to go. The question is whether you do that through the framework of a 
Cold War-like, adversary-based arrangement or through a more modem system that tries 
to limit conflict instead of embracing it. It is clear that the governments of the United 
States and Japan have chosen to advance behind the policies of engagement, though the 
execution of these policies has not been without problems. It also seems even those in 
opposition to these policies, agree with the ultimate goals associated with engagement. 
The problems with the current policies of engagement include its lack of direction 
and problems with its articulation. Kenneth Lieberthal points to the Clinton 
administration's lack of an ability to prioritize as one of the biggest problems, because it 
has allowed every governmental agency to pursue its own China policy. 
While the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative threatens sanctions over 
market access and intellectual property rights, the Department of 
Commerce goes all out to increase U.S. investment in China; while the 
Department of State thrashes China for human rights violations and 
nuclear proliferation, the Department of Defense works hard to develop 
military-to-military ties. 57 
While in some ways a small dose of ambiguity created by this disparate set of actors 
might be appropriate or even helpful, the conflicting and contradictory statements and 
56 Ibid. p. 205. 
57 Lieberthal, p. 43. 
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actions of the U.S. has resulted in China not getting a clear picture or understanding the 
ultimate goals and desires ofthe participants. 
Lieberthal also notes problems with President Clinton's direction of China policy 
and his public vacillation and about-faces on it, often in response to popular or 
congressional pressure. His examples of the delinking of China's most-favored nation 
status from human rights violations and the handling of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-
hui's visa to visit his alma mater aptly demonstrate the problems vacillations and reversal 
of policies can have on the President's credibility and Chinese perceptions.58 
In the case for either engagement or containment, the key to success for both is 
the relationship between the United States and Japan. The main difference between these 
tv.•o approaches can be seen in the roles, strengths and purpose for the relationship with 
Japan. The current position of Japan under the policies of engagement call for it to 
continue to incrementally adjust its military through its mid- to long-range plan laid out 
in the NDPO. It stresses the desire to develop and nurture regional, multilateral security 
structures that can develop into forums capable of diffusing tensions, settle disputes and 
generally begin to institutionalize the use of these forums for peace and stability in the 
region. It also calls for Japan to incrementally increase its role in international peace-
keeping situations as well as disaster relief situations that meet the criteria established 
\Vi thin its peace-keeping laws and constitution. 59 
58 Ibid. pp. 44-45. 
59 "Five Principles Restricting Japan's Participation in PKO." Defense Guide of Japan, p. l. Available 
HTTP. http://cssewOI.cs.nda.ac.jp/-yas/JDA/DOJ/ PKO.html. Also 
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Those who challenge the policies of engagement tend to call for a larger role for 
Japan. This is particularly the case with Bernstein and Munro. They foresee the need for 
a stronger, more "normal" Japan: 
Preserving the balance of power in Asia essentially means one thing: 
strengthening Japan. The growth of Chinese power has made much of the 
recent American attitude toward Japan obsolete. We can no longer operate 
on the assumption that a weak Japan is a good Japan. Japan can be 
encouraged to reject China's guilt and intimidation campaign, not by 
repudiating its war guilt, but by building a credible military force even in 
the face of it ... A strong Japan, in genuine partnership with the United 
States, is vital to a new balance of power in Asia. A weak Japan benefits 
only China, which wants not a stabilizing balance of power in Asia but 
Chinese hegemony, under which Japan would be little more than China's 
most useful tributary state. 60 
The difficulty with this idea is that outside of those that advocate it, there does not 
seem to be a strong basis for support. Pushing Japan to enlarge its military as this 
proposes, would surely incite an arms race in the region. Beyond this, the general 
destabilizing effect it would have on the relations between the United States and Japan, 
let alone the relations with China, South Korea and much of Southeast Asia, could not 
possibly be in either Japan or the United States' best interest. While there is some in 
Japan who have called for Japan to progress toward becoming a more "normal nation,"61 
this usually begins within the guise of the current security arrangements, and then 
incrementally increases the degree to which Japan would provide for its own defense. In 
60 Bernstein and Munro. pp. 219-220 
61 See Edward W. Desmond. "lchiro Ozawa: Reformer at Bay." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74. No. 5. 
September/October 1995. pp. 117-131, "The Third Opening." The Economist. 9 March 1996, pp. 21-24. 
Morihiro Hosokawa. "Rebuilding the US-Japan Security Structure." Keynote Address, Seattle 
Washington, 12 March 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.us-japan.org/jassw/what/archive96 
/031296Hosokawa.html. 
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either case, the most difficult part for Japan would be the constitutional changes that 
would be required to advance in this direction. 
2. Japan's role in the future 
Despite the criticisms identified above which call for other approaches, the United 
States and Japan have decided that the engagement approach is the appropriate way to 
deal "With China. For engagement to work, the United States and Japan must work to 
better articulate and convey to China's leaders the conduct expected of major powers at 
this time, so that neither country will be seen by China as the sole enforcer of these 
norms. A good example of the progress made in this area, was in Prime Minister 
Hashimoto's remarks before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. 
comments on China he reemphasized Japan's desire to: 
support China's reform and openness policy so that it consolidates its 
status as a constructive partner in the international community. At the 
same time, there is an increasing need for China to adjust a variety of its 
domestic systems so that they will become consistent with international 
rules and standards. 
In his 
Additionally he called for China to continue its efforts to increase transparency of its 
defense forces, as well as the need to deal with the issues of the environment, energy 
supplies and population growth in regional forums. On human rights, Prime Minister 
Hashimoto emphasized that "greater awareness will develop with regards to human rights 
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and other social issues," based on an incremental increases in contacts between China and 
the international community and with the economic development of China. 62 
The important aspect of this speech is that Japan and the United States can be seen 
to be speaking as one, in terms that clearly show the desire to bring China more fully into 
the international community as an actor with whom all are able to work. Without the 
acrimony and moral indignation that often accompanies U.S. comments on human rights, 
Prime Minister Hashimoto was able to stress the importance of this area to the world, 
while at the same time acknowledge China's progress toward better relations. 
Additionally, while the United States has been the standard bearer of the policies of 
engagement, another champion now clearly articulates its standards of conduct. Best yet, 
this is from an Asian perspective, something with which China may relate. For the 
policies of engagement to work, more of this positive communications needs to occur. 
Within Japan, there is a growing concern that the level of public awareness about 
the importance of the security arrangements, the level of involvement appropriate for the 
Self-Defense Forces and the importance of China to this overall process is very low and 
has not made it into the public consciousness. Open and public debate is needed within 
Japan on what its role in the security of the region should be, in order to defeat the 
problems of neutrality associated with lack ofknowledge and concern. 
62 Remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro before the National Press Club, Washington 
D.C., 25 April 1997. "Japan's Path and the . Japan-U.S. Relationship." Available HTTP. 
http://www .mofa.go.jp/424-051/w425.html. 
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While it is clear that the government of Japan is clearly behind incremental 
increases in its roles and missions, both of its SDF and its diplomatic roles, the people of 
Japan are woefully uninformed and uninvolved in the process. The politicization of 
Okinawa has increased the attention on the unfair proportion of support it provides, which 
has had the positive affect of involving the average citizen of Okinawa in discussions of 
the security arrangements and the methods in which they are carried out.63 This same 
involvement must be brought to the main islands of Japan, and in a more positive light. 
This is necessary if any of the forces are to be relocated from Okinawa to the main 
islands, and it will have the secondary benefit of beginning the process by which the 
issues about Japan's role in the international community and level of support for future 
actions can be obtained.64 
63 Giarra, p. 25. 
64 Activities to promote public understanding of the SDF are part of the IDA actions to better infonn and 
involve the public into these forces role in Japan. They are outlined in Defense of Japan, pp. 196-197. 
Additionally, the most recent public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's office in 1995, 
did show an increase in public interest in the activities and missions of the SDF. p. 197. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have looked at Japan's reaction to the reemergence of China as a 
powerful player in East Asia security affairs, particularly as manifest in the 
modernization of the People's Liberation Army. In so doing, I have attempted to answer 
the question, "To what degree has Japan's reevaluation of its security position has been 
infl:uenced by the reemergence of China and how will this 'China factor' continue to 
affect Japan as it inches toward its newly described role?" 
I began by looking at the Sino-Japanese relationship from a historical perspective. 
I found that many of the key events in the modem relations of Japan and China have 
contributed to the development of sources of negative tensions that continue to influence 
this relationship today. Despite the historical animosity, belief in a kind of Japanese 
uniqueness and fear of a remilitarizatized Japan, there is an equal if not greater positive 
trend toward economic interaction and social conduct. In fact, the level of interaction 
between Japan and China, in terms of trade, loans and interpersonal contacts, is the 
highest among any other country (excluding Greater China) with which China has 
relations. The level of Japanese investment into China has increased from approximately 
$349 million in 1990 to over $2.5 billion in 1994. The Japanese trade deficit with China 
in 1995 was almost $14 billion, with imports of almost $36 billion and exports of almost 
$22 billion. It seems to be the case, however, that the deep-seated negative tensions that 
are a result of the history of animosity and destructive actions of Japan continue to arise 
and disrupt relations between the two countries. China continues to use these historical 
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animosities and Japan's history of aggression as a whip to beat Japan with whenever they 
feel threatened by Japanese actions. 
I also found that China's rapidly developing economy has been able to provide the 
fiscal resources necessary for moderate military modernization of the People's Liberation 
Anny (PLA). Based on the Four Modernizations, they reflect militarily the lessons 
learned from China's poor showing in the Sino-Vietnam border war and the performance 
of the allied forces in the Persian Gulf War. From these stimuli China has evolved its 
guiding military doctrine and strategy from that of a "People's War" to a modern version 
oriented on "limited war." This shift is reflected in a broad-based defense doctrine 
comprising the central concepts of local war, active peripheral defense, and rapid power 
projection. It is for these reasons that the China threat is believed to be growing, and 
analysts in Japan lay claim that a "new cold war" has begun. China's concentration on 
modernizing the PLAN is particularly threatening to Japan. A move to develop a blue 
water navy, while arguably aimed at protecting China's territorial sovereignty in the 
South China Sea, is equally disturbing to the security of these sea lanes, through which 
the vast majority of its oil and natural resource imports must flow. 
Japan's effort to modernize its security affairs began with the revision of the 
National Defense Program Outline and the five-year Mid-term Defense Program. These 
constitute the foundation on which the Japanese organize, change and improvement their 
defense system. After reviewing the new changes, this thesis argues that the JSDF is 
well-equipped with modern weapons and as well-trained as can be expected given self-
imposed limitations. It is capable of conducting operations in the defense of Japan and is 
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in the process of restructuring, making force and equipment level changes, and preparing 
to conduct training to meet it new missions. 
Key to meeting the new requirements of the NDPO and MTDP is strengthening 
and employing a joint structure. The problem of Japan's "stove pipe" approach to the 
SDF has not been addressed adequately by systemic reforms. The Joint Staff Council 
continues to be nothing more than an advisory body, and one not responsible, nor greatly 
involved in the separate defense forces. The improvements in command, control and 
communications will go a long way to making the current joint system more 
interoperable and compatible, but does nothing to improve the diffusion of direction at 
the upper levels within the defense establishment. 
The "balanced approach" advanced by the NDPO and the MTDP also has an 
inherent conflict in missions. The new emphasis on multilateral security efforts and 
Japan's role in United Nations peace-keeping missions are restricted greatly by the "Five 
Principles" governing the use of Japanese forces. These limitations, coupled with the 
continued constitutional question on the use of and deployment of Japanese forces 
outside the border of Japan, greatly impair the possibility that Japan will be able to fulfill 
successfully their newly stated role in anything more than a cursory manner. Until the 
conflict between the SDF'-s "new mission" of peace-keeping and the restrictive principles 
for its participation is resolved, Japan's participation can only be nominal. 
The budget has and will continue to be the major arbiter between desire and 
capability. Competition exists between the large host nation support requirements for 
the U.S. forces stationed in Japan and the funds needed to continue the modernization of 
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the Self-Defense Forces. When these two are placed within the context of Japan's current 
economic conditions and the one percent ceiling under which the IDA has worked under 
since 1976, the question of priority becomes real. Resolving this issue is something that 
must be done incrementally and could continue to be a problem for years to come. The 
constraints of the budget and the competition it causes between the SDF's new raison 
d'etre peace-keeping, and the U.S.-Japan security relations must be resolved for Japan to 
finish its modernization for the 21st Century. 
The procedural way in which Japanese security and defense matters are addressed 
and the systematic way the National Defense Program Outline and the Mid-Term Defense 
Program are reviewed, revised and updated make clear that external threat concerns have 
at best a weak influence on the process. While this may simply be a reflection of the 
relatively peaceful nature of the current security environment, it seems clear that at least 
currently, fears of some sort of "China threat" is not directly influencing the process by 
which Japan reviews and modernizes its Self-Defense Forces. The greatest influences on 
the modernization process have come from internal sources. The bureaucratic process and 
system Japan has developed to manage and control its security forces, domestic political 
concerns, the pacifism that has been embraced by a majority of the Japanese people have 
greatly influenced how and what Japan modernizes. 
External factors such as the U.S. security arrangements also have a strong 
influence on the modernization of the Japanese defense forces both directly, through 
limitations on what it will and will not provide, and indirectly in the pressure it puts on 
Japan to increase its portion of this defense commitment. Other external factors such as 
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the growing regional and international structures for security which Japan is both an 
active participant in and a strong endorser of, have had a moderate influence on the 
modernization process both as a forum in which Japan can discuss and address security 
issues, as well as a reason for structural and mission changes to its defense forces. As 
Japan develops these forums, possibly into ones with some sort of enforcement 
mechanism, they will play an even stronger role in the future. 
In that Japan has developed its defense forces and security structure devoid of any 
specific orientation or threat, the reemergence of China in regional and international 
affairs has had almost no direct influence in the modernization process or the orientation 
of the Japanese defense forces. The reaction to China's reemergence, as it impacts on 
Japan's security concerns, is much greater at a higher, strategic and political level and is 
reflected in the U.S.-Japan security relationship. 
The U.S.-Japan security relationship has progressed from a one-sided relationship 
characterized by total dependence to one that though not reciprocal, at least has the two 
countries dealing with each other as more equal partners in providing for the stability and 
security of Japan. It has dealt with changing priorities within each government, economic 
tensions and disputes, yet has remained the most important bilateral relationship in the 
world. 
The influence of China on this relationship has changed over time as well. The 
early stages of the Cold War saw China as a junior partner to the Soviet Union and any 
concern of it from a security perspective was secondary to the Soviet Union and Japan's 
defense forces were developed to defend against this threat. As the Cold War progressed, 
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China's influence grew in the economic and political realms but it remained a lessor 
threat to the Soviet Union in the security arena. With the end of the Cold War and the 
demise of the Soviet Union that China began to have influence into the U.S.-Japan 
security relations, but only weakly. Despite its decline and the economic and political 
troubles, Russia was still seen as the greatest threat. With the focus of the security 
arrangement turned toward stability in the region, China's growing military 
modernization and aggressive actions clearly have became one of the primary concerns of 
the security arrangements and will affect the direction of the relationship. 
The year-long review of the U.S.-Japan security relationship brought about a 
renewed and revitalized desire for cooperation and stability to the region. The emphasis 
ofthe alliance has shifted from one focused on just the defense of Japan to one concerned 
\\ith the broader regional security issues as well. The review process and the Joint 
Declaration which came from it has resulted in a stronger security relationship between 
the United States and Japan than at any time during the Cold War. Prime Minister 
Hashimoto's statement clearly highlights its importance. "There is no other bilateral 
relationship in the world that has any semblance to the Japan-U.S. relationship in the 
present and fundamental importance. I would like to reiterate my determination to further 
enhance the Japan-U.S. relationship for the benefit of not only the two peoples, but also 
for the Asia Pacific region and the world as a whole." 
China's conduct in its seizing of Mischief reef off the coast of the Philippines and 
its naval exercises and missile firings off the coast of and over Taiwan, demonstrate that 
while it may not be a direct threat to Japan, its aggressive actions prove it to be an 
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intimidating presence that introduces instability in the region. Japan's VIgorous 
el).dorsement of the U.S .• Japan security arrangements reflect China's negative influence. 
Japan and the United States have worked closely to develop an environment that 
strives to integrate China. It requires, however, China's continued desire to be an 
involved actor within this established structure. This point was made clear in the Joint 
Declaration on Security by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto on ·17 April 
1996, " .. .it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China 
play a positive and constructive role, and in this context [the peaceful resolution of 
problems in the region], stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation 
with China." The environment and structure of the security relationship between the 
United States and Japan stresses the importance of China and attempts to engage China is 
stabilizing and peaceful ways. It is not an attempt to contain China, though 
miscommunications and misperceptions on either side could cause it to go that way. 
China, more than any other player in the region, controls the way in which relationships 
in the region will develop. Their involvement in various regional and international 
forums and their actions in the region will be the factors that decide the future directions 
of the U.s .• Japan security relations as well as Sino-Japanese and Sino-American 
relations: 
The Japanese, with their "balanced approach" to security in Asia, have carefully 
and incrementally prepared for the 21st Century. By addressing security from bilateral, 
regional/multilateral, and international approaches, Japan has put its relationships on a 
more even keel. It is no longer relying exclusively on the United States-Japan security 
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arrangements nor waiting for the United States to lead the way in its foreign policy. The 
'China factor,' in its small way, has compelled Japan to better prepare itself to deal with 
the United States, its neighbors, as well as the rest of the world, as it prepares for the 21 51 
Century. 
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